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ABSTRACT 
Several experiments are presented to evaluate the development of visuo-spatial short term 
memory from childhood to old age (from five-year-olds to about 70-year-olds). Visuo-
spatial short term memory was assessed through transformational imagery tasks. 
The first set of experiments (chapters 3, 4 and 5) concerned the development of mental 
rotation abilities. A review of the literature suggested that young children (specifically so-
called preoperational children) and elderly people are poor at rotating a mental image of a 
visual pattern. However, as some mental rotation abilities have been reported while using 
Shepard's paradigm, attention was focussed on the role of the first steps necessarily taken 
while performing a mental rotation task, specifically the maintenance of a visual pattern in 
STM. 
The second set of experiments (chapter 6) considered another imagery subsystem, namely 
"mental scanning". Like mental rotation, it requires the maintenance of a visual pattern in 
short term memory. 
Image maintenance ability has been assessed in reference to Kosslyn's (1994) model 
although Baddeley's (1986) working memory model- specifically, Logie's (1995) revision 
of the VSSP - has been sometimes considered while interpreting the data. These two 
different theoretical models suggest the existence of two related but different subsystems for 
sotring visual and spatial information. 
Most of the data presented in this thesis suggest that young children and the elderly have 
some difficulties maintaining spatial characteristics of a visual pattern in short term memory, 
i.e. the orientation of the stimulus in the mental rotation tasks and the location of targets in 
the mental scanning tasks. These results tend to provide some developmental evidence for a 
dissociation between the dorsal and ventral subsystems. It seems that the two subsystems 
develop at different speeds. The ventral subsystem might be better developed earlier than the 
dorsal subsystem. Similarly, some data suggest that the same ventral system is not yet 
affected by ageing when the dorsal subsystem has already begun to deteriorate. 
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Chapter One 
General introduction I 
Think about your very first actions in the morning when you wake up. Your eyes open ... 
Here is vision ! Once our eyes are opened, we are able to capture a huge amount of 
information. We see our environment and decide what actions to take. Visual perception 
guides our behaviour, it is useful for prompting behaviours, for moving around and for 
touching things (Watt, 1991). Vision is part of all our everyday life activities. However, we 
might sometimes have the impression of "seeing" although our eyes are closed. In such 
situations, we are "seeing" mental images of our environment that we have stored in 
memory. We "see" with our mind's eye. Indeed, two related sets of visual representation 
can be activated to preserve the physical characteristics of external objects (e.g. the 
configuration of an environment). The first representation is elaborated when the objects are 
present and constitutes a physical code (i.e. the visual percept) while the second 
representation is actively generated in the absence of external objects - it constitutes a mental 
image (Shepard, 1978). 
We can roughly say that visual perception corresponds to the process of interpreting and 
understanding sensory information (i.e. the light reflected by an object on the retina) 
(Ashcraft, 1994, p. 88). Levine and Shefner (1981) mentioned that "Perception refers to the 
way in which we interpret the information gathered (and processed) by the senses. In a 
word, we sense the presence of a stimulus, but we perceive what it is". What about mental 
images? Finke (1989) has proposed a convenient definition: Mental imagery is defined as 
"the mental invention or recreation of an experience that in at least some respects resembles 
This introduction is adapted from Lejeune (1 993a). 
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the experiences of actually perceiving an object or an event, either in conjunction with, or in 
the absence of, direct sensory stimulation". 
Mental images arise in several everyday activities. We use mental images while solving 
problems, while remembering details of a painting seen in a museum, or while remembering 
whether a friend wears glasses. 
Although it is hard to reject the phenomenological existence of imagery, its scientific 
study is challenging. Indeed, imagery is a subjective phenomenon; it is not directly 
observable. Moreover, mental images are elusive. Consequently, experimental methods are 
needed to infer the properties of imagery in an objective manner and to elicit the images 
themselves (Finke, 1989). 
For these reasons, the history of mental image studies is long and controversial (Denis, 
1989; Le Ny, 1994; Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983). At the end of the 19th century, psychology 
as the "science of mental activities" was the first discipline after philosophy to study the 
mind's eye. Introspection was then used to understand the human mind: Subjects were 
required to report what was going on in their mind. References to mental images were often 
reported. However at the beginning of the 20th century, psychology stated the firm wish to 
become a scientific discipline. Watson's (1913) radical position claiming psychology as the 
"behavioural science" had a dramatic impact on American studies of imagery. These "Ghosts 
in the mind machine" (Kosslyn, 1983) became very rarely studied; they were considered to 
have no functional role in behaviours. The situation was however somehow different in 
Europe where several scientists continued their researches in the field (e.g. Bartlett (1932) 
continued to study visual memory in United Kingdom). It was only in the fifties with neo-
behaviourism that mental imagery was reconsidered in the whole scientific world as a 
possible mediator in human and animal behaviours; for instance, Skinner (1953, p.266) 
referred to operant seeings. 
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In this theoretical evolution, Paivio's (1971, 1986) dual coding theory was probably the 
first integrative theory to reconsider the mental images. Briefly stated, the dual coding theory 
postulates the existence of two classes of phenomena cognitively governed by two 
subsystems functionally and structurally distinct. One subsystem is specialised for the 
representation and the processing of non-verbal or imaginal information, whilst the other is 
specialised for verbal information. Paivio gave imagery a major status in the cognitive 
system. Images, for instance, were shown to be involved in language comprehension (see 
for a brief discussion: Lejeune, 1993e). His model continued to develop in the seventies and 
eighties, and still animates several debates in current research. 
Cognitive psychology and mental imagery 
The birth and the development of cognitivism firmly re-integrated imagery into the field of 
psychology. Since the 1970s, new methodologies have been developed and a huge amount 
of empirical data has been collected. Although different methodologies have been used, 
mental chronometry has been the most valuable source of information. This literature is 
large and it is sufficient for present purposes to highlight two central sets of studies: Mental 
rotation and mental scanning. 
Mental rotation 
Shepard and his associates (for a review, see Shepard & Cooper, 1982) pioneered the 
scientific study of mental rotation. They widely investigated young adults' ability to maintain 
and to rotate a visual image in short term memory. In the first experiment, Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) presented subjects with pairs of perspective line drawings of three-
dimensional objects having no canonical orientation. The objects were identical or mirror 
images of one another, and they differed by rotations that were either in the picture plane or 
in depth, about the vertical axis. The angular difference between the objects systematically 
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varied from trial to trial. The subjects judged whether the objects were identical or were 
different, i.e. whether one of the objects was a mirror-reversed version of the other one. 
Reaction times (RTs) were a linear function of the angular discrepancy. In other words, the 
time to verify that the stimuli were equivalent increased in direct proportion to the angular 
differences between the stimuli. This proportional increase in RTs implied that the mental 
rotations must have been carried out at a constant rate for all the comparisons. 
Shepard and Metzler (1971) suggested that subjects mentally rotate one of the objects 
towards the orientation of the other before carrying out the final comparison. Mental rotation 
resembles the actual rotation of concrete objects or patterns. "Imagined transformations and 
physical transformations exhibit corresponding dynamic characteristics and are governed by 
the same laws of motion" (Finke, 1989, p. 93). 
This principle leads to, at least, two predictions: (1) Mental rotation is holistic, and (2) 
mental rotation is continuous. 
The holistic characteristics of mental rotation have been demonstrated by Cooper (1975) 
and Cooper and Podgorny (1976). They showed that rotation rates are not dependent on the 
complexity of the patterns. While using polygons varying in complexity as stimuli, RTs 
increased linearly with increasing departure from the initial position of the stimulus, and the 
rate of increase was independent of the patterns' complexity. 
Moreover, Cooper (1976) demonstrated that mental rotations are continuous, i.e. mental 
rotations pass through all the intermediate points along the transformational path. Mental 
rotations do not occur as discrete sequences of static images but are carried out in a smooth 
and continuous manner. In a classical experiment, Cooper (1976) presented subjects (who 
already participated in experiments on mental rotation, so that their rotational speed was 
known) with polygons in one of six orientations that they were already familiar with (i.e. 0°, 
60°, 120°). As soon as the pattern was removed, subjects were required to imagine that it 
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was rotating clockwise at their normal rate of mental rotation. While the subjects were 
imagining the rotation of the polygon. a test was presented. either in one of the six familiar 
orientations, or in an intermediate orientation (i.e. 30°, 90°, 150°). Reaction times increased 
linearly with increasing departure of the test stimulus orientation from where the mentally 
rotated pattern should have been at that time (inferred from Cooper's knowledge of 
individual subject's rotational speed). These results suggested that mental rotations are 
continuous. 
Although much chronometrical data supports the conclusions about the dynamic 
characteristics of mental rotation, some psychologists have not been totally convinced and 
several alternative explanations have been offered. Four major groups of criticisms have 
been formulated about imagery results. 
Pylyshyn (1981) as well as Intons-Peterson (1983) has drawn attention to some biases 
related to the task demands and the tacit knowledge subjects may have about the processes 
engaged. The way stimuli are presented and/or the expectations of the experimenter might 
affect subjects' performances. However, as subjects are never told to imagine simulating 
physical motions, mental rotation studies are less susceptible to these criticisms. But, in 
other studies on imagery, it has been demonstrated that experimenter's expectations might 
influence subjects. It has been shown for instance that some of the results of imagery 
studies disappear when the experiment is run by naive experimenters (Intons-Peterson & 
White, 1981). 
It seems that Shepard and Metzler's pioneering study is not the most convincing research 
to prove the analogical nature of mental rotation. Indeed, Just and Carpenter (1978) have 
shown that during such a task, eye movements suggest that subjects are processing the 
stimulus step by step considering only some stimulus segments during the task. 
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Hochberg and Gellman (1977) reported evidence that mental rotation is not always 
continuous and holistic. They showed that the rates of mental rotation were reduced when 
the landmark features of the rotated stimuli became more salient. Consequently, the rate of 
mental rotation might depend on the stimulus characteristics. However, in Hochberg and 
Gellman's (1977) study, it seems that when salient orientational features were included in 
the stimuli, subjects did not have to carry out mental rotations (see Shepard & Cooper, 
1982, for a counter-criticism). 
Finally, when congenitally blind people are required to compare normal and mirror-
reversed versions of patterns (tactile modality), their RTs increased with increasing angular 
disparity (Kerr, 1983; Marmor & Zabeck, 1976). These results suggest that mental rotation 
is not restricted to the visual modality, but can be applied in any sensory modality. 
Mental scanning 
Mental scanning represents another process which has been classically studied in the field 
of imagery. In their pioneering study, Koss1yn, Ball and Reiser (1978) presented subjects 
with a map of an imaginary island which they were to memorise in the form of a mental 
image. Several objects (a hut, a tree, a beach ... ) were drawn on the island. After the 
memorisation of the pattern, the picture of the island was removed. Subjects had to generate 
a mental image of the previously memorised island and to focus their attention on a particular 
detail (e.g. the tree). They were then invited to mentally scan from that location to another 
designated one (e.g. the beach). When "arrived", they pressed a button: Scanning times 
were recorded. Kosslyn et al. (1978) showed that the scanning times were linearly 
dependent on the physical distance separating the two details on the map. Based on these 
results, they suggested that mental images preserve the visuo-spatial extension of the 
external referent. 
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Similar results were reported with other patterns and different procedures: A map 
representing the University Campus of San Bernardino (Evans & Pezdek, 1980); a map of 
Netherlands (Boer, 1991). However, although Kosslyn et al. 's (1978) results have been 
replicated, several criticisms were formulated against these experiments. This was 
particularly true since the generation of an image of an island from a verbal description of 
this pattern yielded similar results (see Denis & Cocude, 1989; Denis & Zimmer, 1992). It 
seems that there is an equivalence between images constructed from verbal descriptions and 
those based on memories for pictorial stimuli. But whatever the results, Denis and Cocude 
(1989) continued to consider that mental scanning is an entirely analogical process. 
Pylyshyn (1984) has been the most sceptical about scanning studies results. He claimed 
that tacit knowledge subjects have about visual scanning rates could be responsible for the 
observed results. Indeed, Mitchell and Richman (1980) have replicated Kosslyn et al. 's 
(1978) results while using another experimental methodology. In this study, subjects were 
not required to scan across a mental image but rather to estimate the scanning times. The 
estimated times matched very closely the image scanning times. 
To avoid these criticisms and especially those related to tacit knowledge, other 
methodologies were used. Finke and Pinker (1982) presented subjects with four dots on a 
screen. When the dots were removed, subjects were asked to image the precise locations of 
the dots. An arrow then was displayed in an unexpected orientation and location, and 
subjects were required to judge as quickly as possible whether the arrow was pointing to one 
of the previously presented dots. Although subjects were not explicitly instructed to scan 
across the pattern, RTs increased linearly with the distance separating the arrow and the 
pointed dot. This new methodology confirmed that imaginal representations preserve the 
visuo-spatial characteristics of the external referent. 
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Visual mental imagery : A representation which is functionally and 
structurally equivalent to visual perception. 
Despite several criticisms and mainly on the basis of chronometrical studies, the image 
and the percept became two distinguished concepts and several models were developed to 
account for these different psychological phenomena. Research showed that mental imagery 
can be considered equivalent to the visual representations associated with the perception of 
visual stimuli. In other words, studies demonstrated that the generation of an image can be 
considered as an afferent activation of perceptual representations identical to those 
automatically activated during the perception of an external stimulus. This idea - going back 
to the philosophical essay of Hume (1739) - was developed by authors such as Hebb 
(1968), Shepard (1978, 1984) and Finke (1980), and an increasing number of studies 
continued to test the functional and structural equivalences between imagery and visual 
perception (Finke, 1985; Finke & Shepard, 1986; Farah, 1988). 
"Imagery is ... (considered to be) functionally equivalent to perception to the extent that 
similar mechanisms in the visual system are activated when objects or events are imagined as 
when the same objects or events are actually perceived" (Finke, 1989). These functional 
equivalences were demonstrated for instance in probe detection tasks using imagined 
features (see Podgorny & Shepard, 1978), or with imagery-induced color aftereffects (see 
Finke & Schmidt, 1977). 
Similarly, "the spatial arrangement of the elements of a mental image corresponds to the 
way objects or their parts are arranged on actual physical surfaces or in an actual physical 
space. This principle requires that mental images, like a physical surface or space, be 
spatially continuous" (Finke, 1989). This principle was evidenced for instance in studies on 
imagined scanning (see Kosslyn, 1973; Pinker, 1980). 
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These characteristics gave rise to the notion of imagery as an analogical representation. In 
cognitive psychology, the representation of an external information is called "analogical" if it 
preserves the structure or other properties of this information without the intervention of a 
symbolic (propositional or numerical) encoding (Doron & Parot, 1991). Mental images 
seem to respect these criteria, and consequently can be considered as analogical 
representations. Indeed, "Visual images have all the attributes of actual objects in the world. 
That is, that they take up some form of mental space in the same way that physical objects 
take up physical space in the world" (Eysenck & Keane, 1990, p. 216). Kosslyn (1980, 
1994) has offered a theoretical model based on these ideas (see later). 
Alternative theories 
However, during this period, several inconclusive debates took place. In the context of 
studies on problem solving (specifically, on deductive reasoning), Huttenlocher (1968) 
suggested that subjects solve the task on the basis of spatial images (a mental space). 
However, this position was contested by Clark (1969) who insisted on the abstract format of 
mental representations used to process syllogisms. 
In addition, the propositionalist school which emerged from late behaviourist criticisms 
(see Anderson & Bower, 1973) had a dramatic impact on imagery studies. Pylyshyn (1973), 
as a representative of this school, considers images as epiphenomena to which functional 
properties are wrongly attributed. A more abstract representation would exist which is not 
equivalent to imaginal nor to verbal representations that propositionalists call amodal 
representation or propositional representation. Propositional representations would be the 
single valid form of representation underlying all types of memory. One argument of the 
propositionalist school is that verbal and visual information has to be connected in some 
way. Consequently, it would be very inefficient to store information permanently in two 
separate codes (as in Paivio's dual coding theory - see above). 
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In this so-called "imagery debate" (see for a review: Tye, 1991), Anderson (1978) has 
proposed the thesis of indetermination. According to this position, we are not in a position to 
clearly differentiate the analogical versus propositional conceptions. Both conceptions could 
be pertinent to account for several imaginal phenomenon; any empirical data could receive 
both interpretations. 
Kosslyn (Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer & Feinstein, 1977) proposed a mixed theory. 
In his first version of his model, Kosslyn (Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith & Schwartz, 1979; 
Kosslyn, 1980) attempts a computational approach to imagery. He accurately describes 
several components of the imagery system and tries to determine the "deep" structure of 
these representations. According to his position, images are representations which preserve 
an analogical correspondence with the represented objects. He considers that imaginal 
processes combine properties from the visual modality (which would be roughly speaking 
analogical) with "profound components" of representations. Propositions could be used to 
describe the infrastructure and the encoding modality of images in long term memory whilst 
the format of images when they are consciously experienced could be analogical (Kosslyn & 
Pomerantz, 1977). Images would have an analogical visual format when they are generated 
in short term memory in a structure called the "visual buffer". 
Imagery and cognitive neurosciences 
Cognitive psychology could hardly answer the objections concerning the nature of mental 
imagery. Consequently, neurological studies were elaborated to resolve this debate. If 
cognitive neuroscience can provide convincing evidence that mental imagery makes use of 
certain regions of the brain that have specialized functions - specifically that imagery shares 
processing sites with visual perception -, one could narrow down the range of possible 
explanations (Finke, 1989). During the 1990s, a huge number of experiments in this field 
have concerned imagery. 
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Experimental and clinical neuropsychology showed that imagery is a process which 
requires the activation of visual processing subsystems. In her systematic review of reported 
cases of brain-damaged patients with imagery impairments, Farah (1984) has shown among 
other things that patients with left posterior hemisphere lesions are impaired in the generation 
of mental images. Such a report questions the widespread belief that imagery is a "right 
hemisphere" skill because of its popular association with "global" processing (Bruyer, 1982; 
Erlichman & Barret, 1983). Studies of subjects with brain focal lesions or 
commissurotomized patients (Farah, Gazzaniga, Holtzman & Kosslyn, 1985) as well as 
studies using lateralized tachistoscopy in normal adults (Farah. 1986) have produced 
evidence that the left hemisphere is involved in the generation of mental images. 
Specifically, these studies showed that imagery involved posterior areas of the brain, i.e. 
involved the visual cortex. 
In a set of experiments, Peronnet and Farah (Peronnet & Farah, 1990; Farah, Peronnet, 
Gonon & Giard, 1988) demonstrated with psychophysiological techniques that the 
generation of mental images activates representations in the visual system. It is well known 
that to generate a mental image of an object (e.g. the letter H) improves the perceptual 
detection of a corresponding visual percept (see Podgorny & Shepard, 1978). Electro-
physiological activity of the brain recorded during the processing of one of these visual 
detection tasks under image generation instructions showed an effect of imagery on the 
temporal and topographical distribution of Event Related Potentials (ERPs). These effects 
were also observed in the occipital regions of the brain, i.e. the visual cortex. 
Similarly, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and regional Cerebral Blood Flow 
(rCBF) studies have clearly confirmed that imagery activates visual cortex (Cohen, Kosslyn, 
Breiter, Di Girolamo, Thompson, Anderson, Bookheimer, Rosen & Belliveau, 1996; 
Deutsch, Bourbon, Papanicolaou & Howard, 1988; Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, 
Willmes, Suess, & Deecke, 1989; Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, & Willmes, 1987; Roland 
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& Friberg, 1985). The activation of these posterior cortical areas suggests that visual 
imagery is a function related to the visual system. 
All these findings that demonstrate that imagery involves an activation of the visual cortex 
cannot easily be explained in terms of propositions or other nonvisual forms of internal 
representation. Indeed, the occipital cortex processes information that is predominantly 
visual. Similarly, tacit knowledge, experimenter's expectations, or other forms of criticisms 
can be ruled out. It is very unlikely that a subject would know, tacitly or otherwise, which 
areas of the brain are supposed to be activated during imagery tasks. Consequently, to quote 
Kosslyn (1994, p. 406) : "We now have strong evidence in favor of depictive 
representations, and a reasonably clear picture of the mechanisms that generate, interpret, 
and use imagery in information processing. ( ... ) We can stop debating about the 
fundamentals, and can address additional questions". 
Kosslyn's theory of imagery revisited: Evidence from the new Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
Kosslyn (1994) reformulated his theory of mental imagery in the light of the new 
cognitive neuroscience, and as a consequence, could reply to the criticisms against the 
concept of imagery. His new theory not only reformulates some ideas about mental imagery 
but also considers the visual cognition as a whole. He integrates data from neural 
computations, neurophysiology (including animal models), and neuroanatomy. The 
"computer metaphor" used in his previous theory (see Kosslyn, 1980) - the Dry Mind - is 
replaced by a new concept: the Wet Mind (see Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). His theory is 
extensively presented as it constitutes the most developed theory of imagery at present. 
The cognitive system is conceived as a functional system composed of neurones 
responsible for several operations (eventually engaged in a particular task). These neurones, 
organised in networks, receive similar INPUT and send similar OUTPUT (Kosslyn, 1987). 
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For particular processing, neurones have to interact rapidly. As a consequence, 
complementary neurones are usually located in similar areas of the brain; it explains the 
localisation of the different psychological functions in the cerebral cortex. 
In Kosslyn's theory, seven major subsystems are identified: the visual buffer, the 
attention window, the object properties encoding system, the spatial properties encoding 
system, the associative memory, the information lookup system, and the attention shifting 
mechanism. 
The Visual Buffer 
The visual buffer is located in the retinotopic areas of the visual cortex (Kosslyn, Alpert, 
Thompson, Maljkovic, Weise et al., 1993). It acts as a two-dimensional space where objects 
are represented as patterns of neuronal activation. The visual buffer is not a physical space 
but rather a functional space, i.e. properties such as position or distance are determined by 
the relations of contiguity between the cells but do not correspond necessarily to physical 
properties of position or distance on the neuronal structure which is the medium of the 
representation. The visual buffer has a limited spatial extent, is elliptic, and has a limited 
resolution which decreases when the pattern is displayed at the periphery of the buffer 
(Finke & Kosslyn, 1980; Finke & Kurtzman, 1981). 
As only a limited amount of information can be processed at a particular time, a mobile 
attention window selects visual input for the next stages of processing. The attentional 
window is conceived as a system which inhibits information that is not under current 
processing. 
The selected information is then simultaneously sent to two sets of subsystems which 
work in parallel. These correspond to the two major visual cortical pathways (Ungerleider 
&Mishkin, 1982): (1) The Ventral System (What System) - or occipito-temporal path -
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which is engaged in the processing of visual properties of objects (colour, shape, texture), 
and (2) the Dorsal System (Where System) - or occipito-parietal path - which is engaged in 
the processing of spatial properties of objects (localisation, orientation, size). 
The Ventral System 
The ventral system encodes objects properties (such as shape, color and texture) and 
matches them to visual representations in Long Term Memory (LTM) to allow object 
recognition. 
A "Preprocessing subsystem" extracts the nonaccidental and signal properties of the input 
image. Nonaccidental properties are edges that are roughly parallel, intersecting, collinear, 
and so on. Signal properties include colored and textured regions that distinguish the object. 
In addition, a "Motion Relation encoding subsystem" encodes the object characteristics 
related to an actual movement of the object. 
The image and extracted properties are sent to the "pattern activation subsystems". The 
mental representation which is most activated by these INPlITS is then "selected": The object 
is visually recognised. 
The Dorsal System 
The Dorsal System operates in parallel with the Ventral System. It encodes a 
representation of location, size, and orientation of each of the perceptual units within the 
attention window. 
The information contained in the Visual Buffer is too incomplete to allow the analysis of 
spatial properties. Indeed, as this information is retinotopically organised, it is considerably 
modified by ocular saccades and head movements. A "Spatiotopic Mapping subsystem" 
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encodes the location, the size and orientation of the object as a whole. It locates accurately 
the objects in space relating information about the eyes, head and body position and the 
visual information in the Buffer. Its OUTPUT can be considered as a set of co-ordinates 
which determines the spatial position of each object present in the visual field. The 
spatiotopic mapping subsystem sends input to the "categorical spatial relations encoding 
subsystem" and to the "coordinate spatial relations encoding subsystem". 
The "Coordinate Spatial Relations Encoding" subsystem encodes metric information 
about location, size and orientation. It sends spatial co-ordinates (i.e. spatial relations) to 
long term memory. This subsystem is located in the posterior parietal area which not only 
receives visual afferences but is also implicated in the control of movement. As a 
consequence, the information related to the localisations could be encoded in a format 
directly usable for moving behaviours. 
The "Categorical Spatial Relations Encoding" subsystem works in parallel with the 
former subsystem. It encodes spatial relations in the format of categorical representations 
(e.g. "connected to", "on", "under", "on the right of' ... ). The categorical representations 
preserve the invariant parameters, i.e. those which do not affect the purely metrical 
properties of the objects. 
Associative Memory, Information lookup and attention shifting 
The information from the Ventral and Dorsal Systems then converge in the associative 
memory (LTM). The information is synthesised and associated to other information kept in 
this amodal memory such as the name, the category, the function, etc. 
The information lookup subsystems and the attention shifting subsystem are used when 
the object is not immediately recognised. They allow the search of other information both in 
the associative memory and in the visual buffer (through a shifting of the attention window). 
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Mental imagery in Kosslyn's (1994) theory 
We have known since the late 1980s that visual imagery shares with visual perception the 
same structures. It has been demonstrated that visual imagery activates the same cortical 
areas of the brain (cf infra). As a consequence, subsystems involved in visual information 
processing should help to explain imagery processes. However, in the case of imagery, the 
INPUT is no longer sensorial but originates in associative memory. The system is acting 
backwards, i.e. the reversed scenario of visual perception: associative memory> dorsal and 
ventral subsystems> visual buffer. 
Moreover, Kosslyn (1994) adds to his model a subsystem called "Configuration shifting" 
to refer to the image transformations (mental rotation, mental scanning ... ). This subsystem 
transforms the patterns in the visual buffer. 
Baddeley's (1986) working memory model 
Another theoretical model which could be considered with interest is Baddeley's (1986) 
working memory model. However, it is concerned with not only visual information but also 
auditory information. Although less explicit on imagery subsystems, the working memory 
model shares some common characteristics with Kosslyn's (1994) model. It will be 
considered only in this context. 
According to Baddeley (1986, 1992), working memory is a system with a limited 
capacity for temporary storage and manipulation during information processing. It includes a 
central executive for complex decision and control processes and a number of subsidiary 
slave systems thought to be involved in specific processing. Two such subsystems were 
envisaged in the original formulation, namely the articulatory loop and the vi suo-spatial 
scratch pad. The former subsystem is thought to act as a subvocal rehearsal buffer and has 
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received the largest share of fruitful research effort. The visuo-spatial scratch pad (VSSP) 
has received rather less attention, and its characteristics are somewhat less clear as a result. 
The VSSP is responsible for storage of visuo-spatial information in short term memory. 
The most interesting aspect of this model for our concern is that Logie and Marchetti (1991) 
have suggested that this system is decomposed into two subsystems: A spatial and a visual 
one. These concepts parallel the dorsal and ventral subsystems in Kosslyn's (1994) model. 
Indeed, visual distractor tasks can interfere with visual, but not spatial, working memory 
(Baddeley, Grant, Wight & Thomson, 1975; Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980). Conversely, 
spatial processing interferes specifically with spatial working memory (Baddeley & 
Lieberman, 1980; Logie & Marchetti, 1991). 
According to Baddeley (1986), VSSP would be involved in the active manipulation of 
mental images. He wrote (1986, p. 143) that "there is good evidence for the occurrence of a 
temporary visuo-spatial store ... that is capable for retaining and manipulating images". 
However, a recent neuropsychological case study of a patient with a left parieto-occipital 
lesion (Morton & Morris, 1995) has demonstrated selective impairment in mental 
transformation in the absence of an impairment in visuospatial working memory. This case 
questions the strict association of VSSP and image transformation. 
Conclusion 
In the present thesis, two imagery subsystems are considered: Mental rotation and mental 
scanning. Neither Kosslyn (1994) nor Baddeley (1992) considered imagery from a 
developmental perspective although it might help to clarify some issues in this field. The 
approach of the present thesis is clearly a developmental one. Abilities in mental rotation and 
mental scanning will be approached in a life-span perspective. 
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Mental rotation as well as mental scanning can be decomposed into several subsystems. 
This thesis sets out to examine the development of these components in order to understand 
the maturation and deterioration of mental rotation and mental scanning. In Kosslyn's 
(1994) theory, many subsystems are engaged in imagery processes. For the sake of clarity, 
only some components will be considered in the present research. These components have 
been selected because they seem to be particularly important when we have to carry out 
mental rotation or mental scanning. Basically, two general components will be considered in 
this thesis: (1) processes engaged in the encoding of a visual pattern (dorsal/spatial and 
ventral/visual subsystems), and (2) processes engaged in the transformation of a mental 
image. 
In Chapter 2, the developmental literature on mental rotation abilities is reviewed. As 
only very few papers have considered the development of mental scanning, these studies 
will be presented in the introduction of Chapter 6. The literature on mental rotation is 
organised into several sections corresponding to the different subsystems supposed to be 
engaged in mental rotation. 
Chapter 3 presents a study which provides information on children's, young adults' and 
the elderly'S ability to carry out a mental rotation of an object in space. To my knowledge, 
this study is the first experiment to assess mental rotation ability with identical tasks across 
ages. 
Vi suo-spatial short term memory with large capacity seems to be particularly necessary to 
carry out transformations of mental images. In Chapter 4, the central issue in this thesis is 
introduced: Is the development of mental rotation abilities dependent on visuo-spatial short 
term memory? A correlational analysis between mental rotation abilities and short term 
memory span for visual patterns is presented. 
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However, according to Kosslyn (1994) and Baddeley (1992), mental imagery functions 
are strongly related to processes engaged in visual and spatial short term memory. They 
suggest that the stimuli are encoded in two parallel subsystems : A visual/ventral and 
spatial/dorsal subsystems. These components encode specific characteristics of the visual 
pattern. The visual component encodes the "visual" characteristics, i.e. color, texture, 
shape, etc. The spatial component encodes the "spatial" characteristics, i.e. orientation, 
location, etc. Both subsystems are engaged in the encoding of a visual pattern. In Chapter 
5, vi suo-spatial short term memory is no longer considered as a single structure but is 
decomposed into these two sub-components. The role of the localisation processes is 
particularly assessed in three consecutive experiments. 
Chapter 6 generalises the conclusions of previous chapters to another mental imagery 
subsystem: Mental scanning. Vi suo-spatial short term memory capacity is assessed and its 
impact on mental scanning abilities is analysed. 
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Chapter Two 
Development of mental rotation : 
Studies of children and elderly people 
As described in the general introduction, imagery studies have developed dramatically 
since the 1970s, and still more clearly in the 1990s. Imagery as a whole has received much 
attention not only from classical cognitive psychologists but also from cognitive 
neuroscientists. It has allowed an integrative approach of imagery. 
Another valuable source of knowledge about imagery could be provided by 
developmental psychology. Developmental psychology might help to clarify some 
controversies in this field of research. As mentioned by Mandler (1983) and Paivio (1986), a 
developmental approach could allow, for instance, some clarification of a potential 
distinction between an analogical versus propositional format of imagery. But more 
interestingly, a developmental approach - especially if considered in a life-span perspective-
could bring us some information about how the different subsystems postulated in 
Kosslyn's (1994) theory evolve with age. Are all subsystems equally developed in 
childhood? Are they affected equally by ageing? Can we identify developmental trends 
among the different subsystems? 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, several theoretical models of imagery were 
formulated in the 1980's, and all of them state the composite character of the imagery system 
(e.g. Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, 1994). A common aspect of these models is that they 
propose the generation and the transformation of mental images. The generation of images 
refers to processes which allow subjects to create an image in mind; they "see" what an apple 
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looks like, they remember the face of their closest friend. These images are generated from 
information kept in an associative memory (see Kosslyn, 1994). In contrast, the 
transformation refers to a set of subprocesses which modify the content of images or animate 
them through particular movements. Image transformations are defined by their dynamic 
characteristics. Subjects can scan across mental images, they can increase or reduce its size, 
they can mentally rotate an image. This distinction between image generation and image 
transformation is useful in a developmental approach. 
This review considers the development of one imagery subsystem: "Mental rotation". 
Roger N. Shepard and Lynn A. Cooper referred to this term in the 1970s while carrying out 
a number of classical experiments (see chapter 1). The process is classically used for 
instance when we have to identify what the letter p looks like when 1800 rotated. 
Cooper and Shepard (1973b) referred to a specific algorithm to describe mental rotation 
processes. When particular characters or figures have to be compared or identified, their 
structure and orientation are first globally encoded in short term memory. Second, a 
transformational process is activated to rotate a mental image of the stimulus to its canonical 
or learned orientation. When mental rotation has been carried out, the mental image of the 
object is compared with the referent. When the image is in congruence with its referent, we 
respond. 
In terms of Kosslyn's (1994) theory, the first step probably corresponds to the activation 
of the ventral and dorsal subsystems which send their OUTPUT to the associative memory 
(which allows object recognition). The second step corresponds to the activation of the so-
called "Configuration shifting" subsystem which transforms the patterns in the visual buffer. 
The third phase allows a comparison between the information in the visual buffer and the 
representation ofthe corresponding information in the associative memory. 
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Previous reviews (see Dean, 1990; Lautrey & Chartier, 1991) have considered the 
development of mental imagery as a whole. They argued that young children are very poor at 
transforming mental images. However, such an approach is misleading. These authors seem 
to consider imagery as an undifferentiated system. They reviewed the literature as if there 
would be just one general system which deals with imagery. Such a conception supposes 
that the different imaginal abilities (mental rotation, mental scanning, etc.) develop at the 
same speed since they belong to the same general system. Or in other words, to acquire 
knowledge on the development of one subsystem gives us information on the other 
subsystems (in Dean, 1990, and Lautrey & Chartier, 1991, they used mainly mental rotation 
studies to infer a general theory on the development of imagery). Such an approach is 
incorrect. Indeed, computational, neuropsychological, differential as well as developmental 
studies have clearly demonstrated the specificity of each imagery subsystem (e.g. Kosslyn, 
Flynn, Amsterdam & Wang, 1990; Farah, 1984; Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave & Wallach, 1984; 
Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf & Daly, 1990). 
This chapter reviews only the development of mental rotation. Studies are organised 
around Shepard's basic algorithm. Both children's and the elderly's capacities are 
considered and their difficulties are categorised in terms of the different steps they 
necessarily take during a mental rotation task. 
Stimulus encoding 
When an adult is confronted with a visual stimulus, he spontaneously extracts global 
characteristics of the structure and the orientation of the perceived objects. During this first 
processing, which covers in fact several parallel processes, the object is recognised. 
Stimulus recognition is fundamentally based on a dissociation between two main processing 
sets: the perception and the elaboration of the percept, and the comparison of this percept 
with representations kept in memory. 
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Stimulus recognition is not extensively considered here, however we must be conscious 
that this step necessarily precedes the activation of the mental rotation processes per se (see 
for a discussion on the recognition of misoriented shapes: Corballis, 1988; or for a broader 
discussion of the models of visual cognition: Pinker, 1984; Humphreys & Bruce, 1991; 
Kosslyn, 1994). Pinker (1984) grouped the different theories of object recognition into 
three categories: (1) Viewpoint-independent models, (2) Multiple-views models, and (3) 
Single-view-plus-transformation models. In the Viewpoint-independent models, a single 
representation is attributed to the object independently of its size, orientation or position. 
Marr's (1982) theory falls into this category. His approach is to use simple, low-level 
properties of an object's shape, such as axes of elongation, to define a reference frame 
intrinsic to the object. The shape of the object can then be represented in terms of relation of 
the object's parts to its intrinsic reference frame. This description yields to an "object-
centered" representation. Because intrinsic reference frames change orientation with the 
object, object-centered representations are orientation-invariant. In the Multiple-views 
models, an object is represented in a set of representations, each associated with a familiar 
orientation. The object is recognised when it matches one of them. Finally, in the Single-
view-plus-transformation models, the objects are represented in a single viewer-centred 
orientation and the recognition is reached through transformation processes which convert a 
representation of the perceived object into a canonical orientation kept in memory, or which 
match memory representations with the perceived form. The mental rotation process has 
been proposed to be a candidate for this transfonnation process. 
However, many studies in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology suggest that 
mental rotation is not always used when we have to recognise "misoriented objects". 
Corballis (1988) has suggested that mental rotation would be only used when the 
identification or recognition tasks are unusual or difficult. It would particularly be the case in 
a handedness recognition task where discriminations between nonnal and mirror-reversed 
versions of the stimuli have to be realised. On the contrary, faster mechanisms would be 
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used when the stimuli are simple or highly familiar. For instance, Corballis, Zbrodoff, 
Schetzer and Butler (1978) have shown that RTs to name rotated alphabetical characters do 
not depend on the stimulus orientation, and Eley (1982) has reported a similar flat RT trend 
in a task requiring the identification of misoriented letter-like symbols. 
However, the familiarity of the stimuli does not always seem to prevent the use of 
transformation processes. Jolicoeur (1985, 1988, 1990) and McMullen and Jolicoeur (1992) 
have shown that the time to name misoriented line drawings of familiar objects and animals 
increases systematically as a function of stimulus orientation. The recognition of a 
disoriented natural object requires the alignment of visual inputs with the stored 
representations through a normalisation process (Ullman, 1989). Naming time functions 
seem to reflect a transformation process related to mental rotation. This suggests spatial 
processing similar to those carried out in mental rotation tasks. 
In these chronometrical studies, the slope of the RT function has been used as a criterion 
to state whether a mental rotation process has been used to recognise the misoriented object. 
Indeed, Metzler and Shepard (1974; quoted from Shepard & Cooper, 1982) wrote that "The 
subject... can perform mental rotation at no faster than some limiting rate". Cohen and 
Kubovy (1993) summarised the data mentioning that a rate of 1 mslrotational degree is the 
limiting value in interpreting the RT slopes as evidence for a mental rotation process. This 
limiting value is based on reported data in several published papers (e.g. Corballis, 
Zbrodoff, Shetzer & Butler, 1978, p.100 : 0.97 ms/degree; Takano, 1989, p.35 : loooo/s.; 
Tarr & Pinker, 1989, p.256 : 0.78 ms/degree). As in many object identification studies 
recognition time has been shown to be below this value (e.g. Jolicoeur & Landau, 1984; 
Takano, 1989), another process might be used while naming misoriented objects. In fact, 
Jolicoeur (1990) has suggested a dual-system model of object identification in which a slow 
normalisation process - i.e. mental rotation - is needed to maintain the spatial relations 
among stimulus features so that these descriptions might be mapped onto memory 
representations (Koriat & Norman, 1989; McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1992). However, with 
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practice, subjects are able to name the objects more quickly, and the steepness is reduced to 
less than the value mentioned above. It seems that subjects shift from an analogue-
transformation process to a feature-based system when knowledge is acquired about the 
objects to be identified (Murray, Jolicoeur, McMullen & Ingleton, 1993). It is only under 
particular conditions - namely, when orientation-invariant information is difficult to isolate -
that subjects continue to rely upon an alignment system to recognise misoriented objects 
(Tarr & Pinker, 1989). Apparently, object recognition can be reached through two different 
but related transformation processes during repetitive presentations of natural objects. 
Mirror-reversed versus normal discriminations and object naming activate related spatial 
processes which tend to become independent with practice. According to Murray, 
Jolicoeur, McMullen and Ingleton (1993), the diminution of the orientation effect with 
practice could be explained by learned representations which keep orientation-invariant parts 
or attributes, independently of their spatial relations. In terms of Biederman's (1987) 
theory, one source of orientation-invariant parts may be geometric primitives called geons, 
derived from viewpoint-invariant nonaccidental properties of the stimulus. 
Neuropsychological data also support object recognition models increasing the standing 
of hypothesised relations between viewers and objects. However, some single case studies 
suggest a dissociation between mental rotation and rotated object recognition: L.B., a 
commissurotomized subject, who was very poor at mentally rotating letters presented to the 
left hemisphere, was well able to identify the same letters in varying orientations (Corballis 
& Sergent, 1989). Similarly, Farah and Hammond (1988) have reported clear evidence for a 
dissociation between mental rotation and object recognition abilities. Their patient R.T., who 
had a large right frontotemporoparietal lesion, was presented with different mental rotation 
and object recognition tasks. While he preserved the aptitude to recognise rotated objects, he 
performed badly in the different mental rotation tasks. 
In this section, I consider whether these components affect children's and elderly 
people's performances in mental rotation tasks. First, are they able to recognise misoriented 
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stimuli ? Second, are they able to encode and to maintain visual information in short term 
memory ? 
Studies of children 
Object recognition 
So far as children's ability to recognise rotated stimuli is concerned, many empirical 
studies (e.g. Bower, 1967; Gibson, Owsley & Jonhson, 1978) have demonstrated object 
constancy across changes in orientation in infants. 
Spelke and associates (Kellman & Spelke, 1983; Spelke, 1985) have run a number of 
experiments to test young infant's object knowledge and identification of object features to 
which they respond. Using an habituation paradigm, they demonstrated that separated 
fragments of an object are interpreted as parts of a single object if they undergo a common 
motion. 
Kellman and associates (Kellman, 1984; Kellman & Short, 1987) confirmed that infants 
abstract information about geometric form from kinetic information. In their studies, three-
dimensional objects were presented under several orientations. When four-months-old 
infants observed a continuously moving stimulus, they recognised it across changes in 
orientation. However, two different views of a single form seen in a static view (without 
being presented with the rotational motion between the two end-states of the form) were not 
considered as identical. 
Testing older children (five and eight-year-olds), Lejeune (l992b, 1996) clearly showed 
that they have no difficulty in naming misoriented familiar objects, an ability which was 
shown to be independent of mental rotation ability. Subjects who achieved good 
performance in object recognition tasks often performed very poorly in mental rotation tasks. 
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This suggests that the ability to recognise misoriented objects emerges well before the ability 
to mentally rotate an image. However, Lejeune's (1992b, 1996) studies could be criticised. 
It might be that the two sets of tasks were not matched for difficulty. In particular, the object 
recognition tasks could have been much easier. However, as Farah and Hammond (1988, 
p. 42) mentioned: "Could it be the case that mental rotation is simply harder than orientation-
invariant object recognition, and that this alone accounts for the observed dissociation 
between the two types of task? Mental rotation may well be harder than orientation-
invariant object recognition, but if this is true then our case has already been made: 
Logically, it cannot be true both that mental rotation is harder than orientation-invariant 
object recognition and that mental rotation is required for (Le., a component of) orientation-
invariant object recognition". 
Maintenance of visual information in short term memory 
Does this mean that a reason for children's failure in mental rotation tasks should be 
sought in the development of visuo-spatial memory ? 
Childs and Polich (1979) and Waber, Carslon and Mann (1982) considered this problem 
in examining differences in performance between children and adolescents. Subjects were 
asked to decide whether rotated stimuli were normal or mirror-reversed. Without advance 
information about the structure and the orientation of the test character, RTs increased with 
the departure of the stimulus from its upright orientation as in classical experiments (see 
Cooper & Shepard, 1973a). The chronometrical index suggested that subjects mentally 
rotated stimuli into congruence. In another condition, subjects were provided with structural 
and orientational information about the object that was to be presented. Provided with such 
information, they were expected to generate a mental image of the pattern in a particular 
orientation before the presentation of the target and, as a consequence, were expected to 
respond uniformly and rapidly to all orientational conditions. Indeed, in such situations, 
27 
when young adults are presented with information on the forthcoming target, their answers 
are the same for all orientational conditions, i.e. RTs are no longer dependent on stimulus 
orientation but rather a flat function is observed. It is classically interpreted that this flat 
function suggests that young adults, when provided with information, do not carry out 
mental rotation. This RT pattern was expected in children and adolescents. However, 
although younger subjects (9-year-olds) claimed to generate an imaginal representation of the 
stimulus, RT curves strongly suggested that they did not. RTs still depended on the stimulus 
orientation just as in a condition without advance information. The authors concluded that 
children can use mental rotation strategies to solve the problem, but are impaired in preparing 
and maintaining visuo-spatial information for 1000 msec in short term memory. 
Could we reasonably suppose that young children are not able to maintain visual 
information for 1000 msec in working memory? Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf 
and Daly (1990) demonstrated that the maintenance of visual images is far superior to 1000 
msec in 5-year-olds; it is indeed equal to at least 3 seconds. Moreover, Wilson, Scott and 
Power (1987) showed that the memory span for visual patterns does not decrease between 2 
and 10 seconds in five-year-olds. Such empirical evidence calls the previous interpretation 
into question. 
In Childs and Polich (1979) and Waber, Carlson and Mann (1982), visual short term 
memory was conceived as a single structure. However, since the development of 
Baddeley's working memory model, and still more specifically, Logie's (1995) revision of 
the visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSSP) - the slave system in charge of the maintenance of visuo-
spatial information -, we know that visual short term memory is a dual structure where 
visual and spatial information are encoded separately. 
Similarly, recent computational models of high-level vision subsystems (Kosslyn, 1994; 
Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992) could help us to reinterpret these data. As mentioned in the 
general introduction, two sets of subsystems (corresponding to the two major visual cortical 
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paths in brain) have been identified in these models: The first path, classically referred to as 
the ventral system - or occipito-temporal path - analyses the structure of the stimulus, whilst 
the second path, referred to as the dorsal system - or occipito-parietal path - considers the 
spatial dimensions of the stimulus. It would be worth identifying developmental trends of 
these two subsystems in the context of mental rotation tasks. It could be that the information 
young children forget during the 1000 msec retention interval is more related to spatial 
characteristics, i.e. the stimulus orientation, rather than structural characteristics of the 
stimulus. 
Complexity of the stimuli 
The idea of a poor encoding of the stimuli in mental rotation task was suggested both in 
Kail, Pellegrino and Carter's (1980) and in Carter, Pazak and Kail's (1983) studies. They 
demonstrated not only that the speed of mental rotation increases with development but that 
unfamiliar characters (abstract shapes from Thurstone's P.M.A. task versus alphanumeric 
characters, i.e. familiar characters) require more time to be rotated, encoded and compared. 
However, it is unclear whether the reported results were due to the complexity of the stimuli 
or due to the experimental procedure. Although in both tasks two stimuli were presented 
simultaneously (one upright stimulus and one rotated stimulus), it could be that subjects did 
not use the upright version of the alphanumeric character to carry out the comparison but 
rather used the mental representation of the letter they had in L TM. As a consequence, when 
submitted to this version of the task, subjects were, in a way, confronted with a mental 
rotation task where a single shape was presented. We know that such task lead to higher 
rotational speed (see Shepard & Cooper, 1982). The authors might have then wrongly 
attributed the effect on RTs to stimulus complexity. It would rather be due to the 
experimental procedure. 
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Rosser, Ensing, Glider and Lane (1984) and Rosser, Ensing and Mazzeo (1985) also 
considered the issue. They tested the role of stimulus features in the prediction of the 
appearance of rotated objects. They showed that to add at least one orientational marker to 
poor stimuli such as squares or other simple geometric figures increases success rates in 
young children (4- and 5-year-olds). 
However, these results lead to a dilemma. Adding orientational features improves 
children perfonnances but also increases both the difficulty of encoding the stimulus and the 
memory load. The more features there are, the more difficult it is to keep them in short tenn 
memory. A way to solve this issue is to suggest that only orientational features are encoded 
and later rotated. Such a hypothesis is consistent with some data collected in adults (e.g. 
Carpenter & Just, 1978) suggesting that they rotate part of the figure. Similarly, Bialystok 
(1989) has shown that children (9- and ll-years-old) encode only critical features (those 
related to the orientation of the stimulus) and not the whole figure. Such results could be 
partially related to Lejeune's (1994) findings which suggest that before the emergence of 
mental rotation abilities in children, the strategies used are based on a perceptual analysis of 
the location of some stimulus details. 
Studies of elderly people 
Object recognition 
In a review of the literature, Bmyer (1994) has suggested that ageing has little effect on 
visual recognition. When deficits are reported, they rather concern low level vision. For 
instance, Fozard (1990) reported that ageing affects sensitivity to luminosity and spatial 
resolution (e.g. visual acuity, contrast sensitivity or depth perception). Specifically, Hoyer 
(1990) has suggested that ageing might affect localisation processes (see Kosslyn's (1994) 
model) but not object identification. 
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Visuo-spatial short term memory 
No study has considered the effect of ageing on visuo-spatial memory in connection with 
the development of mental rotation abilities. However, it seems that visuo-spatial memory 
span decreases with age. In a recent study, Feyereisen and Van der Linden (1992) showed 
that ageing does affect spatial memory span (measured with the block-tapping test). 
Similarly, Dror and Kosslyn (1994) showed that image maintenance is affected by age. 
Transformational phase: The mental rotation itself 
Studies of children 
Piagetian perspective 
Before the mid seventies, most of the studies on the development of mental imagery in 
children had been carried out by Piaget and Inhelder (1966). Two major questions were at 
the origin of their work: (1) Is mental imagery a by-product of perception or is it a 
reproductive mechanism like imitative behaviours, (2) Is the development of imagery 
independent of other intellectual abilities or is it related to the development of "operations" ? 
To assess their ideas, Piaget and Inhelder (1966) tested broad samples of children in 
several experimental conditions. It appeared in most of their studies that so-called 
"preoperational children" (i.e. children younger than about 7 years of age) were particularly 
poor in image transformational tasks. Consequently, Piaget postulated that only reproductive 
images are present in young children: Children are able to generate static images of an object 
or a scene but cannot transform them. It is only after the age of seven or eight that 
anticipatory images appear: Children become able to implement transformations of images 1. 
Interestingly enough, dreaming studies in subjects younger than seven-years-old suggest that children's 
dreams are simple and static (e.g. Foulkes, 1982). 
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These imaginal transformations are only possible when children can distinguish the invariant 
parameters of the object, and have explicitly understood the transformation itself. According 
to this hypothesis, the development of mental imagery would parallel the development of 
"concrete operations". The static character of images before age seven would depend on the 
preoperational tendency of the child to centre himself (herself) on the objects and to ignore 
them when they are moved from an initial position to a final one. The child does not 
understand that the parts of the moving object change their position in a co-ordinated way. 
As a consequence, preoperational children would distort one or more of its properties. 
Moreover, he thinks that any imaginal anticipation of movement presupposes that the images 
follow one another in order of succession, which derives from operational seriation; the 
child would need to understand the logical sequence of movement to imagine correctly the 
transformation imposed on the object. Clearly, the Piagetian conception was developed in a 
context which tended to attribute a symbol status to mental imagery (see Meyerson, 1923). 
The image is no longer an extension of perception, it seems to be a product of the 
interiorization of intellectual acts: It is an interiorized imitation. Such ideas were at that time 
suggested in psychophysiological work (e.g. Rey, 1947, 1948; Jacobson, 1931). 
However, the relationship observed between motor activities and imagery would be now 
interpreted as an effect of motor imagery, used for instance in mental rehearsal techniques in 
sport training (see Murphy & Jowdy, 1992), rather than visual imagery. 
The information-processing approach 
Cognitive psychology has considered the development of mental imagery, mainly through 
mental rotation processes. Shepard and Metzler's (1971) paradigm has been applied in 
developmental studies. Most of the time, mental chronometry has been used to assess 
Piagetian ideas. Specifically, several studies tried to determine whether mental imagery is 
static or kinetic in young children. However, at present, no empirical evidence has been 
brought to explain the origin of mental imagery; only Kosslyn (1981) and Shepard (1984, 
1988) have suggested some hypotheses about the genesis of this cognitive function. 
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It is common to distinguish between the origin of imaginal representations and 
transformational imagery processes. Structures and processes might be innate, but the 
content of mental images would be - of course - acquired through visual experiences (see 
Dean, 1990). 
Shepard (1984, 1988; see also Lejeune, 1992a) has offered the most developed theory of 
the origin of mental imagery. Humans move and live in a three-dimensional world in part 
populated with mobile objects. The constraints on mobility imposed by this three-
dimensional space would be physical invariants which have prevailed throughout biological 
evolution; Evidence for mental rotation abilities has been reported in baboons (see for 
instance: Vauclair, Fagot & Hopkins, 1993) and in very young human subjects (see 
Darcheville, Bideaud & Devos, 1992). Among these constraints, the kinetic component 
(governing the displacement or the spatial transformation between objects, and between 
objects and us) would be essential. Stable spatial transformational rules based on the six 
degrees of freedom of the environment would have interiorized: Three translational 
components (up-down, left-right, backward-forward) and three rotational components 
(angular shifts of attitude, pitch, yaw - in aeronautical parlance). 
It is in this particular space that mental rotation would take place. Mental rotation would 
respect intrinsic characteristics of this space and consequently would respect the "least action 
principle": The constructed and mentally used path would tend to be the simplest and 
shortest one in a set of possibilities. Lejeune (1993b) showed that the representation of 
rotational movement in three-year-olds respects this principle. 
Empirical work: Evidences from mental chronometry 
Marmor (1975) used Shepard's paradigm to study the development of mental rotation 
capacities in young children. She presented five and eight-year-olds with pairs of panda 
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shapes differing in orientation by a rotation in the picture plane. Children were instructed to 
imagine visually the rotation of one of the pandas to superimpose it on the other one, and to 
determine after the rotation whether the two pandas were the same or different. The pandas 
could have the same or different legs raised. One of the stimuli was rotated by 30°, 60°, 120° 
or 150°. RTs served as an evidence for the use of mental rotation. Results indicated that 
young children could use kinetic imagery: RTs showed a significant linear relationship with 
stimulus orientation as in young adults (see figure 1). It should be emphasized that, in this 
experiment, children were instructed to imagine the rotation of the patterns. Consequently, 









'.::1 c: 3 ~~ 
~ 2 .--
... • 
o 30 60 90 120 150 
Stimulus orientation 
(in degrees) 
Errors (in %) 
5-year-olds : 5,4 - 5,4 - 13,3 - 20,4 
8-year-olds : 2,5 - 2,5 - 06,7 - 12,1 
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(squares). Adapted from Mannor (1975). 
34 
Although several studies have replicated Marmor's results (Courbois, 1994; Dean, 
Scherzer & Chabaud, 1986; Hatakeyama, 1989; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barret, Goldknopf & 
Daly, 1990; Kerr, Corbitt & Jurkovic, 1980; Lejeune & Decker, 1994; Marmor, 1977), 
others have failed (Dean, Duhe & Green, 1983; Dean & Harvey, 1979). One possible 
explanation for such failure might be the nature of the stimuli used in these experiments. The 
later two studies used abstract shapes as stimuli which might be more difficult to encode. 
In addition to reporting a linear trend of RTs as a function of stimulus orientation, 
Marmor (1975) also suggested that mental rotation speed evolves with age. The increasing 
of rotational speed with age has also been reported by Carter, Pazak and Kail (1983), Kail 
(1985) and Kail, Pellegrino and Carter (1980). Several explanations have been offered for 
this. Kail, Pellegrino and Carter (1980) first suggested that a global transformational 
processes could explain the lower rotational speed in young children. In older subjects, just 
one part of the stimulus would be rotated which would result in higher rotational speed. 
However, this hypothesis has been later rejected in favour of a general reduction of 
processing time in children (Kail, 1991, 1993; Kail & Park, 1990). Whatever the task, RTs 
at a particular age could be expressed by RTe = me RTa (with RTc for the Response time in 
children at a particular task, me as a variable which is function of age - me is constant at a 
particular age and decreases as an exponential function of age to reach the value of 1 at 
adulthood -, and RTa as the value of RT in young adults in a corresponding task). The 
change in rotational speed is not specific to mental rotation but is also observed in other 
tasks. 
Shepard and Metzler (1971) demonstrated that mental rotation obeys the same rules when 
stimuli are rotated in depth. However, all the developmental studies mentioned so far used 
two-dimensional stimuli rotated in the frontal plane. Two studies tested mental rotation in a 
three-dimensional space in young children: Foulkes and Hollified (1989) and Lejeune and 
Decker (1994). 
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In the first experiment, although the performance of five to six-year-olds was as good as 
that of young adults, the classical linear RTs trend was not reproduced in five-year-olds 
either for two- or three-dimensional rotations. On the contrary, in the second experiment, 
RTs with a linear trend were observed in six, seven and ten-year-olds for two-dimensional 
rotations, but was only observed in the younger children for depth rotations. Moreover, 
error rates increased in younger children in the three-dimensional condition. Lejeune and 
Decker (1994) suggested that an imaginal processes was used for frontal rotations in all 
subjects but, in the older subjects, logical reasoning might be used for three-dimensional 
rotations. Such interpretation is in congruence with the hypothesis which states that the 
development of imagery goes from an analogical mode to a more propositional (abstract ?) 
mode (see for instance: Dean, Duhe & Green, 1983; Lautrey & Chartier, 1991). Divergences 
between Foulkes and Hollifield's and Lejeune and Decker's studies are difficult to interpret. 
However, it should be noticed that stimuli and stimulus orientations were different in these 
two studies. In Foulkes and Hollified's study, stimuli were rotated by only 0°,30°,60° and 
150° rotated. 
In summary: Compromises between the Piagetian and the information-processing 
approaches? 
New methodologies (especially mental chronometry) have allowed psychologists to 
examine the development of mental rotation abilities. Does it mean that the Piagetian 
position has to be definitely abandoned? 
In fact, several studies have systematically tested the relationship between mental rotation 
abilities and the operational level of development (see Dean, Scherzer & Chabaud, 1986; 
Foulkes, Sullivan, Hollifield & Bradley, 1989; Hatekeyama, 1989; Kerr, Corbitt & 
Jurkovic, 1980; Marmor, 1977). Generally, no correlation appeared between mental rotation 
abilities and the operational level of development. 
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However, a Piagetian approach is not totally irrelevant in imagery studies. Methodologies 
used by the information-processing school are just different (Dean, 1990; Mandler, 1983; 
Lautrey & Chartier, 1991). In Piaget and Inhelder's (1966) studies, drawings, statements or 
gestures were used to extemalise the mental representations; such methods might not be 
good methods to study the development of children's representations (Kosslyn, Heldmeyer 
& Locklear, 1977; Kosslyn, 1980; Marmor, 1977). All Piagetian tasks require the child to 
have an explicit knowledge of the processes used to solve the task. On the contrary, in 
information-processing studies, an implicit knowledge is sufficient to solve the task. As a 
consequence, the two approaches might deal with different aspects of the development of 
imagery. 
In fact, Dean, Duhe and Green (1983) and Lautrey and Chartier (1991) have suggested 
that spatial cognition would evolve from an analogical to a propositional format. The 
analogical representation would allow children to mentally represent transformations without 
an explicit representation of the transformation. These analogical representations would 
allow the prediction of successful anticipation of end-states in a transformational task (see 
for instance some results reported in Piaget & Inhleder, 1966, Dean et ai., 1986; Marmor, 
1975). On the contrary, the propositional representations would be based on abstract and 
logical rules. They would result in an explicit knowledge of the transformation. During the 
preoperational period (in Piaget's parlance), children's kinetic images would be global units. 
They would become progressively differentiated and abstracted in sequences with 
meaningful relations during the next developmental stage. Very young children, who 
succeed in end-state comparison tasks such as those used classically by Shepard (see 
Shepard & Cooper, 1982) may be able to imagine rotations by using a qualitatively different 
mental imagery than do older children. 
Although interesting, the hypothesis offered by Lautrey and Chartier (1991) is too 
general. Consequently, other empirical studies will be necessary to test their hypothesis. 
What can be remembered from their approach is the distinction between implicit and explicit 
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knowledge of the transformation. It seems that this distinction could account for the 
differences between Piagetian and infonnation-processing studies. 
Studies of elderly people 
If many empirical works have tested the development of mental rotation abilities in 
children, very few studies have considered the ability of the elderly. All the published work 
has used an infonnation-processing approach, and has applied Shepard's paradigm. 
At present, there is no elaborated theory on the effect of ageing on imagery abilities. 
However, we know that imagery has a complex underlying structure (see Kosslyn's (1994) 
model presented in the general introduction). The imagery subsystems result from the 
workings of specific regions of the brain. Hence, changes in the brain with ageing could 
selectively affect different aspects of individual cognitive functions (Bruyer, 1994; Dror & 
Kosslyn, 1994). 
Empirical works: Evidence from mental chronometry 
Johnson and Rybash (1989) reviewed several studies on mental rotation abilities in 
elderly (Berg, Hertzog & Hunt, 1982; CerelIa, Poon & Fozard, 1981; Gaylord & Marsh, 
1975; Hertzog, Vernon & Rypma, in press; Jacewicz & Hartley, 1979; Puglisi & Morrell, 
1986; Sharps & Gollin, 1987). 
Some of these studies reported slower rotation rates in elderly (e.g. CerelIa, Poon & 
Fozard, 1981; Dror & Kosslyn, 1994; Gaylord & Marsh, 1975), others did not report 
differences between elderly people and young adults (e.g. Jacewicz & Hartley, 1979). 
However, it has to be mentioned that in the later study, for instance, subjects as young as 
56-years-old composed the group of elderly people. Age of the subjects might explain the 
differences in performance. Moreover, stimuli and procedures varied in the different 
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experiments (letters, human figures, etc). These differences could also explain the different 
results reported so far (see Sharps, 1990). 
Considering the different published works as well as the performance of elderly people in 
other imagery tasks (mental scanning, image maintenance, etc), Dror and Kosslyn (1994) 
proposed an explanation for the difficulties elderly people encounter in mental rotation tasks. 
They suggest that a deficit in spatial location could explain their poor performance; however, 
it is not clear how this explanation works (this issue will be reconsidered later). 
Many studies have also considered the modification of response times with ageing (see 
Welford, 1988). All of them demonstrated that ageing increases response times. Reviewing 
the literature, Feyereisen (1994) suggested that this general slowing down might be due to 
both sensori-motor deficits and modifications of central operations, i.e. attentional 
mechanisms, signal identification, selection and control of action. 
Conclusion 
The present chapter addressed the question of the evolution of mental rotation capacities 
from childhood to old age. The literature has been reviewed through Cooper and Shepard's 
(1973b) algorithm: (a) The encoding phase and the maintenance of visual information in 
short term memory, (b) The mental transformation of the stimulus (mental rotation itself). 
At first glance, we may be surprised to notice the similarity between the abilities of 
children and the elderly. Both groups encounter similar difficulties while carrying out a 
mental rotation task. However, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions since age 
categories, stimuli, and experimental conditions are often different in the reported 
experiments. 
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If we accept Shepard's (1988) theory of the origin of imagery subsystems which 
postulates an innate origin for all transformational imagery subsystems, we should admit that 
the difficulties encountered both by children and the elderly should be sought in other related 
cognitive subsystems. Indeed, the innate origin of transformational subsystems seems to be 
plausible since mental rotation abilities have been reported in animals such as pigeons 
(Hollard & Delius, 1982) or baboons (Vauclair, Fagot & Hopkins, 1993) which suggest that 
it has prevailed through biological evolution. 
As a consequence, a poor functioning of the transformational process itself (the so-called 
"Configuration shifting subsystem" in Kosslyn's (1994) theory) could not explain the 
difficulties encountered by young children and elderly people. Indeed, several studies 
showed some mental rotation abilities in children (e.g. Marmor, 1975) and in the elderly 
(e.g. Dror & Kosslyn , 1994) - at least, when Shepard's paradigm was used - although their 
performance is usually poorer than those of young adults. In many studies, RTs have been 
shown to increase linearly as a function of stimulus orientation just as in studies assessing 
mental rotation abilities in young adults. 
Just one noticeable difference was always reported: Processing speed in mental rotation 
tasks has been shown to be lower in children (see Kail, 1986, 1988) and in the elderly (see 
Feyereisen, 1994). But in both groups of subjects, it seems that a central mechanism could 
be responsible for the speed of information-processing. A plausible candidate could be the 
quantity of processing resources (or effort, attention, etc) subjects have at their disposal to 
execute a cognitive processes. Brandimonte, Hitch and Bishop (1992) raised similar 
conclusions while studying other imagery abilities (e.g. image combinations) in children. 
Where else could the difficulties come from ? As is shown by this review, children as 
well as the elderly seem to be poor in encoding and maintaining the stimulus which has to be 
rotated. 
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During the recognition of the stimulus, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) have some 
difficulties in discriminating rotation differences between stimuli (see Rosser et al., 1985). 
Moreover, older children (around 9 years of age) seem to be even poorer in keeping vi suo-
spatial information in short term memory (Bialystok, 1989; Carter et al., 1983; Childs & 
Polich, 1979; Waber et ai., 1982). 
It might not be surprising then that several papers have insisted on the role of stimulus 
characteristics: Better performance in children has always been observed while using familiar 
objects as stimuli (e.g. Bialystok, 1989; Dean et ai., 1986; Marmor, 1975, 1977). On the 
contrary, an increase in error rates has often been reported when more abstract stimuli were 
used (e.g. Dean & Harvey, 1979; Piaget & Inhelder, 1966). Similarly, Kail and Park (1990) 
have suggested that what seems to be acquired during development is the use of mental 
rotation in various situations. They (Kail & Park, 1990) have reported that, with massive 
practice, young subjects (11 and 20 years of age) answer more quickly. However, the 
practised skill did not generalise to other stimuli: Subjects trained with rotating letters did not 
improve their performances when they were tested with other stimuli. In fact, what has been 
interiorized with practice is not mental rotation per se, but a catalogue of stimuli in different 
orientations. 
In elderly people, several studies have reported that they do not seem to be poor at 
recognising objects (see, Bruyer, 1994). However, it seems that some basic processes in 
vision might be affected by ageing (specifically, the localisation processes - see, Hoyer, 
1990). Moreover, their ability to maintain vi suo-spatial information in short term memory 
seems to be poor (Dror &Kosslyn, 1994). 
Does this mean that children and elderly have difficulties in encoding the stimulus and 
keeping short term memory traces? This could explain the difficulties they meet during the 
transformational phase. 
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The study of mental imagery development, and consequently of mental rotation, is still in 
its infancy stage. We need both new methods and procedures to analyse empirical data. We 
need parametric studies to systematically compare the different results reported so far. 
Different stimuli do not yield similar performance, and angular orientations have not always 
been identical in published work (notably, the absence of the stimulus presentation at 180 
degrees in some studies). We could also regret that only two studies in children (and no 
study in the elderly) have considered depth rotations although such rotations may be more 
common than picture-plane rotations. The age categories are sometimes too broad and are 
often different across studies. All these parameters should be considered in future research. 
Rather than simply multiplying studies, we should systematically focus on each step of 
the process, taking into account theories of memory, space and perception. We know that 
mental rotation is not just a "sma]} box" in the cognitive system. Mental rotation is a 
complicated processes which requires the activation of several paral1el subsystems. The 
development of these subsystems has to be understood if we want to gain insight to the 
genesis of mental rotation. Some systems could be innate and some could be acquired 




Mental Rotation from childhood to old age: 
Some preliminary empirical data 
As reported in chapter two, both children and elderly people have difficulty in carrying 
out mental rotation. However, no study, at present, has assessed mental rotation abilities in 
children and elderly people using the same set of tasks and the same stimulus orientation. 
An experiment designed to compare developmental differences in mental rotation is 
reported as a preliminary study. Four groups of subjects (five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, 
young adults and elderly people) were given mental rotation tasks. The tasks were borrowed 





Ninety six subjects participated in the experiment. Twenty four five-year-olds (mean age: 
5;02 - range 4;09-5;03), 24 eight-year-olds (mean age: 7; 11 - range 7;09-8;03), 24 young 
adults (mean age: 20;01, range 18;02-24;06) and 24 elderly people (mean age: 71 ;02, range 
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66;02-82;04) were recruited in the surroundings of Liege, Belgium. The children were from 
schools serving middle income communities in and around Liege, while the young adults 
were students or staff members at the University of Liege who participated as volunteers. 
Elderly people were members of the University Alumni Association or were recruited 
through personal contacts. Gender was not controlled, and all subjects were native French 
speakers. 
General procedure 
Subjects were tested individually in a session lasting approximately 40 minutes. Subjects 
performed the tasks in the following order: Cones, Mannequins and L-shape. Although the 
tasks were different, they were not systematically counter-balanced. It was assumed that 
they were identical in difficulty. 
Mental Rotation Tasks 
Material 
Two stimuli were presented simultaneously on each trial (except for the L shape task). 
Three sets of stimuli were used in testing: the cones task (Marmor, 1977), the Mannequin 
task (Lejeune, 1994), and the L task (Farah & Hammond, 1988). The stimuli are presented 
in figure 2. 
Mannekins Cones L shapes 
Figure 2: Stimuli used in the mental rotation tasks. 
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A slide projector was used to project the stimuli on a white screen (50 x 30 cm). Slide 
projection was controlled by the experimenter and stimuli were projected until the subject 
answered. The next stimulus was presented when the subject was ready. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure consisted of two parts for children: (a) pretraining on same-
different judgements, and (b) experimental tests. Adults and elderly people were introduced 
to the experimental tests without pretraining. 
During the pretraining, children were taught through verbal instructions and 
demonstrations to discriminate between same and different pairs. The stimuli were pasted on 
pieces of cardboard that the child could manipulate. During the first phase of the pretraining, 
two stimuli were presented in the upright position. The subjects were required to say 
"same" when the stimuli were identical, and "different" when the stimuli were different. 
During the pretraining, the child could manipulate the pieces of cardboard; they could 
superimpose them to see whether they were identical. 
Subjects were then given the experimental tests. In these tests, the stimulus on the 
subject's left side remained upright while the stimulus on the subject's right side appeared in 
one of four orientations: upright or 60°, 120°, 180° clockwise rotation from the upright. 
Each subject was given three experimental tests (three sets of stimuli: Cones, Mannequins 
and L shapes). Each experimental test was composed of 32 trials randomly ordered. 
Subjects were asked to mentally rotate the figure in the frontal plane before judging (as 
quickly as possible) whether the stimuli were the same or different. When different, the 
cones were not nicked on the same side, the mannequins did not hold the object in the same 
hand, and the L shapes appeared mirror reversed. Subjects' answers were tape recorded. 
Performance (errors) was later analysed. 
The design included four groups (5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, young adults and elderly 
people), three sets of stimuli (cones, mannequins and L shapes) and four orientations (0°, 
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60°, 120° and 180°). Orientations and stimuli were within-subjects factors while group was a 
between-subjects factor. 
RESULTS 
The number of correct trials for each subject in each mental rotation task was calculated. 
A repeated measures ANOV A was carried out on individual score with Age (5-yr-olds, 8-yr-
oIds, young adults and elderly people) and stimulus orientation (0°, 60°, 120° and 180°) as 
independent variables. 
Cones task 
In this task, Error rates were significantly different in the different age categories, 
F(3,88) = 13.19, P < 0.0001, and were affected by stimulus orientation, 
F(3,264) = 28.97, p < 0.0001. Moreover, a significant interaction between age and 
stimulus orientation, F(9,264) = 7.29, p < 0.0001, was observed. Error rates increased 
significantly as a function of stimulus orientation in the five-year-olds, F(3,66) = 26.24, 
p < 0.0001, in the eight-year-olds, F(3,66) = 4.72, p < 0.005 and in the elderly people, 
F(3,66) = 9.11, p < 0.0001, but not in the young adults, F(3,66) = 0.82, p < 0.49. 
Moreover, I tested the difference between the means for each orientation in comparison with 
the 0° condition in each age category. A Dunnett post-hoc analysis revealed significant 
differences for some orientations (p < 0.05). Significant differences are marked with an 
asterisk in figure 3. Error rates as a function of stimulus orientation for the four age 
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Figure 3: Error rates in the Cones task as a function of 
stimulus orientation and age. 
Mannequin task 
In this task, the age of the subjects and the stimulus orientation significantly affected 
performance, respectively, F(3,88) = 15.08, p < 0.0001, and F(3,264) = 51.93, 
p < 0.0001. However, the interaction between age and stimulus orientation was not 
significant, F(9,264) = 0.84, p < 0.58. Moreover, error rates increased in function of 
stimulus orientation in all age categories with F(3,66) = 22.11, F(3,66) = 4.62, F(3,66) = 
21.47 and F(3,66) = 15 (all with p < 0.005), respectively in 5-, 8-yr-olds, young adults and 
elderly people. However, a Dunnett post hoc analysis revealed that the difference between 
the 0° and the other orientations was only significant (with p < 0.05) in some of the 
conditions (significant differences are reported with an asterisk in figure 4). Error rates are 
reported in figure 4. 
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L shapes task 
Similar results were observed in the L shapes task: Age categories and stimulus 
orientation influenced significantly performance, respectively, F(3,88) = 8.74, p < 0.0001, 
and F(3,624) = 27.05, p < 0.0001. Moreover, the age variable interacted with stimulus 
orientation, F(9,264) = 4.97, p < 0.0001. Complementary ANOVAs revealed that 
orientation significantly affected the error rates in five-year-olds, F(3,66) = 18.08, 
p < 0.0001, in eight-year-olds, F(3,66) = 8.05, p < 0.0001, and in young adults, 
F(3,66) = 2.94, p < 0.04. A similar tendency was observed in elderly people, 
F(3,66) = 2.37, p < 0.08. Figure 5 presents the error rates as a function of stimulus 
orientation for the four age categories, and significant differences between the 0° and the 
other orientations (as revealed by a Dunnett post hoc analysis, with p < 0.05) are marked 
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Figure 5: Error rates in the L shape task as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age. 
Correlational analyses among mental rotation tasks 
A global score (independent of stimulus orientation) for each mental rotation task was 
calculated. These global scores were used in correlational analyses among tasks for each age 
category. It was expected that good correlations would be observed between tasks as several 
studies have suggested that mental rotation is an automatic process (see, Kail, 1991, or 
Corballis, 1986). This theoretical assumption has not been observed in all age categories. A 
summary of the correlational analysis are reported in table 1. Interestingly, positive 
correlations between tasks are observed in young adults and in eight-year-olds - two age 
categories for which mental rotation is supposed to be mature. On the contrary, positive 
correlations are not observed between some tasks in the younger children and in the elderly. 
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0.44 (p < 0.03) 
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0.55 (p < 0.005) 
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0.14 (p < 0.52) 
-0.05 (p < 0.83) 
L-shape 
0.69 (p < 0.0002) 
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Mannequins L-shape 
0.73 (p < 0.0001) 0.61 (p < 0.001) 
1 0.52 (p < 0.008) 
Mannequins 
0.25 (p < 0.24) 
L-shape 
0.44 (p < 0.03) 
0.15 (p < 0.49) 
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General scores for mental rotation tasks 
Performance for each mental rotation task was summed for each subject to get a general 
score. Due to the lack of positive correlation between tasks in some age categories, no 
inferential statistics analysis was performed; however, data are reported in scattergrams 
(figure 6) with general scores (in %) presented in ascending order in each age category (each 
black point represents an individual score). 
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Figure 6 : Individual scores (in ascending order) for mental rotation tasks 
in five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly people. 
General scores are expressed in percentages of correct responses. Twenty 
four subjects were assessed in each age category (each black point 
represents a subject). 
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to address the issue of the development of mental rotation in a 
life-span perspective. Similar tasks were used across ages (five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, 
young adults, and the elderly people). Mental rotation was supposed to be required to solve 
the tasks. Indeed, the cones task has been validated in young adults by Marmor (1977), the 
Mannequins task and the L shape task by Lejeune (1994, 1995 - the L shape task was 
inspired from Farah and Hammond (1988) who described this task as a mental rotation task 
in a neuropsychological study). In all these previous published papers, reaction times were 
linearly dependent on stimulus orientation in adults - a function which has been often used as 
an evidence for mental rotation. For these reasons, although we have no direct evidence that 
subjects carried out mental rotations (RTs were not measured in this study), it was assumed 
that they did. 
An additional reason why subjects were supposed to carry out mental rotation can be 
found in the error distributions. When each task is considered separately, errors were 
observed to be significantly affected by stimulus orientation (with an exception) - a fact 
which is often observed in mental rotation tasks. Globally, errors increased with stimulus 
orientation with lower values for 00 presentation and higher values for 1800 presentation [An 
exception to this general rule was observed for young adults in the cones task where errors 
were not affected by stimulus orientation]. 
As evidenced in figure 6, most of the young adults performed the mental rotation tasks 
quite well (90 % of correct response). It is however interesting to notice that one subject 
performed the mental rotation tasks very poorly. He was an undergraduate student in our 
Department but performed the tasks at chance level. General scores in eight-year-olds range 
from 70 % to more than 90 % correct responses. In five-year-olds, about half of the 
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subjects got a general score between 50 % and 60 % correct responses, the other half of the 
subjects got a score range between 60 % and more than 90 % correct responses. Clearly, in 
this age category, there are huge individual differences and error rates are sometimes 
particularly high. In the elderly people, most of the subjects obtained rather good scores 
(ranged between 80 % and more than 90 % correct responses). However, some subjects 
(n = 5) performed the tasks very poorly with scores between about 60 % and 70 % correct 
responses. 
These general scores confirm that at the age of eight (and in young adults), performance 
is good. It seems that at this age, mental rotation is mature. On the contrary, at five years of 
age, many children are still poor in mental rotation tasks. We can be particularly alerted by 
the poor performances observed in younger children when the comparison stimulus is not 
rotated. When the referent and the target are both presented at 0°, error rates reach values of 
about 20 % or more. Although children were trained to same-different judgments, their 
performance was still poor in such condition. Similarly, in the elderly people, the fact that 
some subjects get poor general scores suggests that ageing affects mental rotation ability. 
All these data are consistent with most of the studies published so far. 
However, this global approach of subjects' performances has to be considered with 
caution. Indeed, correlational analysis between tasks within age category did not reveal 
significant positive correlation between all tasks in five-year-olds and in the elderly people. 
Moreover, when significant positive correlations were observed in young adults and in 
eight-year-olds, the values of the correlation were not particularly high. Such results 
question the role of stimulus characteristics in mental rotation tasks - a fact which is 
surprising since Kail (1991) has suggested that mental rotation is an automatic process. 
However, it should be noted that Kail (1991) assessed mental rotation ability in young adults 
and in young adolescents, i.e. at an age when mental rotation is mature. It might be that the 
nature of stimulus could influence performance when mental rotation is immature or has 
deteriorated with ageing. 
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Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for the difficulties young children and 
elderly people encounter while carrying out mental rotation. (see chapter two). Whatever the 
explanations are, it first appears that mental rotation is undoubtedly the product of complex 
processing. As mentioned earlier, Kosslyn (1994) suggests the existence of several 
processing subsystems. His model not only considers the constituent features of the object 
but also their location in space. It should allow a decomposition of the respective role of 
these two essential dimensions in visual cognition. Such a model is not only interesting in 
the understanding of object recognition per se, but is also probably valuable in establishing 
the relationships between object recognition and imaginal processes such as mental rotation. 
Mental rotation is a process strongly connected with the dorsal system described in the 
general introduction. Referred as the "ROTATE" unit in an earlier version of Kosslyn's 
(1980) theory, it would assist the usual dorsal routines in particular cases, and consequently, 
would benefit from the assistance of the ventral system as well. 
Very few studies have strictly considered the development of the two major subsystems 
postulated in Kosslyn's model: (1) the ventral system and (2) the dorsal system. The 
intimate interconnection between both subsystems makes it difficult to find convincing 
behavioural effects. However, an explanation for the results of the present experiment could 
be sought in the development of these subsystems. 
Explanations for the difficulties encountered by young children and elderly people while 
solving a mental rotation task should be sought both in the development of visuo-spatial 
short term memory and specifically in the development of the dorsal system. In a mental 
rotation task, subjects are not only required to analyse the spatial configuration of the rotated 
stimulus but also to keep it a longer time in short term memory (STM) - during the mental 
transformation (i.e. mental rotation) of the stimulus. 
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The next chapters of this thesis are devoted to these issues. Experiment two (in chapter 
four) considers the relationship between the development of visuo-spatial short term memory 
capacity (i.e. memory span), and mental rotation abilities. The major question addressed in 
this experiment is whether the development of mental rotation abilities is dependent on the 
development of STM capacity. Experiment three and the following experiment (in chapter 
five) attempt to decompose visuo-spatial STM into its two components: Visual and Spatial 




Development of mental rotation ability 
and visuo-spatial short term memory span: 
Are they related? I 
We know now that it has been demonstrated several times that human adults are able to 
mentally rotate objects through space (see for a review: Shepard & Cooper. 1982). To 
identify what is the letter p when 1800 rotated. they mentally rotate the stimulus to its upright 
position before judging that it is a d. The so-called "mental rotation" process allows them to 
transform a mental image of the stimulus and consequently to simulate a new position of the 
target stimulus. 
Kosslyn. Flynn. Amsterdam and Wang (1990) have proposed that the mental rotation 
process can be activated when an image is kept in the visual buffer (i.e. the structure on 
which mental images are displayed in the cognitive system). This image is a short term 
memory (STM) representation formed either through a visual percept (e.g. Shepard & 
Metzler. 1971). or generated from long term memory (e.g. Kosslyn. Ball & Reiser. 1978). 
Once generated. the image has to be maintained until the transformation. i.e. mental rotation. 
has been accomplished. 
Consequently. this model suggests that mental rotation could be based on the ability to 
keep visual information in STM for a certain period of time. In fact. humans have been 
This study has been presented in an oral communication at the Second International Conference on 
Memory, Padova, Italy, 14th-19th July 1996. 
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shown to be able to keep visuo-spatial information in STM (Baddeley, 1986; Logie, 1986; 
Phillips, 1983). But, Wilson, Scott and Power (1987) showed that visuo-spatial STM 
capacity, i.e. the memory span, changes with age. This quantity is smaller in young children 
and in elderly people than in adolescents and young adults. 
Does this mean that STM capacity (as revealed through the memory span) affects mental 
rotation abilities? Should we search for developmental differences in mental rotation abilities 
considering the development of STM span? The present study proposes a correlational 
analysis between mental rotation performances and visuo-spatial memory span across ages 
(from childhood to old age). 
In fact, very few studies have considered this issue. A reason for this fact might be that 
Corballis (1986) as well as Kail (1991) have suggested that mental rotation is an automatic 
process. In these studies, subjects were asked to solve a classical mental rotation task (see 
for instance: Cooper & Shepard, 1973a) while increasing the memory load. Mental rotation 
of letters had to be carried out while retaining either digits or patterns in STM. Although the 
competing tasks slowed subjects while answering, the response times remained linearly 
dependent on the stimulus orientation. Mental rotation was not affected by an increase of the 
memory load. However, in both studies, subjects tested in the experiments presented well-
developed mental rotation abilities. In Corballis's (1986) study, young adults were tested. In 
Kail's (1991) study, the youngest subjects were nine-years-old. If we refer to the 
developmental literature, there is no doubt that after the age of eight the mental rotation 
process is mature (see for a review: Dean, 1990). So, the question is: Is mental rotation 
independent of STM capacities before the age of eight? Moreover, what about such 
independence when STM capacity has begun to deteriorate with age? Indeed, several studies 
have suggested that the capacity of vi suo-spatial STM is smaller in young children and 
elderly people than in young adults (see Van der Linden & Hupet, 1994; Wilson, Scott & 
Power, 1987). 
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Relevant to the present issue are both Kosslyn, Margolis, Barret, Goldknopf and Daly's 
(1990) and Dror and Kosslyn's (1994) studies. The first study considered mental rotation 
and image maintenance abilities in children, the second one considered the same issue in 
elderly people. Kosslyn et al. (1990) showed (among other things) that young children are 
relatively poor at rotating objects in images, but some of their data suggested that they are 
relatively good at maintaining images (at least for 3 seconds). On the contrary, Dror and 
Kosslyn (1994) showed that old age affects both mental rotation and image maintenance 
abilities. Consequently, it appears that different imagery subsystems are differentially 
affected by age. 
In this study, five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly people were 
presented with selected mental rotation tasks already used in experiment 1. In addition, their 
STM span for visuo-spatial information was measured. Correlational analyses between tasks 




Forty eight subjects participated in the experiment. Twelve five-year-olds (mean age: 
5;01 - range 4;09-5;03), 12 eight-year-olds (mean age: 8;02 - range 7;09-8;03), 12 young 
adults (mean age: 21;03, range 19;06-25;10) and 12 elderly people (mean age: 75;03, range 
68;05-83; 11) were recruited in the area of Liege, Belgium. The children were from 
kindergartens and schools in and around Liege, while the young adults were undergraduate 
students at the Department of Psychology, University of Liege. Elderly people were 
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recruited through personal contacts. All subjects participated as volunteers. Gender was not 
controlled, and all subjects were native French speakers. 
General procedure 
Subjects were tested individually in a session lasting approximately one hour. Subjects 
carried out two sets of tasks: Mental rotation tasks and Memory span tasks. All the subjects 
did the mental rotation tasks first followed by the memory tasks. Although the tasks within 
the two sets were somewhat different, they have not been systematically counter-balanced 
(which would have resulted in too large a combination of experimental conditions). It was 
assumed that mental rotation tasks were identical in difficulty. Each task was composed of 
24 trials. Moreover, in the memory tasks, subjects were first tested on the easiest conditions, 
namely the conditions with the shortest retention interval (see description of tasks for further 
explanation). 
Tasks 
Mental Rotation Tasks 
Material 
Two stimuli were presented simultaneously on each trial (except for the L shape task). 
Three sets of stimuli were used in testing: the cones task (Marmor, 1977), the Mannequin 
task (Lejeune, 1994) and the L task (Farah & Hammond, 1988). The stimuli are presented in 
figure 7. 
Stimuli were presented on A4 white sheets of paper. The next stimulus was presented 
after the subject responded to the previous item. 
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Manneki ns Cones L shapes 
Figure 7: Stimuli used in the mental rotation tasks. For description of the tasks, 
see the procedure section. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure consisted of three parts for children: (a) pretraining on same-
different judgments, (b) criterion test, and (c) experimental tests. Adults and the elderly 
people undertook the experimental tests without pretraining or criterion tests. 
During the pretraining, children were taught through verbal instructions and 
demonstrations to discriminate between same and different pairs (see experiment I). This 
ability was then assessed with a criterion test in which equal numbers of same and different 
pairs were displayed in random order. The subjects were required to say "same" when the 
stimuli were identical, and "different" when the stimuli were different. On each trial, two 
stimuli were presented (except in the L shape task) in the upright position. The criterion used 
was the correct response on all of the first 10 trials or on any 20 of 24 trials. 
Children who passed the criterion test, as well as adults and the elderly people, were 
given the experimental tests which were substantially similar to the criterion test except that 
the stimulus on the subject's left side remained upright while the stimulus on the subject's 
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right side appeared in one of four orientations: upright or 60°, 120°, 180° clockwise rotation 
from upright. 
Each subject was given three experimental tests (three sets of stimuli: Cones, 
Mannequins, and L shapes). Each experimental test was composed of 32 trials randomly 
ordered. Subjects were asked to judge as quickly as possible whether the stimuli were the 
same or different. When different, the cones were not nicked on the same side, the 
mannequins did not hold the object in the same hand, and the L shapes appeared mirror 
reversed. 
The design included four groups (5-year-olds. 8-year-olds. young adults. and the elderly 
people). three sets of stimuli (Cones. Mannequins and L shapes) and four orientations (0°. 
60°, 120° and 180°). Orientations and stimuli were within-subjects factors while group was a 
between-subjects factor. 
Visuo-spatial STM tasks 
Material 
The memory tasks combined both Wilson et al. 's (1986) memory task and Kosslyn 
et al. 's (1990) image maintenance task. Stimuli were patterns composed of boxes which 
could be either filled or unfilled. Each box measured 1 em X 1 cm. Filling the box produced 
a solidly illuminated rectangle. The first pattern presented consisted simply of two boxes. 
one below the other, with one box filled. Pattern complexity increased in steps of two boxes 
at a time. The last level of complexity was represented in a 6 X 5 matrix with IS boxes 
filled. In each pattern exactly half of the boxes were illuminated at random. Four trials for 
each level of complexity were presented. Consequently, subjects could undertake at most 56 
trials (14 levels of complexity X 4 trials). 
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Procedure 
Each trial began with the presentation of an attentional signal. When ready, the subjects 
pressed the space bar, which caused the presentation of the stimulus. The stimulus was 
presented for 2000 msec. After this delay, the stimulus was removed and the subjects had to 
retain an image of the pattern for 500 msec (first condition), 1000 msec (second condition) 
or 5000 msec (third condition). Following this, two X marks appeared within the matrix. 
The subjects were asked to decide whether the stimulus shape (filled boxes) would have 
covered the X marks. If so, they pressed one key; if not, they pressed another one. Subjects 
were first presented with the first condition (500 msec), followed by the second (1000 msec) 
and the third (5000 msec) conditions. Figure 8 presents an example of a trial. The tasks were 
interrupted when subjects committed more than 2 errors in a set of 4 trials (corresponding to 
a particular level of complexity). 
Rentention x 
Interval x 
Figure 8 : Example of stimulus used in the Short term 




Mental rotation tasks 
The number of correct trials for each subject in each mental rotation task was calculated. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for each mental rotation task on individual 
scores with age (5-yr-olds, S-yr-olds, young adults and elderly people) and stimulus 
orientation (0°, 60°, 120° and IS00) as independent variables. 
In the Mannequin task, age, F(3,44) = 7.03, p < 0.0006, and stimulus orientation, 
F(3, 132) = 24.1S, P < 0.0001, significantly affected performance. As the interaction age X 
stimulus orientation was also significant [F(9,132) = 6.63, p < 0.0001], repeated measures 
ANOV As were calculated for each age category considered separately. The stimulus 
orientation significantly affected performance in five-year-olds, F(3,33) = 21.17, p < 
0.0001, in eight-year-olds, F(3,33) = 3.5S, p < 0.02, and in the elderly people, 
F(3,33) = 5.0S, p < 0.005. However, orientation did not affect performance in young 
adults, F(3,33) = 1.72, p < O.IS. Results are reported in figure 9. 
Similar analyses were carried out for the Cone task. A global ANOV A revealed 
significant effects of age, F(3,44) = 8.25, p < 0.0002, orientation, F(3,132) = 17.16, p < 
0.0001, and age X orientation, F(9,132) = 6.29, p < 0.0001. Complementary analyses 
showed that error rates were significantly affected in the five-year-olds, F(3,33) = 15.16, p 
< 0.0001, and in eight-year-olds, F(3,33) = 5.48, p < 0.004. In elderly people, the 
orientational effect almost reached significance, F(3,33) = 2.37, p < 0.08. This effect was 
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Figure 9: Mannequin task: Error rates as a function of stimulus orientation 
in five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly. 
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Figure 10 : Cone task: Error rates as a function of stimulus orientation in 
five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly. 
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In the L shape task, age, F(3,44) = 9.49, p < 0.0001, orientation, F(3,132) = 15.30, 
P < 0.0001, and the interaction age X orientation, F(9, 132) = 3.24, P < 0.002, were also 
shown to affect the scores significantly. Complementary ANOV As revealed that the 
orientational effect was significant at the age of 5, F(3,33) = 6.7, p < 0.001, the age of 8, 
F(3,33) = 3.06, p < 0.04, and in elderly people, F(3,33) = 8.4, p < 0.0003. No effect was 
observed in young adults, F(3,33) = 0.71, p < 0.55. Error rates as a function of stimulus 
orientation in the four age categories are presented in figure 11. 
0 5-yr-olds 
8 8-yr-olds 
• Young adults 
• Elderly people 
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Figure 11 : L shape task: Error rates as a function of stimulus orientation in 
five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly. 
Visuo-spatial STM tasks 
The memory span of each subject was determined as follows. The tasks comprised 
several levels of complexity, each corresponding to a particular memory span. For instance, 
65 
the first level comprised two black squares, in other words two units to maintain, i.e. it 
corresponded to a memory span = 2. The next level corresponded to a memory span = 3, 
and so on until the last level which corresponded to a memory span of 15. The tasks were 
interrupted when the subject committed more than 2 errors for one level of complexity (i.e. 
equal to or worse than chance level: 50 %). The last level of complexity successfully 
completed by the subject determined his/her memory span. For instance, a subject who 
passed the task as far as level 6, i.e. gave the correct answers at least 3/4 trials, reached a 
memory span considered equivalent to 7. The same subject, at level 7, just passed 114 trials, 
i.e. failed more than half the time to give the correct answer. For each subject, this measure 
was computed in each retention interval condition (i.e. 500 msec, 1000 msec, and 5000 
msec). 
Repeated measures ANOV As were calculated on the memory span value with Age (5-yr-
oIds, 8-yr-olds, young adults and elderly people) and Retention Interval (SOD, 1000 and 
5000 msec) as independent variables. Age was a between variable and Retention a within 
variable. Table 2 shows the mean values and standard deviations observed in five, eight-
year-oIds, young adults and elderly people in the three retention interval conditions. 
TABLE 2 
5-yr-olds 8-yr-olds Y2 Adults Elderly 
500 milliseconds m: 2.75 m: 5.33 m: 6.83 m: 4.5 
s: 1.48 s: 2.26 s: 2.51 s: 1.51 
1000 milliseconds m: 2.16 m: 4.75 m:7 m: 3.33 
s: 0.93 s: 1.76 s: 2.41 s: 1.07 
5000 milliseconds m: 1.83 m:4.5 m: 6.66 m:3 
s: 1.26 s: 1.97 s: 2.14 s: 1.76 
Table 2: Means (m) and standard deviations (s) for Memory span in five-year-olds, eight-
year-olds, young adults and elderly people as a function of the retention interval (500 msec, 
1000 msec and 5000 msec). 
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A global ANOV A revealed a significant effect of age, F(3,44) = 17.33, p < 0.000 I, as 
well as of the retention interval, F(2,88) = 8.31, p < 0.0005. The interaction between age 
and retention interval was not significant, F(6,88) = 1.11, p < 0.36. Mean memory spans 
for each retention condition are reported in figure 12. However, a complementary ANOVA 
computed on memory span in each age category considered separately revealed only an 
effect of the retention interval in elderly people, F(2,22) = 6.35, p < 0.0066. No effect was 
observed in five-year-olds, F(2,22) = 2.64, p < 0.09, in eight-year-olds, F(2,22) = 1.94, 












Figure 12: Changes in memory span as a function of age (five-year-olds, 
eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly people) and retention interval 
(black circle: 500 msec, black square: 1000 msec, and black triangle: 5000 
msec). 
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Correlational analysis between mental rotation performances and visuo-
spatial memory span 
Global scores for mental rotation tasks and span tasks were calculated for each subject. 
Pearson correlations were computed on these global scores. Analysis within age group has 
been avoided since the sample size in each age category was relatively small (n = 12). 
Moreover, a cross-age analysis appeared to be more meaningful in the context of this 
developmental study. Correlation between error rates in mental rotation and memory span 
was observed to be relatively high (r = -0.67, p < 0.000 I). Values are reported in figure 
13. When the three young adults scoring particularly high in memory span were removed 
(see figure 13, red squares), the correlation was -0.71 (p < 0.0001). 
Correlation between 
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Figure 13 : Correlation between mental rotation performance 
(global score) and memory span for visual pattern. Each symbol 
represents an individual score. 
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the development of mental rotation 
abilities is related to the development of visuo-spatial STM span. The answer is positive. A 
correlation between mental rotation performances and STM span computed across age 
categories revealed a relatively good association between scores. Consequently, it seems 
that both processes are related. 
The first assessment carried out in this experiment concerned mental rotation abilities). 
This study confirmed that mental rotation abilities are not yet fully developed in five-year-
oIds. At this age, young children performed very poorly in all three mental rotation tasks, 
especially when the stimuli were rotated by 1800 • In this condition, answers were close to 
chance level. Such results confirm previously published studies with preoperational children 
(to use Piagetian parlance) (see: Dean, 1990). Similarly, in elderly people, poor performance 
was found in the three mental rotation tasks (with the exception of the mannequin task). It 
also confirms that mental rotation abilities are affected by ageing (e.g. Dror & Kosslyn, 
1994). 
This study also confirms that at the age of eight, mental rotation abilities are - roughly 
speaking - as well developed as in young adults. At eight-years-old, children perform mental 
rotation tasks as well as young adults. It seems that this part of the cognitive system is well 
developed. This is in agreement with the Piagetian conception of imagery development 
according to which transformational imagery (in this case: mental rotation) is developed after 
the onset of the operational stage (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966). 
Young adults were particularly good at the three mental rotation tasks. Orientation did not 
affect their performances although it did in operational children. This reflects somehow a 
difference between these two last groups of subjects. It might be that the three mental 
For the same reasons as those stated in experiment 1, although RTs have not been measured, I 
consider that subjects carried out mental rotations. 
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rotation tasks were really easy for young adults and/or the tested subjects were particularly 
good at these imagery tasks. 
The second assessment carried out in this study concerned the vi suo-spatial STM span. 
As reported by Wilson, Scott and Power (1987), STM span changes with age. The memory 
span in five, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly as shown in table 2 reproduce Wilson 
et al. 's (1987) results. In younger children, the STM span was smaller than in the other 
groups. Moreover, the memory span decreases with ageing. 
Correlational analysis between the two sets of tasks suggested that mental rotation 
abilities and STM span are related. Does this mean that we should immediately conclude that 
both cognitive processes are totally dependent? In fact, I think that the memory tasks used 
in this experiment - although classical ones - are not sensitive enough to determine in which 
way both cognitive sub-systems are related. 
In such tasks, visuo-spatial STM is considered as a single system. However, Logie and 
Marchetti (1991) have suggested that visuo-spatial STM - referred to in their theory as the 
VSSP (Visuo-spatial Sketch Pad) from Baddeley's (1986) working memory model - can be 
decomposed into two subsystems: (1) A visual and (2) a spatial subsystem. Similarly, 
Kosslyn (1994) has suggested that when studying visual cognition, we might consider the 
two main cortical pathways engaged in the analysis of a visual pattern. The first path, 
classically referred as the ventral system - or occipito-temporal path - analyses the structure 
of the stimulus, whilst the second path, referred as the dorsal system - or occipito-parietal 
path - considers the spatial dimensions of the stimulus. Consequently, both Logie and 
Marchetti (1991) and Kosslyn (1994) suggest that visuo-spatial STM should be decomposed 
into two subsystems. 
If mental rotation abilities and visuo-spatial STM are somehow related, the assessment 
should consider the development of both memory subsystems as defined above. 
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Specifically, mental rotation abilities could be related to the spatial subsystem rather than the 
visual subsystem. It might be that some aspects of the spatial subsystem develop later than 




Retention of spatial information 
in short term memory and mental rotation abilities 
from childhood to old agel 
Cooper and Shepard (1973a) found that RTs increased linearly2 with angular orientation 
of rotated letter stimuli. However, in a particular experimental condition, Cooper and 
Shepard (1973a) showed that providing subjects with information about the structure and the 
orientation of the to-he-compared target modifies the RT function. When young adults have 
enough information to generate an image of the target or can keep structural and spatial 
information about the target in visual short term memory (VSTM), they respond with 
identical speed whatever the stimulus orientation. Reaction times become independent of 
stimulus orientation. 
In addition, Kosslyn et al. (1990) have suggested that the mental rotation process can be 
activated when an image is kept in the visual buffer (i.e. the structure in which mental 
images are generated). This image is a STM representation formed either through a visual 
percept, or generated from long term memory. Once constituted, the image has to be 
maintained until the transformation, i.e. mental rotation, has heen carried out. Consequently, 
the ability to maintain visual information in STM for enough time is essential for a successful 
mental rotation. Similarly, a visual STM trace exempts subjects from the activation of the 
mental rotation subsystem (e.g. Cooper & Shepard, 1973). 
Part of this research has been presented at the Annual Meeting of the Belgian Psychological Society, 
May 12, 1995, Louvain-Ia-Neuve, Belgium. 
2 In fact, to be precise, the RTs function was curvilinear. However. for the purpose of this experiment. 
it is not necessary to consider this difference. These effects were probably due both to the experimental 
procedure and the stimulus characteristics (see for instance: Lejeune, M. & Parmentier, F., in press, for 
a discussion of this issue). 
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Visuo-spatial short term memory: Visual and Spatial 
In the following experiments, visuo-spatial short term memory is considered in the 
context of two theories: (1) Kosslyn's (1994) theory of high level vision, and (2) 
Baddeley's (1986) working memory model. These models were presented in the general 
introduction. 
Considering both models, it seems that visuo-spatial short term memory is not to be 
considered as a single system but rather as - at least - a dual system with a visual (ef ventral 
system) and a spatial (cf dorsal system) subsystem. These two subsystems would process 
different but related information from a visual pattern. 
What do we know about the development of visuo-spatial short term 
memory? 
Studies of children: Memory capacity 
There have not been many studies on the development of visuo-spatial short term 
memory. Most of the studies of children - just as studies of young adults - have mostly 
considered the development of verbal working memory. Dempster (1981) reported that 
verbal memory span (i.e. verbal memory capacity) goes from about two items (digits) at the 
age 2 1/2 to about five items at age 7. In young adults, the verbal memory span value is about 
seven. 
Wilson, Scott and Power (1987) studied visual memory span in five, seven, eleven-year-
olds and young adults. A pattern (black and white grid cells) was presented for two seconds 
(i.e. memorisation time). Then, the stimulus was removed for a period of 2 or to seconds 
(i.e. retention interval). During the to-second retention interval, subjects were either given 
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an interfering task (a counting task) or were not. Following the retention interval, the pattern 
was displayed again but with one black cell replaced by a white one. The stimuli were 
increased in complexity by adding cells to the pattern, i.e. increasing the memory span. 
Subjects were required to point at the position of the missing black cell. The longer the 
retention interval was, the more the memory span decreased in all age categories except in 
the five-year-olds where it remained identical between the 2- and 10-second interval 
conditions (without an interfering task). The mean memory spans in the 2-second interval 
conditions were 3.7, 8.2, 14.1 and 14.3 units, and in the to-second interval condition were 
about 2.8, 6.9, 11 and 11.2 units, respectively in the 5, 7, 11-year-olds and adults. 
Similarly, Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf and Daly (1990) have shown that 
children of five years of age are able to retain visual information for at least three seconds. 
Five, eight and fourteen-year-olds and young adults were asked to memorise grids that 
contained a pattern created by filling in grid cells. After the memorisation period, a key had 
to be depressed and the pattern was removed from the computer screen. Two conditions 
were studied: (1) A 4 items pattern - i.e. a pattern where one-fifth of the cells of a 4x5 grid 
were filled in - had to be maintained for 500 msec, and (2) a 7 items pattern - i.e. a pattern 
where one-fifth of the cells of a 5x7 grid were filled in - had to be maintained for 3000 msec. 
After the retention interval, two X marks appeared either in or out of a previously filled 
square. Subjects were required to judge whether both X marks appeared in or out of the 
memorised pattern. In the heavy load and long retention interval condition, errors were about 
35 %,25 %, 15 % and 7 % respectively in the 5-, 8-, 14-year-olds and young adults. These 
results suggest that young subjects can partially keep visual information in STM for at least 3 
seconds. However, since error rates increased between the two conditions in the three 
younger groups, it appeared also that young children encounter more difficulty in the heavy 
load and long retention interval condition. The percentages of errors (35%) in the five-year-
olds in the second experimental condition are particularly high. However, Kosslyn et al. 's 
(1990) study does not make clear whether the increase in error rates is due to the increase in 
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memory load or due to the increase in the retention interval as the amount of information to 
be kept in STM was not the same in both conditions. 
To answer this question, I (see chapter four) combined Wilson et al. 's (1987) and 
Kosslyn et al. 's (1990) tasks: Wilson's stimuli were used but Kosslyn's methodology was 
applied. The patterns (presented for 2 seconds) became more complex over trials, and 
subjects had to judge whether two X marks had been displayed in previously filled in 
squares. The retention intervals used in this study were 500 msec, 2000 msec and 5000 
msec. Subjects were tested successively on all three conditions. Interestingly enough, the 
retention interval did not affect young adults, or children. These results suggest that the 
reduction of efficiency in young children observed in Kosslyn et aI's (1990) study can be 
explained by the higher memory load in the second condition rather than by the retention 
interval itself. 
Studies of children: Evidence for a dissociation between the spatial and visual 
subsystems ? 
To my knowledge, no study has explicitly tested the dissociation between the spatial and 
visual subsystems in short term memory. However, a reinterpretation of some published 
studies might provide us with some information on this issue. 
Koenig, Reiss and Kosslyn (1990) showed in a study assessing several subsystems 
composing the dorsal system, that young children are highly impaired in assessing the 
metrical distance between objects and parts of objects but are well able to categorise objects. 
Such data would suggest - although not demonstrate - that the spatial subsystem within the 
dorsal system develops later than the other subsystem. 
Two studies on mental rotation abilities in children could also be considered with interest 
in this context: Childs and Polich (1979) and Waber, Carlson and Mann (1982). The first 
75 
authors applied the Cooper and Shepard (1973b) paradigm (cj supra) to young children and 
adults. Nine, eleven and twenty-year-olds were required to judge as quickly as possible 
whether rotated letters were normal or mirror-reversed versions. Two experimental 
conditions were compared: (I) Subjects received no information on the target before the test, 
and (2) subjects received information about the structure and the orientation of the target 
1000 msec before its presentation; concretely, they were shown the forthcoming target in its 
normal form (i.e. not in the mirror-reversed version) in a particular orientation (similar to 
that of the forthcoming target). Without advance information, RTs were linearly dependent 
on stimulus orientation in all subjects. However, in the advance information condition, 
younger children's RTs functions remained linearly dependent on stimulus orientation. 
Children had to carry out mental rotations despite the information provided. They behaved as 
if they did not use the information provided. Childs and Polich (1979) interpreted these 
results as evidence that children have difficulty in keeping visual information in short term 
memory for 1000 msec. 
Waber, Carlson and Mann (1982) reproduced Childs and Polich's (1979) findings in 
other age categories. Fifth- (about lO-yr-olds) and seventh- (about 12-yr-olds) grade 
children were presented with rotated letters and were required to judge whether they were 
normal or mirror-reversed versions. Globally, quantitative analysis showed that RTs 
increased linearly with stimulus orientation either in an advance or no advance information 
condition. However, qualitative analysis revealed that the frequency of an adult-like profile 
(Le. flat slope in the advance information condition) increased substantially between age 10 
and 12 (although only 41 % of the older subjects showed an adult-like profile). 
Consequently, it appeared that manipulations of visual images and visual short term memory 
would still be poor in early adolescence. Subjects at the age of the puberty could hardly 
retain visual information in memory for 1000 msec (which was also the retention interval 
used in this study). 
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As already mentioned in chapter two, I think that the interpretation of these two studies 
should be reformulated in the light of more recently published works. Indeed, can we really 
conceive that young children cannot retain a visual pattern in STM for one second? One 
second is such a short period of time that such a hypothesis does not seem to be seriously 
valid. Indeed, as mentioned above, Kosslyn et al. (1990) showed that children of five years 
of age are able to retain visual information for at least three seconds. In addition, Wilson et 
al. (1987) showed that the retention interval can reach values of 10 seconds in children of 
similar age. 
A fundamental difference between Kosslyn's and Wilson's studies and Childs and 
Polich's and Waber et al.'s studies on mental rotation is the orientation of the to-be-
memorised stimulus. In the two first studies, the patterns are presented in an orientation 
basically defined by horizontal and vertical axes. No stimulus appears in an oblique 
orientation. In contrast, in the mental rotation studies, the orientation is an important 
component of the task: The stimuli are presented in several orientations - often in an oblique 
orientation. Would it mean that the orientation of the memory representation makes the 
difference? Would it be more difficult to keep an oblique pattern in STM ? It would mean 
that the spatial characteristics of the stimuli are lost during the 1000 msec interval used in 
Childs and Polich's (1979) and Waber, Carlson and Mann's (1982) studies. 
In conclusion, the reinterpretations of the previous studies - if correct - would suggest 
that the spatial subsystem (or dorsal system) - at least part of it - is developed later than the 
visual subsystem (or ventral system). This issue is considered in this chapter. 
Studies with elderly people: Memory capacity 
Although several studies (see: Craik, 1977) have suggested that no differences can be 
observed between young adults and elderly people in memory span tasks, others reported 
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opposite results (see: Salthouse, 1991). However, among these studies, very few 
considered visuo-spatial short term memory. 
An effect of ageing has been observed while using the block-tapping test to measure 
spatial memory span in elderly people (Feyereisen & Van der Linden, 1992). Memory span 
values were 6.54 and 4.96, respectively in young adults and elderly people. Moreover, in 
chapter four, similar effects of ageing were reported with another vi suo-spatial memory task. 
Although the memory span in young adults was equal to 6.83 (mean between the different 
retention interval conditions), it was reduced to 3.61 in 65- to 80-year-oIds. Both studies 
suggest that old age reduces visual memory capacity. 
Dror and Kosslyn (1994) observed a similar reduction of visual image maintenance ability 
in elderly people. They used a task also used with children (see Kosslyn et al .. 1990). 
Subjects age 63 were submitted to an image maintenance task. They had to study a pattern, 
and after the removal of the pattern, an X mark appeared after 2500 msec. Subjects had to 
decide whether the memorised shape would have covered the X mark. The patterns became 
more complex over the trials. Error rates increased with the complexity of the pattern. 
Although no significant differences appeared between elderly people and young adults, an 
overall analysis suggested that the elderly may have a deficit in maintaining images. The 
absence of significant differences makes accurate conclusions difficult. 
Studies with elderly people: Evidence for a dissociation between the spatial and visual 
subsystems ? 
There are no more studies on the effects of ageing on the different visuo-spatial memory 
subsystems other than in children. However, Hoyer (1990) reviewed the literature on the 
effect of ageing on visual memory and argued that published studies suggest an effect of 
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ageing on the localisation process (i.e. dorsal system) but not on the identification subsystem 
(i.e. ventral system). 
In fact, Grady et al. (1992) reported clear evidence for a reduction of efficiency of the 
dorsal system in the elderly. In a PETscan study, they showed that different cortical areas 
were activated whilst subjects were submitted to a pattern recognition or pattern localisation 
task. In the first task, the ventral path, i.e. occipito-temporal areas, was activated, while in 
the second task, the dorsal path, i.e. occipito-parietal areas, was activated. However, 
although this dissociation between the two cortical paths was observed in young adults, the 
distinction was less obvious in elderly people. According to the authors, this would reflect a 
reduction of efficiency of these structures (or processes) with age. 
The present study 
The "mental rotation paradigm" might be particularly useful in assessing the development 
of both visual and spatial short term memory. To study this issue, I have used a 
methodology inspired by Cooper and Shepard (1973a). Simple characters were used as 
stimuli to reduce as much as possible the amount of information to be kept in memory. The 
assessment was realised in a life-span perspective: Young children, young adults and elderly 
people were tested. 
EXPERIMENT 38 
Experiment 3a is largely inspired from Childs and Polich's (1979) and Waber, Carlson 
and Mann's (1981) studies. The ability of five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and 
elderly people was tested in a mental rotation task using three experimental conditions. In the 
first condition (see figure 14, A), subjects were presented with the letter L. The letter could 
be presented upright or 60° or a multiple of 60° rotation from the upright. Subjects were 
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required to mention whether the presented stimulus was the normal or mirror-reversed 
version of an L. It was expected that in all age categories, RTs would increase linearly with 
stimulus orientation just as in classical work. 
In the second condition (see figure 14, B), subjects were first provided both with 
structural and orientational information about the target. As in Childs and Polich (1979) and 
Waber et al. (1981) studies, the target appeared 1000 msec after the removal of this 
information. In other words, subjects had to keep the information in short term memory for 
one second. The RT function was expected to be independent of orientation in eight-year-
oids and in young adults since no mental rotation is required in this condition. On the 
contrary, at the age of 5 and in the elderly, the RT function was expected to be dependent on 
stimulus orientation despite the information provided (and consequently, despite the fact that 
no mental rotation is really required in this condition). The hypothesis was based on the fact 
that it appeared in previously published studies (see chapter two) that young children and 
elderly people are poor at maintaining spatial information in short term memory. 
The third condition (see figure 14, C) tested whether a reduction of the time interval 
between the information provided and the target (as defined in the second condition) would 
modify the RT functions. Let us suppose that RT functions are dependent on orientation in 
the second condition in five-year-oIds and elderly people and that these results are due to the 
fact that these subjects cannot retain spatial information for 1000 msec (as postulated in my 
hypothesis). Reducing the retention interval should allow subjects to benefit from the 
provided information. They could possibly maintain the information in short term memory 
for a shorter period of time. If they can retain this information, they should easily solve the 
mental rotation task, and the RT function should become independent of stimulus orientation 
since no mental rotation is required. In the third condition, the retention interval was reduced 




Four age categories of subjects were tested: 36 five-year-olds (mean age: 5;02 [5 years 2 
months] range 4;09 to 5;03), 36 eight-year-olds (mean age: 7; 10, range 7;09-8;03), 36 
young adults (mean age: 20, range 18-26) and 36 elderly subjects (mean age: 71, range 65-
78). All subjects were volunteers. Children were attending public and private schools in the 
surroundings of Liege. Young adults were undergraduate students at the University of 
Liege. The elderly subjects were recruited through personal contacts or in leisure clubs in 
Liege. According to self-reports, all subjects were completely healthy and were not taking 
any medication that might have affected their cognitive performance. 
Subjects from each age category were distributed among three experimental groups, each 
receiving a different version of the mental rotation task. Consequently, each experimental 
group was composed of 12 subjects from each age category (Ln = 48). 
Material 
The stimulus for the task was the same used in Farah and Hammond (1988). The shape 
used in the task looks like the letter L (size: 3.5 cm x 2 cm). The stimuli were presented at 
the centre of a computer screen placed at about 50 cm from the subject. The stimuli were 
presented in six orientations: 0°, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240° or 300°. The letter L could be 
presented in its normal or mirror-reversed version. Two keys on a keyboard were used to 
respond. 
The task comprised 48 trials, 8 at each level of orientation; half of the stimuli at each level 
of orientation were normal, half were mirror-reversed. 
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Procedure 
Three experimental conditions were tested. In the first condition, subjects had to depress 
the space bar when they were ready. Following this, a stimulus was presented. The subjects 
were instructed to mentally reorient the shape to its upright position, and then to decide as 
quickly as possible whether it was a normal or mirror-reversed version of the letter L. They 
depressed one of two keys to answer (left hand on the W key of an AZERTY keyboard for 
"different" answer, i.e. mirror-reversed, and right hand on the + key of an AZERTY 
keyboard for "same" answer). 
In the second condition, when subjects had depressed the space bar, they were provided 
with structural and orientational information about the target, i.e. they could see the letter L 
in its normal format in the orientation of the forthcoming target. This information was 
presented for 2000 msec. Following this, the information was removed from the screen. 
One thousand msec later, the target was displayed. It could be a normal or mirror-reversed 
version of an L presented in the same orientation as the provided information. Subjects had 
to depress a key as quickly as possible (same as in the first condition) to indicate whether the 
target was identical to the provided information. 
Finally, the third condition was similar to the second condition except that the target 
appeared 500 msec after the removal of the information. Figure 14 illustrates the three 
experimental conditions. 
Before the experimental tests as described above, the two groups of children underwent a 
training session to teach them through verbal instructions and demonstrations the difference 
between the normal and mirror-reversed version of the letter L. When the children had 
understood the instructions, the training session began. During the training session, the 
stimuli were always presented on the centre of a computer screen in the upright position but 
could be normal or backward. Children were asked to depress a specific key on the 
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keyboard when the stimuli were the same, and another key when they were different. This 
training task was made up of 24 trials. The training was continued until the child reached a 
score of 80% or more of correct responses. 
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Figure 14 : Schematic representation of the three experimental 
conditions. A : No information. B: Advanced information 
followed by a 1000 msec retention interval before the target. C: 
Advanced information followed by a 500 msec retention 
interval before the target. The target was always presented in 
the same orientation as the advanced information (B & C) but 





Reaction time functions are presented in figures 15 A, 15 B, and 15 C. Means and 
standard deviations are presented extensively in appendix 3. 
A global repeated measures ANOV A was carried out on individual RT means for correct 
responses. Age, stimulus orientation and experimental conditions were considered as 
independent variables. Age, F(3,132) = 28.2, p < 0.0001, and experimental conditions, 
F(2,132) = 3.95, P < 0.02, had a significant effect on RTs. Similarly, stimulus orientation 
which had an overall significant effect on RT, F(5,660) = 13.21, P < 0.0001, also interacted 
with the age variable, F(15,660) = 1.75, p < 0.04, and the experimental conditions, 
F(10,660) = 3.37, p < 0.0003. However, age did not interact significantly with the 
experimental condition, F(6,132) = 0.94, p < 0.47. Similarly, the triple interaction between 
age, experimental conditions and stimulus orientation was not significant, 
F(30,660) = 1.00, P < 0.47. 
Complementary ANOV As were computed on each age category considered separately. In 
the five-year-olds, there was a significant effect of the experimental condition, 
F(2,33) = 7.4, p < 0.002, and of stimulus orientation, F(5,165) = 11.31, p < 0.0001. 
Both variables interacted significantly, F(10,165) = 2.28, p < 0.02. In fact, stimulus 
orientation significantly affected RTs in younger children when they were not provided with 
information, F(5,55) = 4.6, p < 0.001, and when the information was provided 1000 msec 
before the presentation of the target, F(5,55) = 8.25, p < 0.0001. When the retention 
interval was 500 msec, stimulus orientation had no effect on RTs, F(5,55) = 1.78, 
p<0.13. 
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Figure 15 A : Reaction times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
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Figure 15 B : Reaction times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation for the "Advanced information: 1000 msec" condition in 
the four age categories. 
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Figure IS C : Reaction times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation for the "Advanced information: 500 msec" condition in the 
four age categories. 
In the eight-year-olds, similar results were observed. Experimental conditions, 
F(2,33) = 7.65, stimulus orientation, F(5,16S) = 6.74. and the interaction experimental 
condition X stimulus orientation, F(10,16S) = S.19, had a significant effect on RTs, all with 
p < 0.0001. However, the orientational effect was only significant in the first condition (No 
information), F(S,SS) = 7.33, p < 0.0001, and in the second condition (1000 msec retention 
interval), F(S,5S) = 3.14, P < 0.01. Stimulus orientation did not affect RTs in the SOO msec 
retention interval condition, F(S,SS) = 1.82, p < 0.12. 
In young adults, complementary ANOV As revealed a significant effect of experimental 
conditions, F(2,33) = 16.3S, stimulus orientation, F(S,165) = IS.17, all with p < 0.0001, 
on RTs. The interaction between these two variables was also found to be significant, 
F(lO,16S) = 9.9, p < 0.0001. Other analyses showed that stimulus orientation affected RTs 
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when subjects were not provided with information, F(S,SS) = 23.S8, p < 0.0001, and when 
the information was provided 1000 msec before the target, F(S,SS) = 2.66, p < 0.03. In the 
last condition, i.e. when the retention interval was SOO msec, RTs function was independent 
of stimulus orientation, F(S,SS) = 0.8, p < 0.S6. 
Finally, in the elderly, the overall ANOV A showed only a significant effect of stimulus 
orientation on RTs, F(S,16S) = 2.98, p < 0.01. However, neither the experimental 
condition, F(2,33) = 0.1, p < 0.9, nor the interaction between stimulus orientation and the 
experimental conditions, F(1 0, 16S) = 1.21, p < 0.29, was significant. In fact, the 
orientational effect was only significant when subjects were not provided with information, 
F(S,SS) = S, p < 0.0008. In the 1000 msec retention interval condition, the stimulus 
orientation did not affect RTs, F(S,SS) = 0.S7, p < 0.73. Similar results were observed in 
the SOO msec retention interval condition, F(S,SS) = 1.3S, p < 0.26. 
Error rates 
Error rates are reported in figures 16 A, 16 B, and 16 C, and mean values and standard 
deviations are presented in appendix 3. 
A global repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on errors. Age (S-, 8-year-olds, 
young adults and elderly) and the experimental conditions (without advanced information, 
with advanced information 1000 msec and 500 msec before the target) were between 
variables, while stimulus orientation (0°,60° and multiple of 60°) served as a within variable. 
A global effect of age, F(3,60) = 3.29, p < 0.03, and of stimulus orientation, 
F(5,300) = 5.45, p < 0.0001, was observed. However, the experimental conditions did 
not yield significantly different performance, F(2,60) = 0.35, p < 0.7. No interaction 
between variables significantly affected the performance (orientation x age : 
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F(15,300) = 1.33, p < 0.18; age x experimental condition : F(6,60) = 0.45, p < 0.84; 
orientation x experimental condition, F(10,300) = 0.52, p < 0.87; and orientation x 
experimental condition x age: F(30,300) = 0.99, p < 0.48). 
Complementary ANOV As on each age category considered separately confirmed a 
significant effect of stimulus orientation only in five-year-olds, F(5,75) = 2.64, p < 0.03, 
and in the elderly, F(5,75) = 3.4, p < 0.008. No effect of stimulus orientation was observed 
in the eight-year-olds, F(5,75) = 0.61, p < 0.69, and in the young adults, F(5,75) = 1.95, 
p < 0.09. 
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Figure 16 A : Errors (in percent) as a function of stimulus orientation 
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Figure 16 B : Errors (in percent) as a function of stimulus orientation 
for the "Advanced information: 500 msec" condition in the four age 
categories. 
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Figure 16 C : Errors (in percent) as a function of stimulus 
orientation for the "Advanced information: 500 msec" condition in 
the four age categories. 
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Error rates did not differ in the experimental conditions in the five-year-olds, 
F(2, 15) = 0.3, p < 0.75, in the eight-year-olds, F(2,15) = 1.37, p < 0.28, in the young 
adults, F(2,15) = 1.46, p < 0.26, and in the elderly people, F(2,15) = 0.2, p < 0.82. 
Moreover, the experimental conditions never interacted significantly with stimulus 
orientation (in the five-year-oIds: F(10,75) = 0.44, p < 0.92; in the eight-year-olds: 
F(10,75) = 1.21, p < 0.3; in the young adults: F(10,75) = 0.55, p < 0.84; and in the elderly 
people: F(10,75) = 1.52, p < 0.15). 
DISCUSSION 
Three experimental conditions were compared in experiment 3a. When subjects were not 
provided with structural and orientational information on the forthcoming stimulus, and had 
to judge whether the stimulus - which could be rotated - was a normal or mirror-reversed 
version of the letter L, RT functions were significantly dependent on stimulus orientation in 
all age categories. These results suggest that at all ages, subjects were using an analogue 
transformational process before judging the identity of the stimuli. However, it should be 
also noticed that error rates were relatively high in children (between 15 and 20 % for most 
stimulus orientations in five-year-olds). These results suggest that, although young children 
exhibit the same RT functions when they answer correctly, they are relatively poor in mental 
rotation tasks. 
The most interesting results of experiment 3a are found in the second and third 
conditions. When provided with information 1000 msec before the presentation of the target, 
eight-year-oIds and young adults answered uniformly rapidly whatever the stimulus 
orientation. The orientational effect observed in both age categories for this experimental 
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condition should not be interpreted as evidence for mental rotation. Indeed, the RT slope is 
too slight to reflect the mental rotation processes (see chapter two). It seems that they could 
keep the provided information in short term memory and consequently did not need to carry 
out a mental rotation of the target before responding. 
In contrast, younger children did not seem to keep such information for one second as 
revealed by the RT function. Indeed, in the second experimental condition, when provided 
with structural and orientational information 1000 msec before the target presentation, five-
year-olds' RTs depended on stimulus orientation. Moreover, their error rates were quite high 
(more than 20 % of errors) for the larger stimulus orientations. These results confirmed 
Childs and Polich's (1979) and Waber et al. 's (1981) results. 
Similarly, in elderly people, although RTs were not significantly affected by stimulus 
orientation, the RT pattern suggested that their information-processing was not similar to that 
of young adults, but not yet identical to that of younger children. There was a hint that their 
RTs tended to be affected by stimulus orientation (see figure 16 B). As in younger children, 
their performance was poor for larger stimulus disorientation; error rates reached 15 to 25 % 
of errors for the 1200 , 1800 and 2400 orientations. Although provided with information on 
the forthcoming target, elderly people performed poorly in mental rotation tasks. 
The results are even more interesting in the third condition. In this condition, RTs were 
independent of stimulus orientation in all age categories. It seems that at any age, subjects 
can keep structural and orientational information in short term memory for 500 msec. 
However, despite short interval and target priming, error rates were still high (10-15 %) in 
the younger children and in the elderly people. 
In conclusion, experiment 3a seems to confirm that five-year-olds are particularly poor at 
maintaining spatial information (the stimulus orientation) for 1 second but that they can retain 
it for 500 msec. Similarly, experiment 3a suggests that such ability is poor in the elderly. In 
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contrast, eight-year-olds as well as young adults have no difficulty in keeping information in 
short term memory and benefit from this information while solving a mental rotation task. 
The difference observed between the younger children and the other subjects might be 
found in the difficulty that they have mentally rehearsing the information during the retention 
interval. Indeed, several authors (e.g. Cuvo, 1975: Ornstein, Nauss & Liberty, 1975) have 
suggested that young children do not spontaneously use rehearsal strategies. This topic will 
be reconsidered later. 
EXPERIMENT 3b 
The hypothesis that spatial information is particularly difficult to maintain in short term 
memory in children age 5 and in the elderly is tested in experiment 3b. To test this 
hypothesis, the second and third conditions of experiment 3a were replicated, introducing an 
interfering mask during the retention interval. 
Consequently, in experiment 3b, subjects were provided with structural and orientational 
information 1000 msec or 500 msec before the presentation of the target, but during this 
retention interval, an interfering mask was presented. Figure 17 presents the experimental 
conditions. It is assumed that the interfering mask would prevent subjects from mentally 
rehearsing the information provided. Indeed, in such a condition, they should be mainly 
busy with an inhibition of the irrelevant information. 
It was expected that in this condition, both five-year-olds and elderly people would be 
particularly impaired in the task. As a consequence, RTs in five-year-olds and in elderly 
people should be dependent on stimulus orientation in each condition, or in other words, 





Twenty four five-year-olds (mean age: 4; 11, range 4;09-5;03), 24 eight-year-olds (mean 
age: 8;01, range 7;09-8;03),24 young adults (mean age: 19, range 18-24) and 24 elderly 
people (mean age: 69, range 65-80) took part in the experiment. They were recruited through 
the same channels as in experiment 3a. 
Subjects from each age category were distributed among two experimental groups. Each 
experimental group was consequently composed of 12 subjects from each age category 
Cr. n = 48). 
Material 
Basically, the material was identical to experiment 3a except that only four orientations 
were used: 0°, 60°, 120° and 180°. Moreover, an interfering mask was displayed during the 
retention interval (see figure 17 for an illustration of the stimuli). The tasks were composed 
of 32 trials, 8 at each level of orientation; half of the stimuli at each level of orientation were 
normal, half were mirror-reversed. 
Procedure 
Two experimental conditions were tested. In the first condition, subjects were required to 
press on the space bar when they were ready. Following this, structural and orientational 
information about the target was displayed for 2 seconds. The information was removed 
from the computer screen and replaced by an interfering mask (see figure 17). The mask was 
presented for 1000 msec. After this, the target was presented. It was a normal or mirror-
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reversed version of the letter L. Subjects had to decide as quickly as possible whether the 
target was identical to the provided information. When the target was identical to the 
provided information, they depressed a key, and when different, they depressed another key 
on the keyboard (see experiment 3a). 
The second condition was basically the same as the first condition except that the mask 
was presented for 500 msec. 
Children were presented with a training session as in experiment 3a (see above for details 
on the procedure). 
1000 msec OR 
500 msec 
Figure 17 : Schematic representation of the experimental 
conditions. A: with a 1000 msec interval, and B: with a 500 





Reaction times functions are presented in figures 18 A and 18 B. Means and standard 
deviations are reported in appendix 4. 
A global repeated measures ANOV A was calculated on reaction times for correct 
responses. Significant effects of age, F(3,87) = 94.91, and of stimulus orientation, 
F(3,261) = 19.75, were observed. all with p < 0.0001. Similarly, the interaction 
stimulus orientation X age was also significant, F(9,261) = 6.25, p < 0.0001. A Tukey 
post-hoc analysis revealed that the 5-year-olds and the elderly people obtained similar RT 
means (p < 0.05). However, neither the experimental condition, F(1,87) = 0.01, p < 0.91. 
nor the other interactions between variables affected significantly the reaction times [age X 
experimental condition, F(3,87) = 0.3, p < 0.82; experimental condition X stimulus 
orientation, F(3,261) = 0.12, p < 0.95; and stimulus orientation X age X experimental 
condition, F(9,261) = 0.84, p < 0.58]. 
As an effect of age was observed in the global ANOV A, several analyses were carried out 
on each age category considered separately. When subjects had to keep structural and 
orientational information for 500 msec before the presentation of the target, RTs were 
significantly dependent on stimulus orientation in the five-year-olds, F(3,33) = 6.17, 
P < 0.002, and in the elderly people, F(3,33) = 5.31, P < 0.004. No effect of stimulus 
orientation was observed in the eight-year-olds, F(3,33) = 0.47, p < 0.71, and in the young 
adults, F(3,33) = 2.76, P < 0.07. 
When subjects had to retain the information for 1000 msec, similar results were 
observed. Stimulus orientation significantly affected RTs in the five-year-olds, F(3,30) = 
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3.82, p < 0.02, and in the elderly, F(3,33) = 8.77, p < 0.0002, but not in the eight-year-
olds, F(3,33) = 0.47, p < 0.7, and in the young adults, F(3,33) = 2.35, p < 0.09. 
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Figures 18 A and B : Reaction times (in msec) as a function of 
stimulus orientation in five-year-olds, eightyear-olds, young adults 
and elderly people (see symbols on the right side of each graph). 
Results for the "1000 msec retention interval" are presented in part 
A of the figure, whilst results for the "500 msec retention interval" 
are presented in part B. 
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Error rates 
Error rates are presented in figures 19 A and 19 B. Error means and standard deviations 
are reported in appendix 4. 
Similar analyses were computed on error rates. A global repeated measures ANOV A 
revealed significant effects of age, F(3,88) = 32.92, and stimulus orientation, 
F(3,264) = 21.95, with p < 0.0001. The interaction stimulus orientation X age was also 
significant, F(9,264) = 3.99, p < 0.0001. No effect of the experimental condition, 
F(1,88) = 0.58, p < 0.45, and of the other interactions between variables could be observed 
[age X experimental condition, F(3,88) = 2.02, p < 0.12; stimulus orientation X 
experimental condition, F(3,264) = 0.7, p < 0.55; and stimulus orientation X age X 
experimental condition, F(9,264) = 0.65, p < 0.75]. 
ANOV As calculated on each age category considered separately revealed a significant 
effect of stimulus orientation both in the five-year-olds, F(3,33) = 4.29, P < 0.01, 
F(3,33) = 2.74, p < 0.06, in the 500 and 1000 msec conditions respectively, and in the 
elderly people, F(3,33) = 18.14, p < 0.0001, F(3,33) = 9.26, p < 0.0001, in the 500 and 
1000 msec conditions respectively. No effect of stimulus orientation could be observed in 
the eight-year-olds in the 500 msec condition, F(3,33) = 1.73, p < 0.18, and in the 1000 
msec condition, F(3,33) = 1.59, p < 0.21. Similar results were observed in the young 
adults in the 500 msec condition, F(3,33) = l.14, p < 0.35, and in the 1000 msec condition, 
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Figures 19 A and B : Errors (in percent) as a function of 
stimulus orientation in five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young 
adults and elderly people (see symbols on the right side of 
each graph). Results for the "1000 msec retention interval" are 
presented in part A of the figure, whilst results for the "500 
msec retention interval" are presented in part B. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of experiment 3b was to confront subjects with an interfering mask while 
solving a mental rotation task. It was hypothesised that an interfering mask should affect the 
ability of younger children and elderly people to maintain vi suo-spatial information in short 
term memory. 
Experiment 3a showed that five-year-olds are poor at maintaining the orientation of the 
stimulus for 1000 msec in short term memory. It appeared in experiment 3a that the 
maximum time for which they can keep spatial information in short term memory seems to 
be around 500 msec. Indeed, when provided with orientational information about the target 
500 msec before the test, younger children respond at the same speed whatever the target 
orientation. 
Experiment 3b indicates that this 500 msec limit holds good only when subjects have no 
other information processing to carry out during the retention interval. When an interfering 
mask is displayed during the retention interval, it was found again in the five-year-olds that 
the linear RTs trend classically observed when subjects are carrying out mental rotations 
occured. In the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention interval conditions, younger children 
seem to be particularly impaired at maintaining spatial information in short term memory. 
This is also confirmed by the high error rates observed for the 600 to 1800 orientations. 
Similar results were observed in elderly people. In experiment 3a, RTs were not 
influenced by stimulus orientation in the 1000 msec retention interval condition, which 
suggested that elderly people are well able to keep spatial information for such a period. 
Such conclusions however have to be revised in the light of experiment 3b. 
Indeed, in this experiment, the introduction of an interfering mask during the retention 
interval modified RT functions in elderly people. It appeared that they are highly impaired in 
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maintaining spatial information in short term memory even for 500 msec. Their RT functions 
are similar to those observed in younger children (except maybe in the 500 msec retention 
interval where the effect of stimulus orientation is less pronounced - but still significant). In 
addition, error rates were also relatively high in both retention interval conditions, especially 
for the larger stimulus disorientations. 
It should also be noticed that, although no statistical analysis has been carried out between 
experiments 3a and 3b, the graphs suggest that error rates increased in five-year-olds and in 
the elderly people when an interfering mask is displayed during the retention interval. Such 
results confirm the negative effect of the interfering mask on young children and elderly 
performances; it suggests how poor these subjects are in solving such tasks. 
How should the effect of the interfering mask be interpreted ? When provided with 
information on the forthcoming target, subjects have to keep it in short term memory. It is 
well known that to maintain auditory information, subjects use the so-called articulatory loop 
(at least if we refer to Baddeley's working memory model). In some way, they sub-vocally 
rehearse the information. In case of visual information, it seems that a similar processes 
could exist. Kosslyn (1980) refers to a REGENERATE unit. This subsystem would allow 
subjects to mentally rehearse the information to keep it in the visual buffer, i.e. in short term 
memory. 
When an interfering mask is used, subjects are confronted with irrelevant information 
during the period when logically they should be mentally rehearsing the pattern to be kept in 
short term memory. However, it might be that the mask interferes with the rehearsal 
processes. Subjects have to allocate resources for the inhibition of the irrelevant information. 
Consequently, it might be that their ability to rehearse the relevant information is affected by 
the necessity to inhibit the interfering mask. 
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On the one hand, several studies (e.g. Cuvo, 1975; Flavell, Beach & Chinsky, 1966; 
Ornstein, Nauss & Liberty, 1975; Ornstein, Nauss & Stone, 1977) have suggested that 
before the age of 7, children do not use rehearsal strategies. Prior to age 7, children typically 
are not strategic. It is only after this age that they begin to use the simplest rehearsal 
strategies, i.e. overt or covert repetition of items to be remembered. This could account for 
the difficulties young children have in keeping spatial information in memory. In fact, the 
debate on young children's ability to mentally rehearse information is going on. It seems 
that young children can rehearse and spontaneously choose to do so for auditory speech 
material. However, when the memory material is presented in pictorial form, similar 
cognitive processing is not observed (Hitch & Halliday, 1983; See Gathercole, Adams & 
Hitch (1994) for a recent study on this issue). 
On the other hand, some studies (e.g. Zacks & Hasher, 1988) have reported the difficulty 
elderly people have in inhibiting irrelevant information during task solving. Hasher and 
Zacks (1988) have suggested that ageing would be associated with a reduction of efficiency 
of the inhibitory attentional processes which control the access and the temporary 
maintenance of irrelevant information in a task in progress. The existence of distracting 
information in working memory would be the expression of this deficit. It would interfere 
with the resolution of a particular problem. Such a deficit could explain why elderly people's 
RT functions became dependent on stimulus orientation in experiment 3b. 
In conclusion, although similar patterns of responses have been observed in five-year-
olds and elderly people, the responsibility could be shared between two different 
subsystems: A poor rehearsal ability in young children versus a lack of inhibition of 
irrelevant information in elderly (or both). 
The interfering mask did not affected either eight-year-olds or young adults. In both 
groups, RTs remained independent of stimulus orientation. These facts confirm that at these 
ages, both short term memory and mental rotation processes are mature. 
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EXPERIMENT 3c 
Through experiments 3a and 3b, the reasoning has been that five-year-olds and elderly 
people are very poor at maintaining spatial information in short term memory. However, no 
experiment tested whether structural information, i.e. the information processed by the 
ventral or visual subsystem, is preserved in memory. Experiment 3c is designed to assess 
this ability. 
The experimental procedure is similar to that used in the two previous experiments. 
Subjects were provided with structural and orientational information on the forthcoming 
target. Two experimental conditions were used, i.e. a 500 msec and a 1000 msec retention 
interval. The provided information was the letter L or C in different orientations. The target 
could be the same letter or the other one, always presented in the same orientation as the 
provided information. Subjects could be presented with the letter L in its normal version, 
the letter L in its mirror-reversed version, or the letter C as targets (the exact shapes are 
represented in figure 20). In the case where the provided information was an L in its normal 
version followed by an L in its normal version as the target, the two stimuli were structurally 
equivalent. The situation was identical when both the provided information and the target 
were the letter C. In the cases where the letter L in its mirror-reversed version was displayed 
after an L in its normal version, or when an L in its normal version followed the letter C, 
there was a structural difference between the information provided and the target. 
If younger children and elderly people can keep structural information in short term 
memory, when the provided information and the target are structurally different, they should 
immediately notice that there is a mismatch between both stimuli. This is particularly the 
case when the provided information is the letter C and the target is the letter L. 
Consequently, it was hypothesised that in such situation, subjects' RTs should not be 
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affected by stimulus orientation. They should immediately perceive the difference between 
the information kept in memory and the target. 
However, when the letter L, normal or mirror-reversed, serves as target after an L in its 
normal format, the results reported in experiment 3a (second and third experimental 
conditions) should be replicated in experiment 3c. Indeed, in such situation, if they do not 
keep the provided information in short term memory, they have to identify through a mental 
rotation process which version of the letter L is presented as a target. Indeed, as Simion, 
Bagnara, Roncato and Umilta (1982) mentioned: "same" and "different" judgments are 
mediated by the same holistic processor in the case of visual images. As a consequence, 
orientation functions for "different" or negative responses are like those for "same" or 
positive responses in showing a linear or quasi-linear relationship between latency and 
angular difference of the comparison stimuli. 
In showing a difference in RT functions in the two situations, i.e. same structure versus 
different structure, a differential development of the visual and spatial components of STM 
for visual patterns would be partly evidenced in five-year-olds and elderly people. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Ninety six subjects completed the experiment. Twenty four were children aged five (mean 
age: 5;02, range 4;09-5;03),24 were eight-years-old (mean age: 8;01, range 7;09-8;04),24 
were young adults (mean age: 22, range 18-29) and 24 were elderly people (mean age: 78, 
range: 71-80). 
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Children were from kindergartens and schools in the surroundings of Liege and Huy, 
Belgium. Young adults were undergraduate students or staff members at the University of 
Liege. Elderly people were recruited from personal contacts or attended a leisure club in the 
area of Liege. 
Material 
The shapes used in the task were the letters Land C (size: 3.5 cm x 2 cm). The stimuli 
were presented at the center of a computer screen placed at about 50 em from the subject. 
The stimuli were presented in four orientations: 00 , 600 , 1200 or 1800 • The letter L could be 
presented in its normal or mirror-reversed version. The letter C was always presented in its 
normal version. 
Subjects completed 64 trials: 12 times the letter L in its normal version followed by the 
letter L in its normal version (4 trials for each orientation); 12 times the letter L in its normal 
version followed by the letter L in its mirror-reversed version (4 trials for each orientation); 
12 times the letter C in its normal version followed by the letter L in its normal version (4 
trials for each orientation); and 12 times the letter C in its normal version followed by the 
letter C in its normal version (4 trials for each orientation). Trials were displayed in random 
order. Two keys on a keyboard were used to indicate responses. 
Procedure 
Two experimental conditions were tested. In the first condition, when subjects had 
depressed the space bar, they were provided with structural and orientational information on 
the target, i.e. they saw the letter L or C in its normal format in the orientation of the 
forthcoming target. Subjects were instructed that the provided information would be always 
an L or a C in its normal version. This information was presented for 2000 msec. Following 
this, the information was removed from the screen. One thousand msec later, the target was 
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displayed. It could be a normal or mirror-reversed version of an L, or the normal version of 
the letter C. Subjects had to decide as quickly as possible whether the target corresponded to 
the information provided. They depress one of two keys to answer (left hand on the W key 
of an AZERTY keyboard for "different" answer, i.e. mirror-reversed, and right hand on 
the + key of an AZERTY keyboard for "same" answer). 
The second condition was similar to the first condition except that the target appeared 500 
msec after the removal of the information. Figure 20 illustrates the two experimental 



















Figure 20 : Schematic representation of the experimental 
conditions. The provided information are represented on the 
left side with targets represented on the right side. In 
between: retention interval of 500 msec or 1000 msec. 
The provided information and the target were always 
presented in the same orientation. 
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In contrast to the young adults and the elderly people, children were first submitted to a 
training period as defined in the two previous experiments, i.e. discrimination learning of 
"same" and "different" judgments. A criterion test was also used to select subjects as in 
experiments 3a and 3b. 
RESULTS 
Reaction times 
In experiment 3c, there were two experimental conditions : the retention interval for the 
provided information was 500 msec or 1000 msec. Subjects could be presented with four 
trial categories: L normal followed by L normal (L > L), L normal followed by L mirror-
reversed (L > LM), C normal followed by L normal (C > L), or C normal followed by C 
normal (C > C). Stimuli could be presented at 0°,60°, 120° or 180°. 
A first global mixed ANOVA was calculated on RT means for correct responses with Age 
and Experimental conditions as between factors, and Trial category and Stimulus orientation 
as within factors. Results of this global ANOVA are presented in table 3. As all the 
interactions between independent variables but one were significant, several complementary 
analyses have been carried out to understand these complex significant effects. 
Complementary analyses on RTs Trial categories 
A first set of analyses was carried out on RTs for correct responses on each trial category 
considered separately. Age and experimental conditions were between factors and stimulus 
orientation was a within factor. RT means are reported in figures 21 A to 24 B. Data are 
also reported extensively in appendix 5. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of the global mixed ANOV A on RTs for correct responses 
Independent variables and interactions F(df) = value p value 
Age F(3,88) = 24.65 fJ < 0.0001 
Experimental condition (Retention) F(1,88) = 0.52 fJ < 0.47 : NS 
Age x Experimental condition F(3,88) = 0.28 /J < 0.84: NS 
Trial category F(3,264) = 50.8 p < 0.0001 
Trial category x Age F(9,264) = 8.62 p < 0.0001 
Trial category x Experimental condition F(3,264) = 10.24 p < 0.0001 
Trial category x Age x Exp. condition F(9,264) = 3.96 p < 0.0001 
Stimulus orientation F(3,264) = 42.52 p < 0.0001 
Stimulus orientation x Age F(9,264) = 8.9 fJ < 0.0001 
Stimulus orientation x Exp. condition F(3,264) = 7.45 fJ < 0.0001 
Stirn. orientation x Age x Exp. condition F(9,264) = 3.91 /J < 0.0001 
Trial category x Stimulus orientation F(9,792) = 14.57 p < 0.0001 
Trial cat. x Stirn. orientation x Age F(27,792) = 3.49 fJ < 0.0001 
Trial cat. x Stirn. orient. x Exp. condition F(9,792) = 5.63 p < 0.0001 
Trial cat. x Stirn. or. x Age x Exp. condo F(27,792) = 3.1 p < 0.0001 
L normal > L normal 
The results are reported in figure 21 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 21 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
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Figure 21A : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category L > L, the 1000 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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Figure 21B : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category L > L, the 500 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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In the first trial category (L > L), a global repeated measures ANOV A was carried out on 
RT means for correct responses. Age, F(3,88) = 26.16, p < 0.0001, and stimulus 
orientation, F(3,264) = 40.04, p < 0.0001, significantly affected RTs. In addition, 
Stimulus orientation interacted significantly with age, F(9,264) = 8.85, and with the 
retention interval, F(3,264) = 10.14, both with p < 0.0001. The triple interaction orientation 
x age x retention, F(9,264) = 5.05, p < 0.0001, was also significant. The retention interval 
did not affect the RTs by itself, F(l,88) = 0.76, p < 0.38, and did not interact significantly 
with age, F(3,88) = 0.33, p < 0.8. 
The analysis was carried on one step further. Repeated measures ANOV As were 
calculated on each age category considered separately to assess the effect of stimulus 
orientation. 
In the five-year-olds, RTs significantly increased as a function of stimulus orientation in 
the 1000 msec retention interval condition, F(3,33) = 22.02, p < 0.0001, but not in the 500 
msec retention interval condition, F(3,33) = 2.44, p < 0.08. Similar results were found in 
the elderly people: Stimulus orientation significantly affected RTs when the information was 
presented 1000 msec before the target, F(3,33) = 13.44, p < 0.0001, but not - although 
results were almost significant - when the information was presented 500 msec before the 
target, F(3,33) = 2.7, p < 0.06. 
In the eight-year-olds and the young adults, stimulus orientation significantly affected the 
RTs in both experimental condition [Eight-year-olds : 1000 msec retention interval: 
F(3,33) = 3, p < 0.04; 500 msec : F(3,33) = 5.45, p < 0.004; and Young adults: 
1000 msec retention interval: F(3,33) = 4.52, p < 0.009; 500 msec : F(3,33) = 3.46, 
p<0.03]. 
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L normal > L mirror-reversed 
The results are reported in figure 22 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 22 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
Similar results were observed for this trial category. A global ANOVA on RTs for 
correct responses showed that age, F(3,88) = 25.28, and stimulus orientation, 
F(3,264) = 27.39, both with p < 0.0001, significantly affected the RTs. Moreover, 
stimulus orientation interacted significantly with age, F(9,264) = 5.97, p < 0001, and with 
retention interval, F(3,264) = 6.55, p < 0.0003. The orientation x age x retention interval 
interaction was also significant, F(9,264) = 3.57, p < 0.0003. On the contrary, retention 
interval itself did not affect the RTs, FO ,88) = 2.33, p < 0.13, and did not interact with age, 
F(3,88) = 0.75, p < 0.52. 
ANOVAs were then computed on RTs for each age category considered separately. In 
the five-year-olds, an effect of stimulus orientation was observed both in the 500 msec 
condition, F(3,33) = 0.05, p < 0.05, and in the 1000 msec condition, F(3,33) = 15.1, 
P < 0.0001. Similar results were observed in the eight-year-olds [500 msec : 
F(3,33) = 4.77, P < 0.007; 1000 msec : F(3,33) = 3.2, p < 0.04], and in the elderly 
[500 msec : F(3,33) = 3.17, p < 0.04; 1000 msec : F(3,33) = 7.09, p < 0.0008]. In the 
young adults, the orientational effect was only observed in the 1000 msec retention interval 
condition, F(3,33) = 7.64, p < 0.0005, and not in the 500 msec condition, F(3,33) = 1.04, 
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Figure 22A : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category L > LM, the 1000 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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Figure 22B : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category L > LM, the 500 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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C normal > L normal 
The results are reported in figure 23 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 23 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
A global repeated measure ANOV A was carried out on RTs for correct responses. The 
RTs were significantly affected by age, F(3,88) = 19.93, p < 0.0001, and by stimulus 
orientation, F(3,264) = 4.7, P < 0.003. No other variable or interaction between variables 
was observed in this trial category [retention interval: F( 1,88) = 0, p < 0.97; age x retention 
interval, F(3,88) = 0.25, p < 0.86; stimulus orientation x age: F(9,264) = 1.29, p < 0.24; 
stimulus orientation x retention interval: F(3,264) = 0.49, p < 0.68; stimulus orientation x 
age x retention interval: F(9,264) = 1.07, p < 0.38]. 
The orientational effect was assessed for each age category considered separately. 
Stimulus orientation affected RTs in the 1000 msec retention interval in the five-year-olds, 
F(3,33) = 3.11, P < 0.04, in young adults, F(3,33) = 3.38, p < 0.03, and in the elderly 
people, F(3,33) = 2.93, p < 0.05, but not in the eight-year-olds, F(3,33) = 1.2, P < 0.23. 
In the 500 msec retention interval condition, stimulus orientation did not affect 
significantly RTs [Five-year-olds : F(3,33) = 2.75, p < 0.06 (almost significant); Eight-
year-olds : F(3,33) = 2.39, p < 0.09; Young adults: F(3,33) = 1.51. p < 0.23; and Elderly 
people: F(3,33) = 1.38, p < 0.27]. 
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Figure 23A : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category C > L, the 1000 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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Figure 23B : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category C > L, the 500 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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C normal > C normal 
The results are reported in figure 24 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 24 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
In the last trial category, similar analyses showed a significant effect of age, 
F(3,SS) = 23.42, p < 0.0001, stimulus orientation, F(3,264) = 2S.45, p < 0.0001, 
stimulus orientation x age, F(9,264) = 5.5, p < 0.0001, stimulus orientation x retention 
interval, F(3,264) = 3.64, p < 0.01. Other independent variables or interactions between 
variables did not significantly affect RTs [Retention interval: F(1,SS) = O.OS, P < 0.77; 
age x retention interval : F(3,SS) = 0.2S, p < 0.S4; stimulus orientation x age x retention 
interval: F(9,264) = 1.63, p < 0.11]. 
The analysis was carried one step further. Repeated measures ANDV As were calculated 
on each age category considered separately. In the five-year-olds, the RTs significantly 
increased as a function of stimulus orientation in the 1000 msec retention interval condition, 
F(3,33) = 10.24, p < 0.0001. No effect of stimulus orientation was observed in the 500 
msec condition, F(3,33) = 1.44, p < 0.25. 
In the elderly people, stimulus orientation significantly affected RTs when the information 
was presented 500 msec before the target, F(3,33) = 3.59, P < 0.02, as well as 1000 msec, 
F(3,33) = 14.99, p < 0.0001. 
In eight-year-olds, a stimulus orientation effect was observed in the 1000 msec condition, 
F(3,33) = 4.69, p < 0.008, but not in the 500 msec condition, F(3,33) = 2.34, p < 0.09. In 
contrast, in young adults, opposed results were observed: Stimulus orientation influenced 
significantly RTs in the 500 msec retention interval condition, F(3,33) = 5.22, p > 0.005, 
but not in the 1000 msec condition, F(3,33) = 1.73, p < O.IS. 
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Figure 24A : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category C > C, the 1000 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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Figure 24B : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation and age, for the trial category C > C, the 500 msec 
retention interval condition. 
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Complementary analyses on RTs Age categories 
ANDV As were carried out on RTs for correct responses in each age category considered 
separately to assess the effect of retention interval and its interaction with stimulus 
orientation in each trial category. 
Five-year-olds 
The results are reported in figure 25. 
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Figure 25 : Response times (in msec) as a function of 
stimulus orientation, trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C 
> L) and retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 
500 msec) in five-years-old children. 
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For the trial category L > LM, significant effects of retention interval, F(l,22) = 5.41, 
p < 0.03, stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 16.25, P < 0.0001, and stimulus orientation x 
retention interval, F(3,66) = 9.52, p < 0.0001, were observed. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) 
showed that the difference between the retention interval conditions was only present for 
the 1800 orientation. 
For the trial category L > L, the RTs were significantly affected by stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 23.03, P < 0.0001, but not by the retention interval, F(1,22) = 2.15, p < 0.16. 
However, the interaction between retention interval and stimulus orientation was 
significant, F(3,66) = 14.59, p < 0.0001. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) showed a significant 
difference between RT means for the 1800 orientation. 
When children were presented with a C followed by an L, RTs were only significantly 
affected by the stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 5.67, p < 0.002. Neither the retention 
interval, F(1,22) = 0, p < 0.98, nor the interaction retention interval x stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 0.25, p < 0.86, was significant. 
Finally, for the trial category C > C, the stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 10.69, 
P < 0.0001, and the interaction stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 4.92, 
p < 0.004, were significant, but not the retention interval itself, F( 1,22) = 0.84, p < 0.37. 
The interactions between trial category and stimulus orientation are presented in table 4 
for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
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TABLE 4 
Interaction between trial cate 0 and stimulus orientation. Retention interval: 500 msec 
C>C 
L>LM < 0.32 < 0.2 
L>L < 0.86 
C>C 
Interaction be . I tween tna category an d . stlmu us onentatIon. R I 1000 etenUon interva : msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 2.79, p < 0.06 F(3,33) = 8.04, p < 0.0004 F(3,33) = 13.3, p < 0.000 I 
~ 
L>L ~. ~ F(3,33) = 6.0 I, p < 0.002 F(3,33) = 19 p < 0.000 I 
".", i" 
" C>C .. , F(3 33) = 6.43 p < 0.002 
Eight-year-olds 
The RT values are reported in figure 26. 
In eight-year-olds, neither the retention interval [L > LM : F( I ,22) = 0.16, P < 0.69; 
L> L : F(I,22) = 0.38, p < 0.55; C > L : F(I,22) = 1.07, p < 0.31; and C > C : 
F(1,22) = 0.01, p < 0.91], nor the interaction between retention interval and stimulus 
orientation [L > LM : F(3,66) = 2.10, p < 0.11; L > L : F(3,66) = 1.58, p < 0.20; C > L : 
F(3,66) = 1.06, p < 0.45; and C > C : F(3,66) = 0.9, p < 0.45] significantly affected the 
RTs. 
However, RTs were significantly affected by the stimulus orientation in the trial category 
L > LM, F(3,66) = 5.92, p < 0.001, L > L, F(3,66) = 6.51, p < 0.0006, C > L, 
F(3,66) = 2.07, P < 0.01, and C > C, F(3,66) = 5.69, P < 0.002. 
The interactions between trial category and stimulus orientation are presented in table 5 
for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
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Figure 26 : Response times (in msec) as a function of 
stimulus orientation, trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, 
C > L) and retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black 
line: 500 msec) in eight-years-old children. 
. I Interaction between trIa category an 
TABLE 5 
d I sttmu us onentatton. R I 500 etentton interva : msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0.72, p < 0.55 F(3 33) = 1.\9, D < 0.33 F(3,33) = 2.9 D < 0.05 
L>L I " ',.1_ ;ik, ,., 
" 
F(3,33) = 0.47 , D < 0.71 F(3 33) = 2.04, 1) < 0.13 
""" C>C I~ *-.;,,'" ~ F(3 33) = 0.8 D < 0.5 
. I Interaction between tna category an d . sttmu us onentatlon. R etentton mterva I 1000 msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0.15, p < 0.71 F(3,33) = 3.65, D < 0.02 F(3 33) = 2.9, D < 0.12 
1~".1t #')1; T ", ~' F(3 ,33) = 2.68 p < 0.06 L>L ", ~; 0 F(3 33) - 1.32 f} < 0.29 
w 
, 
C>C ",.",,,,, '" F(3,33) = 1.36. fJ < 0.27 
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Young adults 
The results are summarised in figure 27. 
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Figure 27 : Response times (in msec) as a function of 
stimulus orientation, trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C 
> L) and retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 
500 msec) in young adults. 
As in eight-year-olds, the retention interval did not affect the RTs in young adults 
[L > LM: F(1,22) = 4.08, P < 0.06; L> L : F(I,22) = 1.56, p < 0.22; C > L : 
F( 1,22) = 1.67, p < 0.21; and C > C : F( I ,22) = 1.48, p < 0.24], and interacted 
significantly with stimulus orientation only in the trial category L> LM, F(3,66) = 3.65, 
p < 0.02. In fact, a Tukey test showed that RT means were different in the 600 and 1200 
orientation. 
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The stimulus orientation x retention interval interaction was not significant in the L > L 
trial category, F(3,66) = 0.52, p < 0.22, in the C > L category, F(3,66) = 1.93, p < 0.13, 
and in the C > C category, F(3,66) = 0.18, p < 0.91. 
On the contrary, stimulus orientation affected significantly RTs in all trial categories 
[L > LM : F(3,66) = 6.59, p < 0.0006; L> L : F(3,66) = 7.81, p < 0.0002; C > L : 
F(3,66) = 3.98, p < 0.01; and C > C : F(3,66) = 4.43, p < 0.008]. 
The interactions between Trial category and Stimulus orientation are presented in table 6 
for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
TABLE 6 
Interaction between trial cate 0 and stimulus orientation. Retention interval: 500 msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM ~~~~<~0~.6~9 __ -;~~~~~~<~0~.5~7 __ -;~~~~~~~~~ 
L> L < 0.79 
C>C 
and stimulus orientation. Retention interval : 1000 msec 




The results are reported in figure 28. 
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Figure 28 : Response times (in msec) as a function of stimulus 
orientation, trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C > L) and 
retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 500 
msec) in the elderly people. 
In the trial category L > LM, RTs were affected only by stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 9.51, p < 0.1. Retention interval, FO ,22) = 0.1, p < 0.75, and the interaction 
retention interval x stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 2. 17, p < 0.1, did not significantly 
affect the results. 
In the trial category L > L, similar results were observed: The stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 14.45, p < 0.0001, was the only variable to affect the RTs. Retention interval, 
F(l,22) = 0, p < 0.99, and stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 2.47, 
p < 0.07, were not significant, although the interaction almost reached significance. 
122 
No significant main effects or interactions were found in the trial category C > L 
[Retention interval: F(l,22) = 0.18, P < 0.68; Stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 0.14, 
P < 0.] 4; and Stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 0.97, P < 0.41]. 
Finally, in the trial category C > C, stimulus orientation significantly affected RTs, 
F(3,66) = ] 2.66, p < 0.000 I , but neither the retention interval variable, FCI,22) = 0.07, 
p < 0.79, nor the interaction stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 0.61. 
p < 0.61, was found to be significant. 
The interactions between Trial category and Stimulus orientation are presented in table 7 
for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
TABLE 7 









and stimulus orientation. Retention interval : 1000 msec 
A first global mixed ANOV A was carried out on errors with age and experimental 
conditions as between factors, and trial category and stimulus orientation as within factors. 
The results of this global ANOV A are presented in table 8. Several complementary analyses 
were carried out to understand the significant effects. 
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TABLE 8 
Results of the global mixed ANOV A on errors 
" 
Independent variables and interactions F(dt) = value p value 
Age F(3,88) = 16.24 p < 0.0001 
Experimental condition (Retention) F( I ,88) = 23.03 p < 0.0001 
Age x Experimental condition F(3,88) = 5.28 p < 0.002 
Trial category F(3,264) = 16.07 p < 0.0001 
Trial category x Age F(9,264) = 1.9 p < 0.05 
Trial category x Experimental condition F(3,264) = 8.37 p < 0.0001 
Trial category x Age x Exp. condition F(9 ,264) = 1.45 p < 0.17: NS 
Stimulus orientation F(3,264) = 17.19 p < 0.0001 
Stimulus orientation x Age F(9,264) = 1.67 p < 0.09: NS 
Stimulus orientation x Exp. condition F(3,264) = 4.02 p < 0.008 
Stirn. orientation x Age x Exp. condition F(9,264) = 0.78 p < 0.64: NS 
Trial category x Stimulus orientation F(9,792) = 0.94 p < 0.49: NS 
Trial cat. x Stirn. orientation x Age F(27,792) = 0.23 p< I: NS 
Trial cat. x Stirn. orient. x Exp. condition F(9,792) = 0.95 p < 0.48: NS 
Trial cat. x Stirn. or. x Age x Exp. condo F(27,792) = 0.45 p < 0.99: NS 
Complementary analyses on error rates : Trial categories 
A first set of analyses were carried out on errors on each trial category considered 
separately. Age and experimental conditions were between factors and stimulus orientation 
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was a within factor. Error rates (in %) are reported in figures 29 A to 32 B. Data are also 
reported extensively in appendix 6. 
L normal > L normal 
The results are reported in figure 29 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 29 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
In the first trial category (L> L), a global repeated measures ANOV A was carried out on 
errors. Error rates were significantly affected by age, F(3,88) = 16.7, p < 0.000 I, 
retention interval, F(1,88) = 24.01, p < 0.0001, and stimulus orientation, 
F(3,264) = 6.87, P < 0.0002. In addition, the retention interval significantly interacted 
with age, F(3,88) = 4.56, p < 0.005, and with stimulus orientation, F(3,264) = 3.15, 
p < 0.03. However, stimulus orientation did not interact significantly with age, 
F(9,264) = 1.06, p < 0.39, and the triple interaction orientation x age x retention, 
F(9,264) = 0.44, p < 0.91, did not significantly affect the performance. 
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Figure 29A : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category L > L, the 1000 msec retention interval 
condition. 
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Figure 29B : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category L > L, the 500 msec retention interval 
condition. 
Repeated measures ANOV As tested the effect of stimulus orientation on each age 
category considered separately. 
In the five-year-olds, error rates increased significantly as a function of stimulus 
orientation in the 1000 msec retention interval condition, F(3,33) = 5.04, p < 0.006, but 
not in the 500 msec retention interval condition, F(3,33) = 0.67, p < 0.58. Similar results 
were found in the elderly people: Stimulus orientation significantly affected error rates when 
the information was presented 1000 msec before the target, F(3,33) = 3.19, p < 0.04, but 
not when the information was presented 500 msec before the target, F(3,33) = 0.9, 
p<0.45. 
Stimulus orientation did not significantly affect error rates in eight-year-olds and young 
adults, [Eight-year-olds : 1000 msec retention interval : F(3,33) = 0.29, p < 0.83; 
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500 msec : F(3,33) = 0.31, p < 0.81; and Young adults: 1000 msec retention interval : 
F(3,33) = 1.6, P < 0.21; 500 msec : F(3,33) = 0.21, p < 0.89]. 
L normal > L mirror-reversed 
The results are reported in figure 30 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 30 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
Similar results were observed for this trial category. A global ANOV A on errors showed 
that error rates were significantly affected by age, F(3,88) = 9.35, retention interval, 
FO ,88) = 27.8, stimulus orientation, F(3,264) = 8.53, all with p < 0.000 I, and by the 
interaction retention interval x age, F(3,88) = 5.06, p < 0.003. On the contrary, the 
interactions retention interval x stimulus orientation, F(3,264) = 2.2, p < 0.09, stimulus 
orientation x age, F(9,264) = 0.55, p < 0.84, and stimulus orientation x age x retention 
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Figure 30A : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category L > LM, the 1000 msec retention interval 
condition. 
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Figure 30B : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category L > LM, the 500 msec retention interval 
condition. 
ANDV As were then computed for error rates for each age category considered separately. 
In the five-year-olds, an effect of stimulus orientation was observed in the 1000 msec 
condition, F(3,33) = 5.04, p < 0.006, but not in the 500 msec condition, F(3,33) = 0.41, 
p < 0.74. Similar results were observed in the elderly [500 msec : F(3,33) = O.SI, 
P < 0.49; 1000 msec : F(3,33) = 3.61, p < 0.02]. In contrast, in the eight-year-olds and in 
young adults, stimulus orientation did not affect performance [S-year-olds: 500 msec : 
F(3,33) = 0.52, p < 0.67; 1000 msec : F(3,33) = 0.21, P < 0.S9; young adults: 500 msec 
: F(3,33) = 0.46, p < 0.71; 1000 msec : F(3,33) = 2.25, p < 0.10]. 
C normal > L normal 
The results are reported in figure 31 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 31 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
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Figure 3] A : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
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Figure 31 B : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category C > L, the 500 msec retention interval 
condition. 
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A global repeated measure ANOVA was carried out on Errors. Errors were only 
significantly influenced by age, F(3,88) = 5.25, p < 0.002. No effect of other variables or 
interaction between variables was observed in this trial category [Retention interval: F( \ ,88) 
= 2.32, p < 0.13; Age x retention interval, F(3,88) = 1.16, p < 0.33; Stimulus orientation, 
F(3,264) = 2.06, p < 0.11; Stimulus orientation x Age: F(9,264) = 0.36, p < 0.95; 
Stimulus orientation x retention interval : F(3,264) = 0.0.04, p < 0.99; Stimulus 
orientation x age x retention interval: F(9,264) = 0.63, P < 0.77]. 
Unsurprisingly, when age categories were considered separately, the stimulus orientation 
did not affect error rates [5-year-olds: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 0.31, p < 0.8\; 1000 msec: 
F(3,33) = 0.28, p < 0.84; 8-year-olds: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 1.25, p < 0.31; 1000 msec: 
F(3,33) = 0.52, p < 0.67; Young adults: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 0.42, p < 0.74; 1000 msec: 
F(3,33) = 0.65, p < 0.59; and Elderly people: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 1.22, p < 0.32; 1000 
msec: F(3,33) = 1.14, p < 0.35]. 
C normal > C normal 
The results are reported in figure 32 A for the 1000 msec condition, and in figure 32 B 
for the 500 msec retention interval condition. 
In the last trial category, similar analyses showed a significant effect of age, 
F(3,88) = 12.2, P < 0.0001, of retention interval, F(1,88) = 10.09, p < 0.002, and of the 
interaction between these variables, F(3,88) = 3.72, p < 0.01, on performance. The effect 
of stimulus orientation on errors almost reached significance, F(3,264) = 2.38, p < 0.07. 
However, the other interactions between variables did not significantly affect error rates 
[Stimulus orientation x age: F(9,264) = 0.42, p < 0.92; Stimulus orientation x retention 
interval: F(3,264) = 1.3, P < 0.27; and Stimulus orientation x age x retention interval: 
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Figure 32A : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
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Figure 32B : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation and 
age, for the trial category C > C, the 500 msec retention interval 
condition. 
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The analysis was carried one step further. Repeated measures ANOV As were calculated 
on each age category considered separately to test the effect of stimulus orientation. This 
latter variable did not affect error rates [5-year-olds: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 0.5, p < 0.68; 
1000 msec: F(3,33) = 1.03, p < 0.39; 8-year-olds: 500 msec: F(3,33) = I, p < 0.41; 1000 
msec: F(3,33) = 0.08, p < 0.97; Young adults: 500 msec: F(3,33) = 0.28, p < 0.84; 1000 
msec: F(3,33) = 1.28, p < 0.29; and Elderly people: 500 msec: F(3,33) = \, p < 0.41; 1000 
msec: F(3,33) = 1.27, p < 0.3]. 
Complementary analyses on errors Age categories 
ANOV As were carried out on errors in each age category considered separately to assess 
the effect of retention interval and its interaction with stimulus orientation in each trial 
category. 
Five-year-olds 
The results are reported in figure 33. 
For the trial category L > LM, a significant effect of retention interval, F( I ,22) = 9.82, 
p < 0.005, and stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 3.76, p < 0.01, was observed. However, 
the interaction stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 1.19, p < 0.32, was not 
significant. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) showed that the difference between the retention 
interval condition was only present for the 1800 orientation. 
For the trial category L > L, errors were significantly affected by the retention interval, 
F(l,22) = 8.87, p < 0.007, and stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 3.62, p < 0.02. 
However, the interaction between retention interval and stimulus orientation was not 
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significant, F(3,66) = 1.43, p < 0.24. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) showed a significant 
difference between RT means for the 1200 and 1800 orientations. 
When children were presented with a C followed by an L, errors were not significantly 
affected by the retention interval, F(l,22) = 2.08, p < 0.16, the stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 0.54, p < 0.65, and the interaction retention interval x stimulus orientation, 
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Figure 33 : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus 
orientation, trial category (L> LM, L > L, C > C, C > L) and 
retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 500 
msec) in five-years-old children. 
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Finally, for the trial category C > C, only the retention interval, F(l,22) = 9.26, 
p < 0.006, significantly affected performance. Neither the stimulus orientation, 
F(3,66) = 1.43, P < 0.24, nor the interaction stimulus orientation x retention interval, 
F(3,66) = 0.2, p < 0.89, had a significant effect on error rates. 
The interactions between Trial category and Stimulus orientation are presented in table 9 
for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
TABLE 9 





TABLE 9 (continued) 
Interaction between trial cate 0 and stimulus orientation. Retention interval: 1000 msec 
C>L 
L>LM < 0.66 
L>L < 0.84 
Eight-year-olds 
The RT values are reported in figure 34. 
In eight-year-olds, neither the retention interval [L > LM : F(1,22) = 2.2, p < 0.15; 
L> L : F(l,22) = 2.1, p < 0.16; C > L : F(I,22) = 0.89, p < 0.36; and C > C : 
F(I,22) = 0.43, p < 0.52], the stimulus orientation [L > LM, F(3,66) = 0.59, p < 0.63, 
L> L, F(3,66) = 0.08, p < 0.97, C > L, F(3,66) = 0.35, P < 0.79, and C > C, 
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F(3,66) = 0.19, p < 0.9], nor the interaction between retention interval and stimulus 
orientation [L > LM : F(3,66) = 0.59, p < 0.97; L > L : F(3,66) = 0.51, p < 0.68; C > L : 
F(3,66) = 1.10, p < 0.35; and C > C : F(3,66) = 0.6, p < 0.61] significantly affected error 
rates. 
The interactions between trial category and stimulu orientation are presented in 
table 10 for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention interval s. 




--- ~ ~ 0 0 
.5 
'-" 00 600 1200 1800 00 600 1200 1800 
"" 0 
.... 
8-yr-olds : C > C 8-yr-olds : C > L ~ ... 
... 





00 600 1200 1800 00 60° 1200 1800 
Stimulus orientation 
Figure 34 : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus 
orientation, trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C > L) 
and retention interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 500 
msec) in eight-years-old children. 
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TABLE 10 
InteractIOn be . I tween tna category an d I stJmu us onentatlOn. R I 500 etentlOn mterva : msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0.67, p < 0.57 F(3,33) = 0.14, p < 0.94 F(3,33) = 0.74, p < 0.53 
"~~t,~ "~1' 
L>L ¥ F(3,33) = 1.18, p < 0.33 F(3,33) = 0.79, fJ < 0.51 
,< 
C>C F(3,33) = 1.18, p < 0.33 
InteractIOn be . I tween tna category an d . sUmu us onentatlOn. R I 1000 etenllon mterva : msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = o, ~ < I F(3,33) = 0.37, p < 0.78 F(3,33) = 0.41 , fJ < 0.74 
L>L F(3,33) = 0.74, p < 0.53 F(3,33) = 0.57 fJ < 0.64 
,', ~, 
C>C , F(3,33) = 0.74, fJ < 0.53 
Young adults 
The results are summarised in figure 35. 
In young adults, the retention interval [L> LM : F( 1,22) = O. 19, p < 0.66; L> L : 
F(1,22) = 0.08, p < 0.78; C > L : F(1,22) = 0.86, p < 0.36; and C > C : F(I,22) = 0.62, 
p < 0.44], the stimulus orientation [L > LM: F(3,66) = 1.75, p < O. 17; L> L : 
F(3,66) = 1.43, P < 0.24; C > L : F(3,66) = 0.91, P < 0.44; and C > C : F(3,66) = 0.49, 
p < 0.69] and the interaction retention interval x stimulus orientation [L > LM, 
F(3,66) = 1.03, P < 0.38; L > L, F(3,66) = 0.46, p < 0.71, C > L, F(3,66) = 0.08, 
p < 0.97, and C > C, F(3,66) = 0.64, P < 0.59] did not significantly affect the 
performances. 
The interactions between trial category and stimulus orientation are presented in 
table II for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
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Figure 35 : Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation, 
trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C > L) and retention 
interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line : 500 rnsec) in 
young adults. 
TABLE II 
. 1 etween tna category an d stlrnu us onentatlon. R etentlon mterva I 500 
L>L c>c C>L 
rnsec 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0.21, f) < 0.89 F(3,33) = 0 f) < I Fe3 ,33) = 0.23 I) < 0.87 
~c'" 
If-L>L :;&,'\k ' .:i1: .. ,":« .,~;: F(3 ,33) = 0.24 f) < 0.86 F(3 33) = 0.12. f} < 0.95 ". ~ 
I~ ~.@"'" " 
'" C>C F(3 33) = 0.24, I) < 0.86 
Interaction be . I tween trIa category an d . stlrnu us onentatlOn. R I 1000 etentlon mterva : rnsec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3.33) - 0.36, p < 0.78 Fe3,33) = 2.25 f) < 0.1 F(3 ,33) - 0.67 f) < 0.57 
L>L , F(3,33) = 0.3, f} < 0.83 Fe3 33) = 0.64, D < 0.59 
."'''' .:' ',' 
C>C .rtill' tY .K ,E. F(3,33) = 0.3, f} < 0.83 
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Elderly people 
The results are reported in figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Errors (in %) as a function of stimulus orientation, 
trial category (L > LM, L > L, C > C, C > L) and retention 
interval (grey line: 1000 msec; black line: 500 msec) in the 
elderly people. 
In the trial category L> LM, errors were significantly affected by the retention interval, 
F(1,22) = 23.65, p < 0.0001, and the stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 3.35, p < 0.02. 
The interaction retention interval x stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 1.93, p < 0.13, did not 
significantly affect performance. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) showed a difference between the 
retention intervals for the 00 , 1200 and 1800 orientations. 
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In the trial category L > L, similar results were observed : Retention interval, 
F(I ,22) = 19.02, p < 0.0002, and stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 3.11, p < 0.03, 
significantly affected performance. The interaction stimulus orientation x retention 
interval, F(3,66) = 1.51, p < 0.22, was not significant. A Tukey test (p < 0.05) revealed 
a significant difference between the retention intervals for the 1200 and 1800 orientations. 
No variable and interaction between variables was found significant in the trial category 
C > L [Retention interval; F( I ,22) = 1.48, p < 0.24; Stimulus orientation, F(3,66) = 
1.33, p < 0.27; and Stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 1.0 I, p < 0.39]. 
Finally, in the trial category C > C, the retention interval significantly affected RTs, 
F(3,66) = 8.34, p < 0.009, but neither the stimulus orientation variable, F( I ,22) = 0.98, 
p < 0.41, nor the interaction stimulus orientation x retention interval, F(3,66) = 1.38. 
p < 0.26, was found to be significant. 
The interactions between trial category and stimulus orientation are presented in 
table 12 for both the 500 msec and 1000 msec retention intervals. 
TABLE 12 
InteractIon b . ] etween tna category an d I stlmu us onentatlon. R I 500 etentlOn mterva ; msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0, p < 1 F(3,33) = 0.06 v < 0.98 F(3,33) = 1.12, lJ < 0.35 
L>L «. F(3,33) = 1.35, fJ < 0.27 F(3,33) = 1.17. v < 0.33 "" ., 
C>C ~ F(3 33) = 1.35 v < 0.28 
InteractIOn be . I tween tna category an d . stlmu us onentatlon. R I 1000 etentlOn mterva : msec 
L>L C>C C>L 
L>LM F(3,33) = 0.18 p < 0.91 F(3,33) = 0.54, v < 0.66 F(3,33) - 1.12, v < 0.35 
", 
~, 
L>L -"",,~ ". F(3,33) = 0.54 v < 0.66 F(3 33) - 0.55, p < 0.65 
C>C " F(3 33) - 0.54 p < 0.66 
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DISCUSSION 
In experiment 3c, subjects were confronted with four different situations. In the first 
situation, they had to keep in short term memory the letter L in a particular orientation, and 
they were then (after a retention interval of 500 msec or 1000 msec) presented with the same 
stimulus. In the second situation, they were first presented with the letter L and after the 
retention interval, they were presented with the letter L in its mirror-reversed version. In the 
third situation, they were presented with the letter C followed, after the retention interval, by 
the letter C. Finally, in the fourth situation, they were presented with the letter C, and after 
the retention interval, by the letter L. 
Results of experiments 3a were replicated in the first and second situations, i.e. L > Land 
L > L mirror-reversed. When five-year-olds and elderly people had to keep the provided 
information in STM before the presentation of the target, the RTs were dependent on 
stimulus orientation. Although they received information before the presentation of the 
target, they had to activate a mental rotation process to discriminate between a normal versus 
a mirror-reversed version of the letter. In contrast, when the retention interval was reduced 
to 500 msec, flat functions were observed. Reducing the retention interval made them able 
to keep the spatial characteristics of the provided information in STM. Globally, although 
no statistical analyses have been carried out to compare experiments 3a and 3c, error rates 
were equivalent in both experiments for these experimental conditions. Younger children 
and the elderly performed the task poorly, especially for the larger stimulus disorientations. 
Results of experiments 3a were also replicated in eight-year-olds and young adults. An 
effect of stimulus orientation was observed in both retention interval conditions. However, 
the RT slope was too slight to interpret these data as evidence for the use of a mental rotation 
process (see chapter two). Whatever the retention interval, they can keep the information in 
STM which makes mental rotations unnecessary. 
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It was hypothesized in the two previous experiments that these results suggest poor 
maintenance of spatial (orientational) information in STM before the age 5 and in elderly 
people. 
If the orientational effects observed in experiments 3a and 3b were due to the difficulty 
younger children and the elderly had in keeping spatial information in STM, these effects 
should disappear when the information to be kept in STM is structurally different from the 
target. In fact, in this later condition, subjects should immediately notice the mismatch 
between the information provided and the target. The structural difference between the two 
stimuli makes the decision easier and, whatever the stimulus orientation, the responses 
should be uniformly rapid. Subjects, whatever their age, can keep the stimulus structure in 
STM and consequently do not need to activate a transformational process to compare the 
stimuli. In this condition, the stimuli are immediately recognised as being different. Indeed, 
it has been shown that mental rotation is not required to identify rotated letters (e.g. Eley, 
1982; Corballis, Zbrodoff. Schetzer & Butler, t 978). but mental rotation is required to 
discriminate between normal versus mirror-reversed versions of rotated letters (Corballis. 
t 988). This situation corresponds to the fourth one in experiment 4b where the provided 
information was the letter C and the forthcoming target was the letter L. 
The results tend to confirm this hypothesis. Let us first consider the performance of five-
year-olds and elderly people. When the information provided and the target were 
structurally different. i.e. the letter C was followed by the letter L, whatever the retention 
interval. the RTs never reflected the use of mental rotation. The RT functions were the same 
in all subjects. Although the RTs were dependent on stimulus orientation, the RT slope was 
too low to provide evidence for the mental rotation process. Moreover. performances were 
better in this situation (C > L) than in the other situations whatever the stimulus orientation. 
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In eight-year-olds and in young adults, similar results were observed. They did not use 
mental rotation to solve the task, a fact which is not surprising since no mental rotation is 
required to solve such a task ! 
In such conditions, it seems that all subjects, whatever the age, immediately noticed the 
mismatch between the information provided and the target. As a consequence, subjects 
answered uniformly rapidly whatever the stimulus orientation. The very first visual 
processing of the target would be sufficient to observe a structural difference between the 
simultaneously presented stimuli. The segments composing the two letters are different: (I) 
The letter L is composed of one long bar and a shorter bar with a right angle at one of their 
extremities, (2) the letter C is composed of one long bar but two shorter bars also connected 
through right angles at their extremities with the two shorter bars pointing in the same 
direction. The analysis of the stimulus structure during initial visual processing allows the 
subjects to recognise that the presented stimuli are different in structure. In other words, 
these results suggest that young children and elderly people can keep structural information 
in STM. 
CONCLUSION 
Several studies have assessed mental rotation abilities in young children and in the elderly 
(see chapter two for a review of the literature). Although contradictory results are reported, 
most of the authors agree that mental rotation ability is poor in young children (usually 
referred as preoperational children) and in the elderly. They can carry out mental rotations 
but their performance is usually poorer than that of older children (older than about 8 years 
of age) and young adults. Several explanations have been suggested but none of them is at 
present completely satisfactory. 
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However, when the successive steps subjects have to take when confronted with a mental 
rotation task are considered, it seems that young children and the elderly people already 
encounter some difficulties during the very first steps. They are particularly poor at encoding 
and maintaining visuo-spatial information in short term memory. But to understand this 
issue, it seems that vi suo-spatial short term memory should not be considered as a single 
system but rather as a dual system (although a correlation has been observed between 
memory span for visual patterns and mental rotation ability - when performance is 
considered across age categories - [see chapter three]). 
Kosslyn (1994) and Logie and Marchetti (1991) have suggested two different but related 
models of visuo-spatial STM. Both of them suggest that vi suo-spatial STM can be 
decomposed into - at least - two subsystems. Kosslyn (1994) refers to a ventral and a dorsal 
subsystem while Logie and Marchetti (1991) refer to a visual and a spatial subsystem (see 
also, Logie & Reisberg, 1992). The first subsystem (ventral or visual) would process, 
roughly speaking, the structural characteristics of the stimuli, while the second (dorsal or 
spatial) would process the spatial characteristics. The distinction between these two 
subsystems has been supported by neuropsychological studies (e.g. Farah, Hammond, 
Levine & Calvanio, 1988) as well as by connectionist modelling (Rueckl, Cave & Kosslyn, 
1989). 
The present experiments suggest that both young children and elderly people are poor at 
maintaining the spatial characteristics of a visual pattern in short term memory. Specifically, 
they seem to be poor at maintaining the orientation of the stimulus. If we consider both 
Kosslyn's (1994) and Logie's (1995) theoretical models, we might suggest that the spatial 
component of these models is not yet developed in young children and is affected by ageing. 
These results are probably related to other data reported by other authors. Koenig et al. 
(1990) have reported that young children are poor at assessing metrical distances between 
objects, and Hoyer (1990) has suggested that the localisation processes engaged in visual 
processing might be affected by ageing. However, other authors (see Ellis et ai., 1987) 
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have reported that the localisation of objects would be automatically encoded and would 
emerge early in cognition. 
Consequently, this suggests that in the domain of spatial cognition. some spatial 
processes could be more affected by age than others. The dorsal system - if engaged in the 
processing assessed in the experiments as hypothesized - should probably be decomposed 
into other subsystems. However, other studies are necessary to understand the genesis of 
the spatial analysis involved in visual processing. 
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Chapter six 
Mental scanning: A life-span studYJ 
While navigating in town, we sometimes have the impression of visualising the route to 
reach a particular shop, for instance. In such situations, we generate images and scan them 
to "observe" some important characteristics of the route so that we can anticipate our actions. 
Subjects often report the use of a mental scanning process while reading a map, navigating 
in complex environments, remembering details on some of Rodin's sculptures seen in the 
Hotel Biron during a last trip to Paris. 
With the emergence of research on mental imagery in the I 970s, mental scanning began 
to be studied in young adults using mental chronometry as a paradigm. Classical cognitive 
psychology studies have been presented in the general introduction. These classical 
chronometrical studies have been criticised but, again, cognitive neuroscience can help to 
interpret the data in mental scanning. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, Kosslyn (1994) recently reformulated his theory of mental 
imagery in the context of recent cognitive neuroscience. In his theory, image scanning has to 
be considered as an image transformation process. 
This study was done in collaboration with Dr Yannick Courbois, University Charles de Gaulle, Lille, 
France. It is part of a research program assessing the development of imagery abilities in normal and 
mentally retarded children. Normal populations are considered in our laboratory in Li~ge, while the 
French laboratory specializes in mental handicap. Several studies have been presented at different 
international conferences (see Courbois & Lejeune, 1994; Courbois, Lejeune & Aslani, 1995). 
Experiment 4a and 4b will appear in : Lejeune, M. & Courbois, Y. L'inspection mentale de l'enfance 
au grand age: donnees empiriques recentes. In J. Bideaud and Y. Courbois (in press), L'image menlale 
el son developpemenl. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
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Brandt, Stark, Hacisalihzade, Allen and Tharp (1989) showed that eye movements 
always accompany the visualisation of objects, and that subjects also tend to move their eyes 
when scanning visual images internally (Kosslyn, 1973, collected similar unpublished data -
reported in Kosslyn, 1994, p. 366). Kosslyn (1994, p. 366) suggests that "most image 
scanning consists of recalling what one saw when actually scanning along an object, but 
such processing may be more common than one might suspect; people usually have the 
opportunity to scan an object at the time it is initially perceived". 
Image scanning would then be akin to imaged saccades (although imaged saccades are not 
clearly defined in Kosslyn's (1994) theory, they would correspond functionally to real 
saccades but without any physical eye movements). However, in the classical studies 
mentioned before, a more continuous process was suggested by RT patterns. Kosslyn 
(1994) suggests that such a process might mimic what we would actually see after a head or 
body rotation rather than after eye movements. 
Image scanning may involve two mechanisms: One that shifts the attention window (see 
description of Kosslyn's (1994) model in the general introduction) and one that transforms 
the contents of the visual buffer. This latter mechanism may rely on motor programs that 
ordinarily move the eyes, head or body. It replaces the contents of the visual buffer with a 
new representation of material that is contiguous to that in the previous representation. In 
this case the image would "slide" across the visual buffer. 
Studies of children 
If many studies have considered the development of mental rotation abilities in children 
(see chapter 2), very little research has been reported on the development of mental 
scanning. 
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While assessing the development of different imagery subsystems, Kosslyn, Margolis, 
Barret, Goldknopf and Daly (1990) studied image scanning in children. Subjects were 
presented with a "square ring" of boxes covering the entire computer screen (see figure 37). 
Three boxes in different locations at the periphery of the screen were coloured, and the 
centre of the screen was empty. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a pattern made of 
these three cells (with a different location for each trial). Subjects were required to memorise 
the location of the three target cells. When memorised, they pressed the space bar which 
resulted in the removal of the pattern. Immediately after, an X or an 0 appeared within one 
of the boxes of the square ring. When an X was displayed, subjects had to say whether the 
X was located in a previously coloured cell. When an 0 was displayed, subjects had to 
judge whether the cell located opposite the 0 on the other side of the ring was previously 
coloured. This latter condition was supposed to require the activation of an image scanning 
process while the first one should not. RTs were higher when subjects were supposed to be 
using a scanning process whatever the age of the subjects (five-, eight- and fourteen-year-
olds). The unique difference across age categories was the scanning speed: The older the 
subjects were, the quicker they responded. These results were in fact also observed in other 
imagery tasks, especially in mental rotation tasks. These effects have been explained by the 
modification in efficiency of more central processes (see chapter 3). 
Figure 37 : "Square ring" used in the 
image scanning task [adapted from 
Kosslyn et al.'s (1990)]. 
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Although interesting, this study is really too simple. Image scanning is assessed in a 
purely dichotomous way: Scanning or no scanning. Classical studies which assess the 
scanning abilities of young adults utilize different distances between the targets. 
Courbois (1994) has proposed a most interesting task to assess image scanning ability in 
children. He modified Kosslyn et al. 's (1990) task: Three distances were used: No 
scanning, scanning over a short distance, and scanning over a long distance. Four blocks 
composed of two contiguous rectangles served as stimuli. Two blocks were centered at the 
top and the bottom of the screen (referred to as the horizontal blocks), while the two others 
were centered on the right side and on the left side of the screen (referred to as the vertical 
blocks). The distance separating the two vertical blocks was approximately twice the 
distance separating the two horizontal blocks. The centre of the screen was empty and three 
of the eight rectangles were coloured at random in blue - supposed to represent water -
(different rectangles were coloured for each trial). In the imaginal condition. subjects (five 
and eight-year-olds) were required to press the space bar after memorising the location of the 
coloured rectangles. Once the space bar was depressed. the rectangles emptied and the 
"water" was replaced by a fish or a fisherman. When a fish was presented. subjects had to 
decide whether the fish was in a previously filled rectangle. When a fisherman was 
presented, subjects had to judge whether the rectangle on the opposite side had been filled 
in. In a control condition, the rectangles were not emptied when the fish or the fisherman 
was displayed. 
Courbois (1994) reported that RTs were significantly longer in the control condition than 
in the imaginal condition in an age categories. Moreover. RTs were longer in younger 
children - an effect also reported in Kosslyn et al. 's (1990) study. In addition, scanning 
times were significantly affected by the distance. But complementary analysis showed that 
distance affected RTs more clearly in the imaginal condition, and that the difference between 
RTs in both conditions is smaller for a short distance than for a long distance. Performance 
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(error rates) was significantly better in eight-year-olds, but was affected by distance in all 
age categories. 
Although distance affected RTs in the imaginal condition, Courbois (1994) suggests that 
his data do not validate an image scanning hypothesis. Indeed, the increase of RTs between 
short scanning and long scanning was less important in the imaginal condition than in the 
case of the perceptual control. Although scanning times were dependent on the scanned 
distance, the speed at which the attentional window was moved was identical (or even 
quicker) than the rate at which a visual pattern was scanned. According to Courbois (1994), 
such results could be explained if we consider that mental scanning is not imaginal but 
simply perceptual. Subjects would move their eyes to the cells on the opposite side of the 
fisherman and would respond on the basis of memory traces of the target cells. 
In summary, only two studies have been reported so far. However, conflicting results are 
observed from the studies. The task difficulty would possibly explain the differences 
between these two studies. 
Studies of elderly people 
Only one study (Dror & Kosslyn, 1994) assessed mental scanning abilities in the elderly. 
However, given that many studies have suggested that mental imagery and visual perception 
share many mechanisms (see Farah, 1988; Finke and Shepard, 1986), it might be reasonable 
to consider with interest the results reported by Folk and Hoyer (1992) which suggest that 
the ability to scan a perceptual image is not affected by ageing. 
Dror and Kosslyn (1994) presented elderly people (mean age: 63 - which is not very old!) 
and young adults with a square ring of boxes with three cells filled in black. Subjects were 
required to memorise the location of these cells. Once memorised, they press the space bar 
which resulted in a brief display (50 msec) of an arrow followed by the removal of the 
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pattern. The arrow pointed to one cell (that was possibly previously filled in) and the 
distance between the arrow and the cell could be zero, medium (1.2 cm) or long (2.1 cm). 
Subjects were required to judge as quickly as possible whether the arrow pointed to a 
previously filled cell. Results showed that scanning times increased with distance in the 
same way in both groups. Similarly, the overall level of performance was similar in both 
groups. It appears that mental scanning ability seems to be preserved with ageing. 
Conclusion 
Although it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions on the basis of three developmental 
studies, all of them showed significant effect of distance on scanning times in young 
children and elderly. However, if the distance effect can be associated with a mental 
scanning process in the elderly, it might be that another interpretation should be given to the 
results reported in the child studies: the distance effect could be interpreted in terms of 
activation of visual perception processes (specifically, eye movements). 
EXPERIMENT 48 
Experiment 4a was designed to assess mental scanning ability from childhood to old age. 
Five and eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly people were tested using the same task. 
The task is based on a research done by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) and Finke and Pinker 
(1982) -see above. Three patterns (fish) appeared at the periphery of the computer screen. 
Subjects were required to memorise the exact location of the fish. Once this was memorised, 
they pressed the space bar which resulted in the removal of the fish. Immediately after, an 
arrow was presented for 200 msec. The arrow pointed to a previously presented fish or 
somewhere else. Subjects were required to judge as quickly as possible whether or not the 
arrow pointed to a previously presented target. 
150 
Two versions of the task were used: A mental scanning task and a perceptual control (the 
fish were displayed on the screen at the same time as the arrow). Moreover, the effect on 
subjects' performance of irrelevant information during image scanning was tested. An 
animated mask filled the screen while the subjects were supposed to be scanning the image. 
RTs serve as indicators which test the use of a mental scanning process. A significant 
increase of RTs with distance in both experimental conditions was expected. Moreover, it 
was hypothesized that the irrelevant information should not affect the performance of young 
adults but should affect the ability of young children to scan a mental image. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Four groups of subjects were tested: 48 5-year-olds (mean age: 5 years I month, ranged 
from 4 years 9 months to 5 years 3 months), 48 8-year-olds (mean age: 8 years 2 months, 
ranged from 7 years 9 months to 8 years 3 months), 48 young adults (mean age: 24 years, 
ranged from 19 years old to 32 years olds), and 48 elderly people (mean age: 73 years, 
ranged from 65 to 80 years of age). Gender was not controlled. 
All subjects were volunteers. The children (5 and 8-year-olds) were recruited in several 
public and private schools in the surroundings of Liege and Brussels, Belgium. The young 
adults were all students or staff members of the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Liege. The elderly people came from several sources (private contacts, leisure clubs, or 
old people's home), all in the Liege area. 
No subject suffered or had suffered from a neurological disease. 
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Material 
A 4 X 5 invisible grid covered the entire surface of the computer screen. Three cells in the 
perimeter were filled in with a fish pattern at random on each trial. When the space bar was 
pressed, an arrow was displayed for a period (different for the two tests - see below). The 
arrow was presented in one of the matrix cells but never in the cells composing the screen 
borders. The arrow was oriented at 0°,45° or multiple of 45°, and could be presented at three 
distances from the target (short, medium and long). The arrow could point either to one of 
the fish or anywhere else. Twenty four trials were administered, half with the arrow pointing 
to a fish, and half with the arrow pointing somewhere else. Subjects were required to say 
whether the arrow pointed to a fish. We expected YES responses for half the trials and NO 
for the other half. The trial ordering was random. 
Two tests were used: (I) an imagery test, and (2) a perceptual control. In the imagery 
test, the fish were immediately removed before a 200 msec presentation of the arrow. In the 
perceptual control, the fish and the arrow were presented until the subject responded. 
Two versions of each test were used, labelled: (1) NOMASK, and (2) ANIMASK. In 
the NOMASK version, the screen remained empty after the removal of the fish and the 
arrow in the imagery test, and the presentation of the fish and the arrow in the perceptual 
control. In the ANIMASK version, circles successively invaded the screen at high speed 
after the display/removal of the targets and the arrow. 
All the situations are represented in figure 38. 
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Imagery Test: NOMASK 
... 
200 msec 




Perceptual control: NOMASK 
~----------~-.(~ ~ r-------------~ 
Perceptual control: ANIMASK 




Figure 38 : Schematic representation of the experimental situations : Imagery 
tests and perceptual control 
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Procedure 
Subjects' ability to scan an image was assessed individually. The subjects were 
comfortably seated in front of the computer screen at a normal distance (approx.imately 
50 cm). The key-board was at their disposal to respond and to control the arrow display. 
They were instructed that they would have to judge whether a displayed arrow pointed to a 
fish or not. In the imagery test, they were informed that the arrow would appear only for a 
very short period of time. The session began with a short training similar to the ex.perimental 
test, except that each correct response was reinforced by the onset of a short ascending 
sequence of sounds. Subjects were presented with three fish randomly displayed at the 
perimeter of the screen. When they estimated that they had sufficiently memorised the 
positions of the fish, they had to depress the space bar. Twenty msec later, an arrow was 
displayed for a particular period of time (see the different tests). If the arrow pointed at a 
fish, the subjects had to depress a designated key as quickly as possible. In the other case, 
the subject pressed another key. After the subject had responded, another set of three fish 
was presented. Reaction times and errors were recorded. Latencies were measured from the 
onset of the arrow. 
Half of the subjects were submitted to the NOMASK version of the test, and half to the 
ANIMASK version. Half of them were first presented with the imagery test followed by the 
perceptual control, and half were presented first with the perceptual control followed by the 
imagery test. The experimental design is schematically represented in table 13. 
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TABLE 13 
NOMASK version ANIMASK version 
Imagery> Perc. Or/ Imagery> Perc. Or! 
5-yr-olds: n = 12 5-yr-olds: n = 12 
8-yr-olds: n = 12 8-yr-olds: n = 12 
Young adults: n = 12 Young adults: n = 12 
Elderl~ peoEle: n = 12 Elderl~ peoEle: n = 12 
Perc. Ctr/ > Imagery Perc. Or! > Imagery 
5-yr-olds: n = 12 5-yr-olds: n = 12 
8-yr-olds: n = 12 8-yr-olds: n = 12 
Young adults: n = 12 Young adults: n = 12 
Elderly people: n = 12 Elderly people: n = 12 
RESULTS 
Analyses of variance included age (5 year-olds, 8 year-olds, young adults, and elderly 
people), tests (imagery versus perceptual control; in brief: IMA and PER), test versions 
(with or without an animated mask after the display of the arrow; in brief: NOMASK or 
ANIMASK), test order (imagery test followed by the perceptual control, or vice versa; in 
brief: IMA-PER and PER-IMA), and the scanning distance (short, medium, and long) as 
independent variables. The scanning distance and test variables were within subject 
variables, and the other variables were between subjects variables. Response times (RT) and 
errors served as dependent variables. As the distance to scan is only clearly defined when the 
arrow points to the target, only these trials have been analysed for the purpose of this 
experiment. Response times were submitted to analyses of variance (A NOV A) after the 
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removal of outliers. i.e. RT greater than 10 seconds and those exceeding 2 S.D. from the 
mean cell. 
Response times 
Results are reported in figure 39. A global ANDV A revealed a significant effect of Age. 
F(3.137) = 85.89, Test order. F(l.137) = 7.44. Test version, F( 1,137) = 77.52, and 
Distance. F(2.274) = 30.74. all with p < 0.05. Similarly. the interactions Test version x 
Age. F(3.137) = 20.89. Test version x Test order. F(l.137) = 7.87. Distance x Age. 
F(6.274) = 2.66. Distance x Test version. F(2.274) = 2.95. Distance x Test order, 
F(2.274) = 3.39. Distance x Age x Test order, F(6,274) = 3.7, and Distance x Age x Test 
versions x Test order, F(6.274) = 3.83. were significant with p < 0.05. 
Imagery test 
Subjects in four age categories performed the tests at a significantly different speed, 
F(3,141) = 78.77, p < 0.0001. and the RTs were differently affected by the scanning 
distance (interaction age x distance, F(6,282) = 2.17, p < 0.05) as well as when considered 
in interaction with the test versions, the scanning distance and the test order (interaction age 
x distance x test version x test order, F(6,282) = 3.85, p < 0.001). A global significant 
effect of distance was also observed, F(2,282) = 17.62, P < 0.000 I, and the scanning 
distance interacted significantly with the test version and the test order, F(2,282) = 3.67, 
P < 0.03. 
The other variables or interactions between variables did not significantly affect the 
reaction times [test version: F(1,141) = 0.74, p < 0.39; test order: F(l,14l) = 3.48, 
p < 0.06; age x test version : F(3.141) = 0.23. p < 0.88; age x test order : 
F(3,141) = 1.06, p < 0.37; test version x test order: F(1,141) = 0.14, p < 0.71; age x test 
version x test order: F(3.141) = 1.7. p < 0.17; distance x test version: F(2,282) = 2.83, 
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p < 0.06; distance x age x test version: F(6.282) = 0.7. p < 0.65; distance x test order: 
F(2,282) = 0.77, p < 0.47; and distance x age x test order: F(6,282) = 1.55, p < 0.161. 
The age categories behaved differently in the ANIMASK version of the test. In this case. 
RTs were globally different between the age categories, F(3,66) = 32.07, p < 0.0001. No 
other significant effect was observed [test order: F( I ,66) = 0.58. p < 0.45; age x test order: 
F(3,66) = 0, p < 1; distance x age : F(6,132) = 0.3, p < 0.94; distance x test order: 
F(2, 132) = 1.69, p < 0.18; and distance x age x test order: F(6, 132) = 1. p < 0.431. 
In the NOMASK version, age significantly affected the RTs, F(3,75) = 48.66, 
P < 0.0001, and interacted with the order, F(3,75) = 3.36, p < 0.02, with the distance, 
F(6,150) = 2.13, p < 0.05, and with the distance combined with the order, 
F(6, 150) = 3.75, p < 0.002. No significant effect of the test order was observed when 
considered independently of the other variables, F( I ,75) = 3.44, P < 0.07, nor when 
considered in interaction with distance, F(2, 150) = 2.58, p < 0.08. 
Consequently, complementary ANOV As have been computed for each age category 
considered separately. In the five year-oIds, RTs were a function of the scanned distance, 
F(2,62) = 4.54, p < 0.01, but the functions were different in the two test versions when 
considered in interaction with the test order (interaction distance x test version x test order, 
F(2,62) = 3.95, p < 0.02). The effects of the scanned distance in the different experimental 
situations are reported in table 14. As it appeared, when the children were submitted to the 
imagery test before the perceptual control (IMA-PER), the RT functions were independent of 
the scanned distance. However, in the other situation (PER-IMA), RTs were influenced by 
the scanned distance when no animated mask (ANIMASK) was displayed after the arrow 
presentation. No other significant effect was observed in the five-year-oIds [test version: 
F(l ,31) = 0.05, p < 0.83; test order: F(l ,31) = 1.71, p < 0.2; test version x test order: 
F(1 ,31) = 1.23, p < 0.28; distance x test version: F(2,62) = 1.01, p < 0.37; and distance x 
test order: F(2,62) = 1.23, p < 0.3]. 
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In the eight year-olds, RTs were significantly different in the two test versions 
(NOMASK versus ANIMASK), F( I ,38) = 4.41, P < 0.04, and they changed as a function 
of the scanned distance, F(2,76) = 13.25, p < 0.0001. As the test order did not significantly 
affect the results, F( 1 ,38) = 1.62, p < 0.21, and did not interact with other variables I test 
order x test version: F(1,38) = 0.82, p < 0.37; test order x distance: F(2, 76) = 0.25, p < 
0.78; test order x test version x distance: F(2,76) = 0.62, p < 0.541, the two subgroups 
being submitted to the tests in a different order were grouped together. As presented in table 
14 and in figure 39, RTs were significantly influenced by the scanned distance in all the 
experimental situations. This was also confirmed by the absence of a significant effect for 
the interaction between the distance and test version variables. F(2.76) = 1.67. p < 0.2. 
In the young adults, the scanned distance significantly influenced the RTs. 
F(2,72) = 17.04, p < 0.0001. but this influence was different in the two test versions 
(interaction distance x test version, F(2,72) = 3.79, p < 0.03) although the test version itself 
did not significantly affect the RTs, F( 1,36) = 1.22, P < 0.28. However, RTs were 
dependent on the scanned distance in all the experimental situations (see table 14). Results 
are displayed on figure 39. As for the eight year old children, all the young adults were 
combined for these complementary analyses; no order effect was observed Itest order: 
F(l,36) = 0.85, P < 0.36; test order x test version: F(l,36) = 1.09, p < 0.3; test order x 
distance: F(2,72) = 0.17, p < 0.84; test order x distance x test version: F(2,72) = 0.49, 
P < 0.61]. 
Finally, in the elderly people, RTs were significantly influenced by the scanned distance. 
F(2,72) = 6.8, P < 0.002. However, complementary analyses showed that the effect of the 
scanned distance disappeared in the ANIMASK version of the test (see table 14 and figure 
39). As for young adults and eight-year-olds, no single or combined effect of test order was 
observed [test order: F(l,36) = 0.02, p < 0.88; test order x test version: F(l,36) = 1.11, 
p < 0.3; test order x distance: F(2,72) = 2.4, p < 0.1; test order x distance x test version: 
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F(2,72) = 0.22, p < 0.8]. In addition, no global difference on RT was ob erved between 
test versions, F(I ,36) = O.OJ , P < 0.94, and test version did not significantly interact with 
distance, F(2,72) = 1.15, P < 0.32. 
Five-year-olds: Five-year-olds : 




3000 ~ 3000 
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Imagery lest, NOMASK 
-0-
Perceptual ctrl, ANI MASK 
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S M L 
Dis1ances 
Figure 39 : Reaction times as a function of distance (S = short; M = medium; L = long) 
in the four age categories in the different experimental conditions (Imagery test and 
perceptual control, with - ANIMASK - or without - NOMASK - an animated mask) _ 
see symbols used in the right corner of the figure. 
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TABLE 14 
Effect of scanned distance on RTs in msec in the Imagery test 
Five-year-olds : 






















F(2,8) = 0.81 
p < 0.48 
F(2,16) = 0.34 
p < 0.71 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five-year-olds : 






















F(2,20) = 0.39 
p < 0.68 
F(2,18) = 5.43 
p < 0.01 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------.---------------------------
Eiiht-y~m:-olds ; 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
1560 1667 1725 F(2,38) = 5.33 
(SO: 314) (SO: 294) (SO: 397) p < 0.009 
NOMASK version: 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
1398 1386 1623 F(2,42)= 10.02 
(SO: 299) (SO: 282) (SO: 450) p < 0.0003 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Y:QYDi adylts ; 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
721 808 810 F(2,32) = 4.46 
(SO: 218) (SO: 164) (SO: 191) p < 0.02 
NOMASK version: 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
634 680 814 F(2,44)= 16.15 
(SO: 206) (SO: 207) (SO: 276) p < 0.0001 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elder!):: ~Qlll~ ; 
ANlMASK version: Fvalue 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
913 1006 1035 F(2,40) = 1.62 
(SO: 295) (SO: 377) (SO: 322) p < 0.21 
NOMASK version: 
Oistances Short . Medium Long 
863 942 1082 F(2,36) = 7.67 
(SD: 473) (SO: 506) (SO: 647) p < 0.002 
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Perceptual control 
Patterns of response in the four age categories were different, F(3,143) = 76.67, 
p < 0.0001, but the differences depended on the test order (interaction age x order, 
F(3,143) = 3.32, p < 0.02) and when the effect of age was combined with the effects of the 
scanned distance and the test order (interaction age x distance x test order, 
F(6,286) = 3.43, p < 0.003). In addition, a global effect of test order, F(l,143) = 7.15, 
p < 0.008, and of distance, F(2,286) = 23.2, p < 0.0001, was observed. The distance also 
interacted significantly with test order, F(2,286) = 3.29, P < 0.04. 
No effect of other variables or interaction between variables was observed [test version: 
F(1,143) = 0.4, p < 0.53; age x test version: F(3,143) = 0.38, p < 0.76; test version x test 
order: F(1,143) = 0.22, p < 0.64; age x test version x test order: F(3,143) = 0.27, 
P < 0.85; distance x age : F(6,286) = 1.73, p < 0.11; distance x test version : 
F(2,286) = 0.93, p < 0.39; distance x age x test version: F(6,286) = 0.48, P < 0.83; 
distance x test version x test order: F(2,286) = 0.5, P < 0.61; and distance x age x test 
version x test order: F(6,286) = 1.65, p < 0.13]. 
The effect of age was observed both in the ANIMASK and NOMASK versions of the 
test, respectively with F(3,68) = 44.19, and F(3,75) = 35.21 (p < 0.0001). 
In the NOMASK version, distance, F(2,150) = 10.47, P < 0.000 1, and the interaction 
age x distance x test order, F(6,150) = 3.78, p < 0.002, were also observed to be 
significant. No other effect was observed in this version of the test [test order : 
F(1 ,75) = 2.6, p < 0.11; age x test order, F(3,75) = 2.28, P < 0.09; distance x age: 
F(6, 150) = 0.64, p < 0.7; and distance x test order: F(2, 150) = 2.49, p < 0.09]. 
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In the ANIMASK version, a global effect of test order, F(1,68) = 5.33, p < 0.02, and 
distance, F(2,136) = 15.39, P < 0.0001, was observed. The interaction between age and 
distance almost reached significance, F(6, 136) = 1.98, p < 0.07. No other significant effect 
was observed [age x test order : F(3,68) = 1.13, p < 0.34; distance x test order : 
F(2,136) = 0.9, p < 0.41; and distance x age x test order: F(6,136) = 0.43, P < 0.86]. 
To understand the psychological meaning of these statistical analyses, several ANOV As 
were computed on the age categories separately. In the Five year-olds, RTs were globally 
influenced by the test order, F(1,34) = 4.68, p < 0.04, and by the scanned distance, 
F(2,68) = 4.38, p < 0.02. In addition, the interaction distance x order was significant, 
F(2,68) = 3.88, p < 0.03. Table IS shows that the scanned distance affected the RTs both 
when the perceptual control was performed before the imagery test and when no mask was 
displayed after the presentation of the arrow. Means are shown in figure 39. Test version, 
F(l ,34) = 0.25, p < 0.62, test version x test order, F(1 ,34) = 0.18, p < 0.67, distance x 
test version, F(2,68) = 0.48, p < 0.62, and distance x test version x test order, 
F(2,68) = 1.49, p < 0.23, did not significantly affect RTs. 
In the Eight year-olds, RTs were significantly affected by the scanned distance, 
F(2,76) = 20.99, p < 0.0001. The effect of the scanned distance was identical in each 
experimental situation (see table 15 and figure 39). For these analyses, all eight-year-old 
subjects were grouped [no test order effect: F(1,38) = 0.02, p < 0.89; test order x test 
version: F(1,38) = 1.48, p < 0.23; test order x distance: F(2,76) = 1.59, p < 0.21; test 
order x test version x distance : F(2,76) = 0.68, p < 0.51]. Moreover, no effect of test 
version, F(2,38) = 0.26, p < 0.61, and of the interaction test version x distance, 
F(2,76) = 0.61, p < 0.54, was observed. 
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TABLE 15 
Effect of scanned distance on RTs in msec in the Perceptual control 
Five-year-oIds : 






















F(2,14) = 1.53 
P < 0.25 
F(2,16) = 0.39 
p < 0.68 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five-year-olds : 






















F(2,20) = 3.16 
p < 0.06 
F(2, 18) = 6.04 
P < 0.009 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ei~ht-year-olgs : 
ANlMASK version: Fvalue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
1737 1803 1994 F(2,38) = 6.19 
(SD: 592) (SO: 499) (SO: 603) p < 0.005 
NOMASK version: 
Distances Short Medium Long 
1744 1791 2095 F(2,42) = 16.18 
(SD: 292) (SO: 356) (SO: 397) p < 0.0001 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.-----
YQyn~ ildylts : 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
760 774 849 F(2,32) = 5.72 
(SO: 228) (SO: 192) (SO: 259) p < 0.008 
NOMASK version: 
Distances Short Medium Long 
941 1001 1072 F(2,44) = 5.48 
(SO: 280) (SO: 343) (SO: 352) p < 0.008 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~lderly peo121~ ; 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
987 1229 1303 F(2,38) = 10.96 
(SO: 463) (SO: 723) (SO: 668) p < 0.0002 
NOMASK version: 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
1019 1164 1486 F(2,36) = 7.47 
(SD: 288) (SO: 499) (SO: 783) p < 0.002 
163 
In the young adults, the test versions, the test order, as well as the scanned distance 
significantly influenced the RTs, with FO ,36) = 6.99, F(l,36) = 8.72, and F(2,72) = 9.44 
respectively, all with p < 0.05. However, as the test order did not interact with the other 
variables [test order x test version: F(1,36) = 1.53, p < 0.22; test order x distance: 
F(2,72) = 0.24, P < 0.78; test order x distance x test version, F(2,72) = 0.11, P < 0.891, 
we grouped the young adults all together. RTs were significantly influenced by the scanned 
distance in all the experimental situations (see table 15 and figure 39) - a fact also suggested 
by the absence of significant effect of the interaction distance x test version, 
F(2,72) = 0.46, p < 0.63. 
Finally, in the elderly people, RTs were affected by the scanned distance, 
F(2,70) = 15.55, p < 0.0001. This effect was present in each experimental situation (see 
table 15 and figure 39). No other significant effect was observed [test version : 
F(1,35) = 0.37, p < 0.55; test order: F(1,35) = 0.38, p < 0.54; test version x test order: 
F(1,35) = 0, p < 1; distance x test version: F(2,70) = 1.23, p < 0.3; distance x test order: 
F(2,70) = 0.31, p < 0.74; and distance x test version x test order: F(2,70) = 0.6, 
p < 0.55]. 
Errors 
Results are reported in figure 40. We carried out a repeated measures ANOYA on errors 
for the different experimental tests with age (5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, young adults and 
elderly people), distance (short, medium and large), test version (ANIMASK and 




ANOV As showed that subjects from the different age categories performed the test 
differently, F(3,175) = 15.35, p < 0.0001. Moreover, errors were different in the two test 
versions, F(1, 175) = to.27, p < 0.002, and were affected by the scanned distance, 
F(2,350) = 19.86, p < 0.0001. In some age categories, it appeared that test order affected 
the performances: age x test order, F(3, 175) = 3.14, p < 0.03. 
No other significant effect was observed [age x test version: F(3, 175) = 0.86, p < 0.46; 
test order: F(1,175) = 0, p < 0.99; test version x test order: F(1,175) = 1.21, P < 0.27; 
age x test version x test order : F(3,175) = 0.23, p < 0.88; distance x age : 
F(6,350) = 0.96, P < 0.45; distance x test version: F(2,350) = 1.12, P < 0.33; distance x 
age x test version : F( 6,350) = 0.63, p < 0.71; distance x test order : F(2,350) = 1.12, 
p < 0.33; distance x age x test order: F(6,350) = 0.97, p < 0.44; distance x test version x 
test order: F(2,350) = 0.95, p < 0.39; and distance x age x test version x test order: 
F(6,350) = 0.43, P < 0.86]. 
Differences across age categories were observed in both test versions: ANIMASK 
version, F(3,88) = 8.42, p < 0.0001, and NOMASK version, F(3,87) = 7.8, p < 0.0001. 
Similarly, a global significant effect of distance was observed in the ANIMASK, 
F(2,176) = 12.46, p < 0.0001, and in the NOMASK version, F(2,174) = 7.91, 
p < 0.0005. 
The other variables or interaction between variables did not affect performance in the 
ANIMASK version [test order : F(I,88) = 0.65, p < 0.42; age x test order: 
F(3,88) = 2.22, P < 0.09; distance x age: F(6, 176) = 0.19, p < 0.98; distance x test order: 
F(2,176) = 1.8, p < 0.17; distance x age x test order: F(6,176) = 0.78, p < 0.59], and in 
the NOMASK version [test order : F(1,87) = 0.56, p < 0.46; age x test order : 
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F(3,87) = 1.18, p < 0.32; distance x age: F(6,174) = 1.6, p < 0.15; distance x test order: 
F(2, 174) = 0.03, p < 0.97; distance x age x test order: F(6,174) = 0.61, P < 0.72]. 
Complementary analyses were carried out on each age category separately. In Five-year-
olds, performance was globally affected by the distance, F(2,88) = 5.02, p < 0.009. 
However, when the test versions were considered separately, this effect disappeared. No 
other significant effect was observed in this age category [test version: F(l,44) = 1.82, 
p < 0.18; test order: F(1,44) = 2.06, p < 0.16; test version x test order: F(I,44) = 0.35, 
p < 0.56; distance x test version: F(2,88) = 0.27, p < 0.76; distance x test order: 
F(2,88) = 0.04, p < 0.96; distance x test version x test order: F(2,88) = 0.16, p < 0.861. 
In eight-year-oIds, performance was globally different in the two test versions, 
F(1,43) = 12.29, p < 0.001. However, neither the distance, F(2,86) = 2.38, P < 0.1, nor 
the test order, F(1,43) = 1.98, p < 0.17, significantly affected performance. In addition, 
they did not interact with other variables [test version x test order: F(l,43) = 2.24, 
p < 0.14; distance x test version : F(2,86) = 0.54, P < 0.58; distance x test order: 
F(2,88) = 0.54, p < 0.58; distance x test version x test order: F(2,86) = 1.5, p < 0.231. 
In young adults, errors were influenced by the test version, F( 1 ,44) = 10.65, 
p < 0.002, and the distance, F(2,88) = 4.85, p < 0.01. Complementary analyses showed 
that the distance effect was only present in the ANIMASK version of the test whatever the 
test order, F(2,46) = 5.34, p < 0.008. No other variables or interaction between variables 
significantly affected performance [test order: F(1,44) = 1.01, p < 0.32: test version x test 
order: F(1,44) = 0.25, p < 0.62: distance x test version: F(2,88) = 2.43, p < 0.09: distance 
x test order: F(2,88) = 0.6, p < 0.55; distance x test version x test order: F(2,88) = 0.69, 
P < 0.5]. 
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Figure 40 : Errors (in percents) as a function of distance (S = short; M = medium; 
L = long) in the four age categories in the different experimental conditions 
(Imagery Test and perceptual control , with - ANIMASK - or without - NOM ASK-
an animated mask) - see symbols used in the right corner of the figure. 
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Finally, in the elderly, both the distance, F(2,88) = 10.29, p < 0.000 I, and the test order, 
F(1,44) = 3.95, p < 0.05, affected performance. Moreover, the interaction between distance 
and test order almost reached significance, F(2,88) = 2.91, p <.0.06. The distance effect 
was observed in both version of the test: ANIMASK version, F(2,46) = 4, P < 0.03, 
NOMASK version, F(2,46) = 6.61, p < 0.003. No other significant effect was observed in 
the elderly people [test version: F(1,44) = 0.14, P < 0.71; test version x test order: 
F(1,44) = 0.01, p < 0.94; distance x test version: F(2,88) = 0.32, p < 0.72; distance x test 
version x test order: F(2,88) = 0.05, p < 0.95]. 
A summary of the distance effect on errors for each age category in each test version 
(considering test order in five-year-olds for a correspondence between the analysis of errors 
and RTs) is presented in table 16. Percentages are reported in figure 40. 
Perceptual control 
A global ANOV A revealed a significant effect of age on errors, F(3, 175) = 3.0, 
p < 0.03, as well as a global effect of distance, F(2,350) = 22.72, p < 0.0001. 
Performance in the perceptual control test was not affected by other variables or interaction 
between variables [test version : F(1,175) = 1.0 I, p < 0.31; age x test version : 
F(3,175) = 1.82, p < 0.14; test order: F(l,175) = 0.5, p < 0.48; age x test order: 
F(3,175) = 0.23, p < 0.87; test version x test order: F(1,175) = 0.49, p < 0.48; age x test 
version x test order: F(3,175) = 0.43, p < 0.73; distance x age: F(6,350) = 1.7, p < 0.12; 
distance x test version : F(2,350) = 1.31, p < 0.27; distance x age x test version : 
F(6,350) = 0.56, p < 0.76; distance x test order: F(2,350) = 1.18, p < 0.31; distance x 
age x test order : F(6,350) = 1.86, p < 0.09; distance x test version x test order : 
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F(2,350) = 1.73, p < 0.18; distance x age x test version x test order: F(6,350) = 1.47, 
p < 0.19]. 
In the ANIMASK version of the test, the scanned distance significantly influenced error 
rates, F(2,176) = 9.8, p < 0.0001. Moreover, a complex interaction between independent 
variables also appeared to be significant: distance x age x test order, F(6,176) = 2.68, 
P < 0.02. This effect will be decomposed in further analyses. No other significant effect 
was observed in this test version [age: F(3,88) = 0.76, p < 0.52; test order: F(1,88) = 0, 
p < 1; age x test order: F(3,88) = 0.08, p < 0.97; distance x age: F(6,176) = 1.2, 
p < 0.31; distance x test order: F(2,176) = 0.9, p < 0.41]. 
In the NOMASK version, significant effects of age, F(3,87) = 3.79, p < 0.01, and 
distance, F(2,174) = 13.87, p < 0.0001, were observed. The other variables or interaction 
between variables did not affect performance [test order: F(1 ,87) = 0.9, p < 0.34; age x test 
order: F(3,87) = 0.54, P < 0.65; distance x age: F(6, 174) = 1.06, p < 0.39; distance x test 
order: F(2,174) = 1.92,p < 0.15; distance x age x test order: F(6,t74) = 0.81, p < 0.56]. 
Complementary ANOVAs showed that no independent variables significantly affected 
younger children's performance [test version: F(1,44) = 3.03, p < 0.09; test order: 
F(1,44) = 0.56, p < 0.46; test version x test order: F(1,44) = 0.71, p < 0.4; distance : 
F(2,88) = 2.24, p < 0.11; distance x test version: F(2,88) = 1.89, p < 0.16; distance x test 
order: F(2,88) = 0.47, p < 0.63; distance x test version x test order: F(2,88) = 0.54, 
p < 0.58]. 
Distance did appear to significantly affect performance in the eight-year-olds, 
F(2,86) = 3.96, p < 0.02, in the young adults, F(2,88) = 6.58, p < 0.002, and in the 
elderly people, F(2,88) = 12.39, p < 0.0001. 
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No other significant effect was observed in the eight-year-olds [test version 
F(1,43) = 0.79, p < 0.38; test order: F(1,43) = 0.02, P < 0.88; test version x test order: 
F(1,43) = O.lS, p < 0.67; distance x test version: F(2,S6) = 0.S2, p < 0.44; distance x test 
order : F(2,86) = 2.29, p < 0.11; distance x test version x test order : F(2,S6) = 1.71, 
p < 0.19], in the young adults [test version : F(1,44) = 0.26, p < 0.61; test order: 
F(1,44) = 0.3, p < 0.87; test version x test order: F(l,44) = 0.26, p < 0.61; distance x test 
version : F(2,8S) = O.OS, P < 0.93; distance x test order : F(2,SS) = 1.09. p < 0.34; 
distance x test version x test order: F(2.88) = 1.91, P < 0.15], and in the elderly people 
[test version: F(l,44) = 0.04. p < 0.84; test order: F(l,44) = 0.11. p < 0.74; test 
version x test order: F(1,44) = 0.21, p < 0.65; distance x test version : F(2,88) = 0.17, 
p < 0.S5; distance x test order: F(2.SS) = 2.72, p < 0.07; distance x test version x test 
order: F(2,S8) = 2.06, p < 0.13]. 
A summary for the Distance effect in the two test versions is presented in table 17, and 
errors (in %) are reported in figure 40. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 4a was designed to assess mental scanning abilities from childhood to old 
age. A modified version of Finke and Pinker (1982) and Dror and Kosslyn (1994) tasks was 
used. Subjects were required to judge as quickly as possible whether an arrow (briefly 
presented) pointed to a target in a previously memorised pattern. The arrow was presented 
immediately after the removal of the memorised pattern, and the distance between the target 
and the arrow could be short, medium or long. Subjects did several versions of the task. 
The main hypothesis states that if mental scanning is taking place while the subject is 
solving the task. RTs should be linearly dependent on the scanned distance. Results were 
somewhat divergent from this basic hypothesis. A second major hypothesis was that RTs 




Effect of scanned distance on errors in the Imagery Test 
Number of correct responses (max: 4) and standart deviations are reported 
five-year-olds ; 






















F(2.22) = 1.75 
P < 0.2 
F(2.22) = 1.24 
p < 0.31 
---------------------------------------------------------------.-------------------------------------------
Eive-year-olds : 






















F(2,22) = 1.21 
p < 0.32 
F(2,22) = 1.44 
P < 0.26 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biibt-y~m:-Qlg~ : 
ANIMASK version: FvaIue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.45 3.08 3.0 F(2,46) = 1.65 
(SD: 0.88) (SD: 0.71) (SD: 1.1) p < 0.2 
NOMASK version: 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.78 3.56 3.65 F(2,44) = 0.95 
(SD: 0.67) (SO: 0.66) (SO: 0.57) p < 0.39 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
XQUD& agults : 
ANlMASK version: FvaIue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.66 3.29 2.95 F(2,46) = 5.34 
(SD: 0.56) (SO: 0.62) (SO: 0.99) p < 0.008 
NOMASK version: 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.71 3.71 3.58 F(2,46) = 0.44 
(SO: 0.55) (SO: 0.46) (SO: 0.58) p < 0.65 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f;Iderly ~~l~ : 
ANIMASK version: FvaIue 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
3.41 3.08 2.75 F(2,46) = 4.0 
(SO: 0.71) (SO: 0.82) (SO: 0.94) p < 0.03 
NOMASK version: 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
3.45 3.29 2.7 F(2,46) = 6.6 t 
(SD: 0.77) (SO: 1.08) (SO: 1.12) p < 0.003 
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TABLE 17 
Effect of scanned distance on errors in the Perceptual Control 
Number of correct responses (max: 4) and standart deviations are reported 
Five-year-olds : 






















F(2,22) = I 
P < 0.38 


























F(2,22) = 2.75 
p < 0.09 
F(2,22) = 1.18 
P < 0.32 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eil:ht-year-old~ ; 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Oistances Short Medium Long 
3.66 3.58 3.5 F(2,46) = 0.74 
(SO: 0.86) (SO: 0.88) (SO: 1.02) p < 0.48 
NOMASK version: 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.91 3.82 3.52 F(2,44) = 3.54 
(SO: 0.28) (SO: 0.65) (SO: 0.59) p < 0.04 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YQUnl: adults ; 
ANlMASK version: Fvalue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.83 3.83 3.5 F(2,46) = 3.17 
(SO: 0.48) (SO: 0.38) (SO: 0.58) p < 0.05 
NOMASK version: 
Medium Distances Short Long 
3.83 3.75 3.45 F(2,46) = 3.34 
(SO: 0.38) (SO: 0.53) (SO: 0.65) p < 0.04 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bld~rly pe<>P-I~ : 
ANIMASK version: Fvalue 
Distances Short Medium Long 
3.71 3.54 3.04 F(2,46) = 5.07 
(SO: 0.85) (SO: 0.65) (SD: 0.85) p < 0.01 
NOMASK version: 
Medium Long Distances Short 
3.75 3.41 3.00 F(2,46) = 6.91 
(SO: 0.84) (SO: 1.01) (SO: 1.25) p < 0.002 
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Two tasks were used: An imagery task and a perceptual control task. In the imagery task, 
subjects had to judge whether the arrow pointed to a target after the removal of the to-be-
memorised pattern. In contrast, in the perceptual task, the decision was taken while the 
targets and the arrow were simultaneously presented. In both tasks, it was expected that 
distance should affect scanning times. However, subjects should respond more quickly in 
the perceptual control task than in the imagery task. Indeed, in the perceptual control task, a 
single eye movement is necessary to respond. 
Two versions of the tasks were used. An animated mask was displayed immediately after 
the presentation of the arrow. It was expected that this irrelevant information should not 
affect subjects' performance if their scanning process is mature. Based on previously 
published studies, it was hypothesised that this mask could interfere with the scanning 
process in younger children. However, it should not influence eight-year-olds, young 
adults, or elderly. 
Global analysis revealed that the RTs were influenced by age. The mean RT to respond 
decreased from five-year-olds, to eight-year-olds, to elderly people and young adults. This 
probably reflects an increase in speed processing with child development (see Kail, 1986, 
1991) and a parallel decrease in the elderly (see Feyereisen, 1994). This issue has already 
been theoretically addressed in chapter 2 while reviewing the literature on mental rotation 
abilities. 
Surprisingly, overall RTs were longer in the perceptual control than in the imagery task. 
In fact, although subjects were also required to respond as quickly as possible in the 
perceptual control, they preferred to be sure of their judgement before responding (which 
resulted in an increased processing time). Moreover, in this condition, the experimental 
situation did not force them to respond quickly. Indeed, the pattern remained at their disposal 
during the information processing. In the imagery task, if they were slow in responding, 
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there was a higher risk of forgetting the location of the targets. The more time they took to 
judge whether the arrow pointed to a target, the longer they had to keep the pattern in short 
term memory. It is interesting to notice that young adults responded far more quickly in the 
ANIMASK version of the perceptual task: The mask invaded the screen and made the 
judgement more difficult, which forced them, perhaps, to shorten their processing time. 
The main hypothesis for this experiment, i.e. the effect of distance on scanning times, 
was verified. However, complementary analyses on each age category considered 
independently showed different patterns across age. 
RTs were always dependent on distance in young adults and eight-year-olds. Such results 
are not really surprising since several studies have demonstrated distance-dependence in 
such tasks in young adults (e.g. Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser, 1978; Finke and Pinker, 1982). 
Moreover, there is a consensus between developmental psychologists that after eight years 
of age the imagery subsystems are well developed (see Dean, 1990). However, although the 
scanning process seems to be well developed in these subjects, it is interesting to observe 
that the mask seemed to interfere with the analogical process. In young adults, task versions 
and distance interact significantly, and in eight-year-olds, RTs were globally longer in the 
ANIMASK version of the tasks. In addition, errors increased significantly in the ANIMASK 
version in both groups of subjects, particularly for the long distance. 
Patterns are somewhat different in younger children and in elderly. Indeed, if distance 
influenced RTs in the NOMASK version of the imagery task, this effect disappeared in the 
ANIMASK version. Although the reasons are unclear, the mask interfered with the 
analogical process (this issue will be reconsidered in the general discussion). However, 
unlike the other groups of subjects, errors were equal in both versions of the task. 
In fact, to be precise, these patterns were observed in five-year-olds when subjects were 
first presented with the perceptual control followed by the imagery task. Indeed, error rates 
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were higher in this condition (except for the control task with the interfering mask). The 
difference observed between the two task orders could be due to the difficulty younger 
children had in understanding the instructions for the task. Being presented with the 
perceptual control first might have helped them understand the imagery task. It is, however, 
interesting to notice that error rates were always higher in the ANIMASK version of the 
imagery task, particularly in the IMA-PER condition where error rates are consistent with 
guessing. This suggests that when more constraints are imposed on the memory and 
attentional systems, young children are particularly poor in transformational imagery tasks. 
It appears from experiment 4a that scanning abilities (as reflected by distance dependence) 
are well developed by the age of 8. Moreover, it seems that this new set of data suggests that 
scanning abilities might not be functioning as well in five-year-olds and in elderly people. Of 
course, RTs were observed to be dependent on distance in a condition which was in fact 
almost the same as those used by Kosslyn et al (1990) and Dror and Kosslyn (1994), for 
children and for the elderly respectively -, but when a mask interfered with the scanning 
processes, this effect was suppressed. Mental scanning abilities seem to be weak in young 
children and seem to be affected by ageing. The results of experiment 4a will be discussed 
again in the general discussion in parallel to the data reported in experiment 4b. 
EXPERIMENT 4b 
In Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser (1978), subjects had to memorise a pattern and to keep it in 
long term memory. A mental image of the pattern had to be generated from long term 
memory, and mental scanning is carried out on this memory trace. In contrast, in Finke and 
Pinker (1982), mental scanning takes place on a pattern representation which is not 
generated from long term memory. In Pinker and Finke (1982), subjects were required to 
maintain a visual pattern in short term memory immediately followed by a briefly presented 
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arrow. The arrow took the form of an iconic representation (see for a classical work on 
iconic memory: Sperling, 1960), i.e. a situation very close to visual perception. 
Consequently, the cognitive processes engaged in both tasks might be somehow different. 
In experiment 4b, the tasks were similar to those used in experiment 4a but a retention 
interval time was imposed between the removal of the to-be-memorised pattern and the 
arrow display. As a consequence, subjects had a pattern in short term memory which was to 
be scanned later. 
The main advantage of this new procedure is to engage some memory processes (at least 
others than those associated with an iconic memory) in a mental scanning task. It is clear that 
in such a situation, subjects are not confronted with a task similar to that carried out by 
Kosslyn et al. (1978) - they do not have to generate a mental image from associative memory 
_ but are required to maintain a visual (and/or spatial) short term representations in the visual 
buffer. Mental scanning takes place necessarily on a memory representation. 
If subjects use a scanning process, RTs should increase as a function of distance between 
the arrow and the target. However, in this task, mental scanning abilities interact with the 
ability to maintain vi suo-spatial information in short term memory. We know that image 
maintenance in young children (e.g. Kosslyn et al., 1990; Wilson et al., 1987) and elderly 
(e.g. Van der Linden, 1994) is poor (see also chapters 5 and 6). Consequently, the memory 




Twenty four five-year-oIds (mean age: 5,01, ranged 4;09 to 5;03), 24 eight-year-oIds 
(mean age: 8;02, ranged 7;09 to 8;03), 24 young adults (mean age: 19 years of age, ranged 
18;01 to 24;03) and 24 elderly (mean age: 70;02, ranged 66;02 to 77;04) were tested. 
Subjects were recruited through the same channels as in experiment 4a. 
Material 
The material was the same as in experiment 4a except that a retention interval of 2 seconds 
was introduced between the removal of the fish and the display of the arrow. Moreover, no 
perceptual control was used in the present experiment. 
Procedure 
Subjects were distributed among two groups. The first group was submitted to the mental 
scanning task without an animated mask, and the second group was submitted to the task 
with an animated mask (12 subjects from each age category were tested in each condition). 
The procedure was basically identical to that used in experiment 4a. The difference was 
that a retention interval of 2 seconds was imposed after the removal of the fish and before the 
presentation of the arrow for 200 msec. The procedure is presented in figure 41. In 
summary, subjects were presented with three fish. They were asked to memorise the 
location of these three fish. Once memorised, they pressed the space bar which removed the 
fish from the screen. Then, after 2 seconds (retention time), an arrow was presented. It 
could point to a previously presented fish or not. Subjects were required to indicate as 
quickly as possible whether the arrow pointed to a previously presented target. In the mental 
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scanning condition (in brief: NOMASK version), the screen remained empty after the offset 
of the arrow. In the animated mask version (in brief: ANIMASK version), the screen was 





Figure 41 : Schematic representation of the experimental situations 
RESULTS 
In experiment 4b analyses were applied that were similar to those in experiment 4a. 
ANOV As were computed on reaction times for "YES trials" as distance scanned is only 
controlled in such trials. Age (five-year-olds, eight-year-olds, young adults and elderly), and 
test version (ANIMASK versus NOMASK) were between-subject independent variables. 
Distance scanned (short, medium or long) was a within-subject independent variable. 
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Reaction Times 
RT means are reported in figure 42. A global ANOV A carried out on RT means revealed 
a significant effect of age, F(3,l15) = 25.02, p < 0.0001, test version, F(I, 115) = 12.15, 
P < 0.0007, and distance, F(2,230) = IS.92, p < 0.0001. Moreover, several significant 
interactions were observed: distance x age, F( 6,230) = 7.13, p< 0.000 1, distance x test 
version, F(2,230) = 11.7, p < 0.0001, and distance x age x test version, F(6,230) = 2.96, 
P < O.OOS. The interaction between age and test version was not significant, 
F(3, 115) = 1.86, p < 0.14. 
Complementary analyses were computed to understand the complex interactions. 
Considering the test version independently, significant effects of age, F(3,5S) = 13.66, 
distance, F(2, 116) = 20.13, and age x distance, F(6, 116) = 6.28, all with p < 0.000 1, were 
shown in the ANIMASK version. However, in the NOMASK version, only an effect of age 
was reported, F(3,57) = 12.98, p < 0.0001. The effects of distance, F(2,114) = 0.99, 
P < 0.38, and the interaction distance x age, F(6,114) = 1.37, p < 0.23, were not 
significant. 
In five-year-olds, RTs were shown to be significantly different in the two test versions, 
F(1,30) = 7.21, p < 0.01, and were globally affected by distance, F(2,60) = 14.62, 
p < 0.0001. However, as a significant interaction was reported between test version and 
distance, F(2,60) = 7.06, p < 0.002, another ANOV A carried out on the test versions 
considered separately showed that the distance effect was only really present in the 
ANIMASK version, F(2,34) = 14.8, p < 0.0001. This effect was not observed in the 
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Figure 42 : Reaction times (in msec) as a function of distance (S = short; M = 
medium; L = long) in the four age categories in the different experimental 
conditions (Imagery task and perceptual control, with - ANIMASK - or without -
NOMASK - an animated mask) - see symbols used on the right side of the figure. 
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In eight-year-olds, no significant effect was observed [test version: F( 1,31) = 0.29, 
p < 0.59; distance: F(2,62) = 2.63, p < 0.08; distance x test version: F(2,62) = 0.17, 
p < 0.84]. As a consequence, distance did not affect RTs either in the ANIMASK, 
F(2,30) = 1.12, p < 0.34, or in the NOMASK version, F(2,32) = 1.67, p < 0.2. 
Young adults showed that RT patterns were significantly dependent on distance, 
F(2,44) = 3.52, p < 0.04. The effect of test version was almost significant, 
F(1,22) = 3.99, p < 0.06, but did not interact with distance, F(2,44) = 0.58, p < 0.57. 
When test versions were considered separately, the effect of distance disappeared 
[ANIMASK : F(2,22) = 2.17, p < 0.14; NOMASK : F(2,22) = 1.81, p < 0.191. 
In elderly people, the analyses showed a significant effect of distance, F(2,64) = 3.18, 
P < 0.05, which also interacted with test version, F(2,64) = 4.16, p < 0.02. The test 
version alone did not affect RTs, FO ,32) = 0.83, p < 0.37. In fact, the distance affected 
RTs in the ANIMASK version of the task, F(2,30) = 4.27, p < 0.02, but not in the 
NOMASK version, F(2,34) = 0.39, p < 0.68. 
Error rates 
The global ANOV A revealed only one significant effect: the interaction between the age 
and distance variables, F(6,252) = 2.36, p < 0.03. The other variables or interaction 
between variables did not affect error rates [age: F(3, 126) = 2.01, p < 0.12; test version: 
F(1,126) = 1.57, P < 0.21; age x test version: F(3,126) = 1.4, P < 0.25; distance: 
F(2,252) = 2.01, p < 0.14; distance x test version: F(2,252) = 1.73, p < 0.18; distance x 
age x test version: F(6,252) = 0.39, p < 0.89]. 
In fact, only age significantly affected performance in the NOMASK version of the task, 
F(3,63) = 2.86, p < 0.04. We did not observe a significant effect of distance, F(2, 126) = 
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0.26, p < 0.77, and of the interaction between distance and age, F(6, 126) = 1.27, p < 
0.28. In the ANIMASK version of the task, distance had an effect on errors, F(2, 126) = 
3.82, p < 0.02, but neither age, F(3,63) = 0.54, p < 0.66, nor the interaction distance x age, 
F(6, 126) = 1.51, p < 0.18, affected performance. 
Complementary analyses showed that errors were a function of distance only in elderly 
people, F(2,70) = 4.58, p < 0.01, but this effect was really only observed while they were 
submitted to the ANIMASK version of the task, F(2,34) = 6.01, p < 0.006 INOMASK : 
F(2,36) = 0.42, p < 0.66]. The interaction between distance and test version was not 
significant, F(2,70) = 1.93, p < 0.15. In addition, no global difference was observed 
between test versions, F(1,35) = 0.15, p < 0.7. 
No significant effect could be reported in the other age category. In the five-year-olds, 
the following results were observed: test version: F(l,36) = 3.6, p < 0.07; distance: 
F(2,72) = 1.44, p < 0.24; distance x test version: F(2,72) = 1.33, p < 0.27. Similar results 
were observed in the eight-year-olds : test version: F(l,32) = 0.53, p < 0.47; distance: 
F(2,64) = 2.38, p < 0.1; distance x test version: F(2,64) = 0.21, P < 0.81, and in the 
young adults: test version: F( 1,23) = 0.26, p < 0.61; distance: F(2,46) = 1.45, p < 0.24; 
distance x test version: F(2,46) = 0, p < 0.99. 
When test versions were considered separately, no effect of distance was observed in the 
NOMASK version, F(2,34) = 2, p < 0.15, and in the ANIMASK version, F(2,38) = 0.24, 
p < 0.78, in the five-year-olds. Similar results were observed in the eight-year-olds : 
NOMASK : F(2,32) = 0.62, p < 0.55; ANIMASK : F(2,32) = 1.96, p < 0.16, and in the 
young adults: NOMASK: F(2,24) = 0.6, p < 0.6; ANIMASK: F(2,22) = 0.92, p < 0.41. 
Error rates are reported in figure 43. 
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Figure 43 : Errors (in percent) as a function of distance (S = short; M = medium ; 
L = long) in the four age categories in the different experimental conditions Omagery 
task and perceptual control, with - ANIMASK - or without - NOMASK - an animated 
mask) - see symbols used in the right corner of the figure. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of experiment 4b was to assess mental scanning abilities in children, young 
adults and the elderly with a task requiring maintenance of vi suo-spatial information in short 
term memory. Mental scanning had to be carried out on a short term memory representation. 
As a consequence, subjects were not only required to scan across a pattern but also had to 
keep this pattern in the visual buffer for a certain period of time. 
Distance effects on RTs should also be observed in such situations if mental scanning is 
effectively used while solving the task. In addition, the retention interval might affect 
performances of children and the elderly. 
As in experiment 4a, a global reduction in processing speed was observed in children and 
the elderly. Such a result is a classical one. It demonstrates that processing speed is reduced 
in childhood and old age. In addition, RTs were globally higher in the ANIMASK version 
of the task whatever the age category. 
The most interesting results in the present experiment concern the distance effects on RTs 
across ages. In fact, it is not clear whether a mental scanning process (as defined in previous 
work) has been used to solve the task in all age categories. In fact, classical RT patterns 
were observed only in young adults (although error rates were higher than in experiment 4a-
comparison of figures 40 and 43). RTs were dependent on the scanned distance. This effect 
was significant when task versions were joined. When considered separately, the distance 
effect could not be observed. However, as the interaction between task version and distance 
was not significant, we could reasonably think that increasing the sample of subjects would 
have led to a significant effect of distance when task versions were considered individually. 
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In eight-year-olds, distance did not significantly affect RTs. However, surprisingly, there 
was a tendency to observe an inverted-U RTs function. Such a pattern was in fact also 
observed in five-year-olds and the elderly for the ANIMASK version of the task. In these 
subjects, distance significantly affected RTs, but not linearly; medium distance was 
associated with the highest RT values (see figure 42). 
Such results are particularly puzzling and do not confirm the scanning hypothesis. An 
interpretation might be that for short and long distances, subjects are using the screen 
borders to respond. It would result in shorter RTs. Indeed, when the distance between the 
arrow and the target is "medium", the arrow is displayed somewhere in the center of the 
screen, which makes it more difficult to reference to a frame. Without such help, these trials 
would be more complicated and would result in higher RTs. Indeed, there is a hint of 
evidence for better performance for short and long distances in eight-year-olds and the 
elderly (especially in the ANIMASK version) - although it is not significant. Eight-year-olds 
and the elderly committed fewer errors in the short and long distance conditions. 
For the overall experiment, we should stress the fact that error rates were high in all age 
categories (especially in younger children). However, we should also take into account the 
fact that there were only a few trials in a task. Future work should consider this issue and 
propose a methodology which attempts to reduce errors in subjects. 
Consequently, the administration of the current task to children and the elderly failed to 
confirm the scanning hypothesis. When scanning has to be carried out on a short term 
representation, the distance effect observed in experiment 4a was suppressed. This 
suppression cannot be explained by the interference of the mask since no difference was 
observed between task versions in experiment 4b. The condition in which the scanning is 
carried out seems to be the sole explanation for such results. 
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Indeed, it is not surprising to observe different RT patterns in a task which involves 
image maintenance capacity. Several studies have reported the difficulty young children and 
elderly people have in keeping vi suo-spatial information in short term memory (see above). 
CONCLUSION 
Experiments 4a and 4b were designed to study the development of mental scanning ability 
from a life-span perspective. Previously published studies made accurate predictions of 
children'S and elderly people's abilities difficult. Indeed, the results reported from child 
psychology studies were contradictory (see Kosslyn et ai;, 1990, Courbois, 1994). In the 
elderly, only Dror and Kosslyn (1994) reported evidence for good mental scanning ability. 
However, this experiment did not consider any control condition [which has been 
particularly critical in rejecting the scanning hypothesis in the study on children done by 
Courbois (1994)]. 
When mental scanning was carried out in a condition which does not require the 
maintenance of visual information in short term memory (experiment 4a), the scanning 
hypothesis was verified in all subjects. RTs were significantly dependent on the distance 
between the arrow and the target. In such a condition, the targets were available as icons 
when the judgment was made. However, when the scanning process was in "conflict" with 
the presentation of irrelevant information (an animated mask), the distance effect disappeared 
in younger children and in the elderly. 
Kosslyn (1994) has proposed that two different mechanisms might be involved in image 
scanning: The first process shifts the attention window, and the second transforms the 
contents of the visual buffer. In the present experiment, the first mechanism was probably 
used. This first mechanism may be assimilated to imaged saccades. My interpretation of the 
data reported in experiment 4a is that such imaged saccades might explain the distance effect. 
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Indeed, no delay was imposed between the removal of the pattern and the presentation of the 
arrow. Consequently, an iconic trace was probably still present in the visual buffer when the 
arrow appeared. The scanning process involved in this task is probably similar to those used 
in scanning external visual patterns. 
When the mask was displayed, the scanning process was in conflict with distracting 
information - information which, in fact, probably masked the iconic trace of the target 
pattern. As the mask progressively invaded the screen, the information processing speed 
became lower and the distracting effect of the mask became more powerful. In five-year-olds 
and in the elderly, information processing speed was lower than in the other subjects. As a 
result, they should have suffered the most from the animated mask. But in fact, the mask 
affected performance in all subjects: Error rates were globally significantly higher in the 
ANIMASK version of the imagery task. 
So, although it was hypothesized that the scanning process itself would be affected by the 
introduction of a mask after the arrow display, it seems that its main effect could have been 
on the iconic trace. Such an interpretation might be consistent with what has been observed 
in experiment 4b. 
Indeed, in experiment 4b, subjects had to keep the pattern in short term memory for two 
seconds before the presentation of the arrow. Consequently, subjects not only had to scan 
the pattern but also had to maintain it through active processes in the visual buffer. Image 
maintenance and mental scanning might have been in conflict during this particular task. As 
far as image maintenance is concerned, this ability is particularly poor in children and in the 
elderly (see Kosslyn et ai;, 1990; Wilson et ai., 1986; Bruyer, 1994; see also chapters 5 and 
6). In fact, in this condition, the RT patterns did not validate the scanning hypothesis either 
in the NOMASK version or in the ANIMASK version l . 
The absence of a significant effect of the task version in experiment 4b supports the idea that the mask 
did not affect the scanning process itself in experiment 48 but rather suppressed the iconic trace of the 
pattern and the arrow since it was superimposed on it in the visual buffer. 
187 
Consequently, most of the data reported in these experiments invalidate the scanning 
hypothesis especially when subjects have to scan across a pattern maintained in short term 
memory. It seems that young children and the elderly are poor at maintaining vi suo-spatial 
information in short term memory. In the task, the major characteristic of the pattern is the 
localisation of the target rather than its structure. I would hypothesise that this is again 
evidence for a poor ability to maintain spatial characteristics in short term memory. It could 
be evidence for a immaturity of some aspects of the dorsal system (see Kosslyn, 1994) or 
the spatial component of the VSSP (see Logie, 1995), i.e. the subsystems in charge of the 
processing of the spatial characteristics of a visual pattern. 
Does the distance effect observed in experiment 4a in the NOMASK version of the 
imagery task reflect the use of a mental scanning process? Results observed in the 
perceptual control seem to invalidate this hypothesis. Indeed, based on some results reported 
by Pinker (1980), it was expected that scanning speed should be quicker in the perceptual 
control than in the imagery task. In the perceptual control, a single saccade is necessary to 
judge the correspondence between the arrow and the target. In contrast, in the imagery task, 
a shifting of the attentional window on the visual buffer is necessary. A comparison of the 
RT functions in the imagery task and perceptual control on figure 27 should convince us that 
scanning speed is globally equal in both conditions in most age categories - RT functions are 
more or less parallel (except in the elderly where the scanning speed is even less in the 
imagery task than in the perceptual control). There is however, a tendency to get a greater 
scanning speed for the perceptual control in young adults. Consequently, even in the 
experimental condition where RTs are dependent on distance, we should be cautious in 
interpreting this chronometrical index as an evidence for mental scanning in children and the 
elderly. 
Moreover, error rates were not significantly affected by the mask in experiment 4b but were greatly 
affected by it in experiment 4a. We should have observed a similar effect in experiment 4b if the mask 
had an effect on the scanning process itself. 
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In summary, with the exception of young adults where some evidence for mental 
scanning has been observed in these experiments, the data does not support the hypothesis 
claiming the use of mental scanning in children and in the elderly. Most of the data reported 
in these two experiments invalidate the scanning hypothesis, particularly when this process 
is in conflict with other imagery subsystems, namely image maintenance. However, other 
studies will be necessary to understand which strategies children and the elderly are using 
when they are submitted to a mental scanning task, and how to explain the interference 




Several experiments have been presented to evaluate the development of visuo-spatial 
short term memory in a life-span perspective. Visuo-spatial short term memory has been 
assessed through transformational imagery tasks. The age categories selected. i.e. five-year-
olds. eight-year-olds. young adults and elderly people. seem to be key ages to assess the 
development of imagery. Indeed. most developmental psychologists accept the idea of poor 
transformational imagery abilities in preoperational children and have suggested that imagery 
subsystems might be affected by ageing. However. to my knowledge. no previous study 
has assessed mental imagery abilities in a life-span perspective using the same set of tasks 
for all age categories. 
The first set of experiments (chapters 3. 4 and 5) concerned the development of mental 
rotation abilities. A review of the literature suggested that young children (specifically so-
called preoperational children) and the elderly are poor at rotating a mental image of a visual 
pattern. However. as some mental rotation abilities have been reported while using 
Shepard's paradigm. I wanted to focus my attention on the role of the first steps necessarily 
taken while performing a mental rotation task, namely the encoding of the rotated stimulus 
and its maintenance in STM. Indeed, Cooper and Shepard (1973) suggest that these two 
steps necessarily precede the rotation itself. If these steps were immature or deteriorated with 
ageing, mental rotation would be carried out on a flimsy basis. 
The second set of experiments (chapter 6) considered another imagery subsystem. namely 
"mental scanning". Very few studies have been published on the development of this 
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subsystem and the data reported so far is ambiguous. In Kosslyn's (1994) theory, mental 
scanning is conceived as another transformational imagery process. As with mental rotation, 
it requires the maintenance of a visual pattern in short term memory. 
Image maintenance ability has been assessed with reference to Kosslyn's (1994) model 
although Baddeley's (1986) working memory model - specifically, Logie's (1995) revision 
of the VSSP - has sometimes been considered while interpreting the data. 
Kosslyn's (1994) model was presented extensively in chapter l. Several subsystems 
were discussed which are involved in high level vision. Among them, some units are 
particularly relevant for the purpose of the present thesis. A visual buffer acts as a structure 
in which mental images are generated. Images are generated from information kept in 
associative memory reprocessed by two encoding subsystems: The ventral and dorsal 
subsystems. The ventral subsystem processes the "visual" characteristics of the pattern, i.e. 
mainly deals with the structure of the image. The dorsal subsystem processes the "spatial" 
information in parallel. It encodes both the localisation of the objects in space, and the spatial 
relations between object features. This subsystem is particularly interesting when we 
consider transformational imagery. Indeed, transformational imagery mainly modifies the 
spatial characteristics of the pattern. 
Baddeley's (1986) working memory is a system with a limited capacity for temporary 
storage and manipulation during information processing. A central executive is responsible 
for complex decision and control processes. It is helped by two slave systems: One 
responsible in the storage of auditory information - the articulatory loop - and one for visuo-
spatial information - the VSSP. Logie (1995) has recently investigated the VSSP system. 
The system comprises a temporary visual store and a temporary spatial store. Long term 
memory representations are at the origin of image generation. According to Logie (1995), 
the visual store is subject to decay and is sensitive to new information coming in. The spatial 
store is used to plan movement, and to rehearse the information kept in the visual store. 
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Spatial and visual components provide temporary storage of information for the central 
executive which uses it to solve specific tasks. 
In consequence, these two different theoretical models suggest the existence of two 
related but different subsystems to store visual and spatial information. This distinction is 
based on behavioural data collected in young adults (e.g. dual-task studies, see for instance, 
Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980) and on neuropsychological data (e.g. Farah, Hammond. 
Levine & Calvanio. 1988). It is interesting to find some developmental evidence for a 
dissociation between both subsystems. This has been considered in the present thesis. 
Experiment 1 compared mental rotation abilities in young children, young adults and the 
elderly using the same set of tasks. Mental rotation tasks were selected from published 
studies. Basically, they consisted in comparing two stimuli where one was rotated in the 
picture plane: Pandas (Marmor. 1975). Cones (Marmor, 1975) and Mannequins (Lejeune, 
1994). They were constructed on the basis of Shepard's studies in young adults. 
Experiment 1 confirmed that five-year-olds and the elderly people are poor at mental rotation 
tasks. 
Experiment 2 considered the association which might exist between mental rotation ability 
and short term memory capacity. Some previously published studies (e.g. Childs & Polich, 
1979; Waber. Carlson & Mann, 1982) suggested that the difficulty young children have in 
solving a mental rotation task might be traced to their difficulty in maintaining visual 
information in short term memory. In parallel, some studies have demonstrated that the 
memory span for visual patterns is smaller in young children (Wilson. Scott & Power, 
1987) and in the elderly (Feyereisen & Van der Linden. 1992) than in young adults. Is this a 
source of explanation for poor mental rotation abilities in young children and in the elderly? 
A correlational approach between tasks was used in testing this hypothesis. Performance in 
mental rotation tasks used in experiment 1 was correlated with a classical memory span 
tasks. Again. poorer mental rotation performance was found in five-year-olds and the elderly 
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than in eight-year-olds and young adults. Similarly, visual short term memory capacity was 
observed to be smaller in younger children and in the elderly. A correlational analysis 
between the two sets of tasks suggested that mental rotation abilities and STM span are 
related across ages. 
Does it mean that mental rotation is totally related to visual short term memory? In fact. 
the memory task used in experiment 2 - although a classical one - considers visual memory 
as a single structure. However, we know that Kosslyn (1994) as well as Logie (1995) have 
suggested that visual short term memory is a dual system: structural and spatial. In fact, the 
spatial subsystem is fundamental for successful mental rotations. Consequently, the memory 
task used in experiment 2 was too superficial to independently assess the development of 
both subsystems. 
That is why experiments 3a to 3c had to be carried out. Mental rotation tasks were used to 
assess the ability to maintain visual and spatial information in STM. The mental rotation 
tasks were derived from Cooper and Shepard's (1973) study. From Shepard and Metzler's 
(1971) pioneering work, we know that when subjects have to compare two rotated stimuli, 
they are rotating a mental image of one of the stimuli before carrying out the comparison. In 
such studies, RTs served as evidence for the use of such a process: RTs were linearly 
dependent on stimulus orientation. However, when young adults are provided with 
information on the structure and the orientation of the to-be-presented stimulus, RTs become 
independent of the orientation. Subjects have the ability to maintain such information in STM 
before the presentation of the target. Their visual memory trace makes the activation of a 
mental rotation process unnecessary. 
In two published developmental studies (Childs & Polich, 1978; Waber, Carlson & 
Mann, 1982), it appeared that young children are poor at maintaining such information in 
STM: Even when provided with structural and orientation information on the target, RTs 
remain dependent on stimulus orientation. At that time, visual short term memory was 
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conceived as a single structure; the dissociation between the visual and spatial subsystems 
had not yet been proposed. The authors claimed that RTs are dependent on stimulus 
orientation because young children cannot keep visual information in memory and have, 
consequently, to carry out the mental rotation although they were provided with advanced 
information on the target. Another interpretation of these data could be that what was lost in 
young children is the spatial information (the stimulus orientation) rather than the structural 
information. 
In experiment 3a, Childs and Polich's (1978) and Waber et al. 's (1982) results were 
reproduced in five-year-olds when they were provided with information 1000 msec before 
the display of the target. Flat functions were observed in eight-year-olds, young adults and 
elderly people. However, when the retention interval was reduced to 500 msec, RTs became 
independent of stimulus orientation in all subjects. It seems that reducing the retention 
interval allows all subjects to keep the information in STM and exempt them from the use of 
mental rotation. 
In experiment 3b, an interfering mask was displayed during the retention interval. This 
irrelevant information made the maintenance of the information provided in STM even more 
difficult in younger children and in the elderly. In such conditions, stimulus orientation 
affected RT functions. In other words, orientational information was lost in younger 
children and in the elderly. Since orientation is processed by the dorsal system or the spatial 
component of VSSP, I should hypothesise that this system is not mature in five-year-olds 
and is affected by ageing. Indeed. it appeared in experiment 3c that these subjects are well 
able to keep structural information in STM. When the provided information was structurally 
different from the target, all subjects immediately noticed the mismatch between them. 
Reconsidering Kosslyn's (1994) model. I suggest that such data tends to provide some 
developmental evidence for a dissociation between the dorsal and ventral subsystems. It 
seems that the two subsystems develop at different speeds. The ventral subsystem might be 
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better developed earlier than the dorsal subsystem. Similarly, the data suggest that the same 
ventral system is not yet affected by ageing when the dorsal subsystem has already begun to 
deteriorate. 
Again, if an interpretation of visual STM as a single structure has to be rejected, the 
dorsal subsystem should not be conceived as a single subsystem. The data reported in 
experiments 3a, 3b and 3c should not be interpreted as evidence for an immaturity of the 
dorsal system as a whole. Indeed, Ellis, Katz and Williams (1987) and Shumann-Hengsteler 
(1992) have shown that the memorisation of object position is immediately effective and 
evolves little with age. Moreover, position would be automatically encoded (Andrade & 
Meudell, 1993; Ellis, 1990, 1991). In fact, Kosslyn (1994) has suggested that this system 
might be decomposed into at least two units: The "Coordinate Spatial Relations Encoding" 
and the "Categorical Spatial Relations Encoding". Koenig, Reiss and Kosslyn (1990) 
provided some developmental evidence for poorer functioning of the first subsystem than the 
second one in young children. 
Logie (1995) has suggested that two related systems assist the central executive when 
visuo-spatial information has to be kept in STM. Among them, a spatial store is not only 
responsible for maintaining the spatial characteristics of the stimulus but also helps to 
rehearse the information in the visual store. In terms of Logie's model, I suggest that the 
difficulty young children and the elderly have in keeping orientation in STM could be due to 
an immaturity/deterioration of the spatial store at these ages (which consequently could also 
result in poor mental rehearsal abilities). 
In fact, these difficulties in maintaining spatial information in STM were also observed in 
the two last experiments. In experiments 4a and 4b, mental scanning ability was assessed in 
a life-span perspective. Mental scanning development has been considered in parallel with 
mental rotation development since it has to be considered as a transformational imagery 
system as well. Indeed, Kosslyn (1994) suggested that one of the mechanisms involved in 
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mental scanning consisted of transforming the contents of the visual buffer. It replaces the 
representation kept in the visual buffer by a new one formed from the content of the image 
which is contiguous to the previous representation. 
In a mental scanning task, subjects are required to memorise a visual pattern before the 
activation of the mental scanning itself. In such tasks, the critical aspect of the pattern to be 
memorised is not the structure of the pattern but rather the accurate location of several 
details. As a consequence, subjects are confronted with the necessity to activate several 
cognitive subsystems involved in the spatial analysis of the pattern. The dorsal subsystem 
seems again to be a good candidate for this purpose. 
It appeared in experiments 4a and 4b that the mental scanning process is affected by the 
necessity to maintain the localisation of some details in the visual buffer during task solving. 
It was particularly the case in five-year-olds and in the elderly, although such observations 
should also be applied to eight-year-olds in particular conditions. When subjects were 
required to keep the pattern for 2 seconds in STM, the observed RT patterns were 
fundamentally different from those observed in classical studies with young adults. Indeed, 
in these latter studies, scanning times were dependent on the scanned distance, i.e. on the 
distance between the two relevant details of the pattern. In my experiments, this distance 
effect was observed only when the constraints on the maintenance of the pattern in memory 
were minimal, i.e. the pattern had to be maintained during a period which can be assimilated 
to an iconic memory trace. 
When the retention of the pattern was longer or when the iconic trace was interfered with 
irrelevant information, the scanning process was somehow disrupted. However, although 
disrupted, performances were better than chance level. These results are somewhat puzzling 
and I do not have another interpretation to offer. Other studies are necessary to understand 




Several tasks have been used to assess the development of vi suo-spatial short term 
memory. Transformational imagery tasks were used to provide developmental evidence for a 
dissociation between the spatial and visual components of the so-called vi suo-spatial STM. 
If the tasks are valid - a topic that I address below -, it seems that young children and 
elderly might have some difficulties in keeping the spatial characteristics (orientation and 
location) of a visual pattern in STM. In terms of Kosslyn's (1994) model, we might say that 
these difficulties could be related to an immaturity of the dorsal system - at least some 
aspects of it. In terms of Logie's (1995) model, an inefficiency of the temporary spatial store 
could account for these difficulties. 
Consequently, explanations for the difficulties young children and the elderly encountered 
while carrying out a mental rotation or a mental scanning task (or generally, to a 
transformational imagery task) should not be sought in the processes engaged in the 
transformation of images themse1 ves. Indeed, Shepard (1984) has considered that these 
processes might be innate. Rather, we should consider the development of related processes, 
especially the development of the structure in which mental images take place. 
The validity of the tasks used in the experiments 
Mental rotation tasks 
Since Marmor's two studies on the development of mental rotation, developmental 
psychologists have thought that mental chronometry might be the unique way to assess 
mental rotation in a developmental perspective. However, as seen in chapter 2, the 
interpretations of chronometrical data in children as well as in the elderly are ambiguous, 
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especially since experimental conditions have been different across published studies (see 
Dean, 1990). Courbois (1994) has proposed several criticism which might be reconsidered 
in the context of the present thesis. 
We might worry about the ecological validity of such tasks. Indeed, in our everyday life 
activities, we rarely need to discriminate between normal and mirror-reversed versions of a 
visual pattern. It could explain why young children find it difficult to use a process which is 
in fact most of the time useless. However, its artificial character might be useful in assessing 
some aspects of related process as seen in this thesis. 
The use of a paradigm classically applied in young adults might be questionable when 
applied to children or the elderly. I think that developmental psychologists should stress the 
differences they observe while testing young and old subjects. These differences - although 
difficult to interpret - are rich in information. Difficulty in reproducing young adults' results 
is not always synonymous with a misfunctioning of the cognitive system of children or the 
elderly. Similarly, similar results could sometimes receive a different interpretation. To 
illustrate this issue, Lejeune (1994) reported that RTs increasing as a function of stimulus 
orientation in young children should not necessarily be interpreted in terms of the activation 
of a mental rotation process. In his study, he showed rather that this linear trend reflects the 
time to set a psychophysical judgment of the location of some stimulus details. This 
interpretation was based on an detailed analysis of error rates. 
Shepard and Cooper (1982) claimed that the linear trend of RTs is not sufficient to deduce 
the use of a mental rotation process. We have to be sure that the product of mental rotation is 
available for other processing, and that the rotation is continuous. i.e. the representation is 
moved through the different intermediate steps during the rotation. As mentioned by Dean 
(1990), these two conditions have not yet been explored in developmental studies. 
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Finally, in these mental rotation tasks, two end-states of stimuli have to be compared. In 
such a context, is it fundamentally necessary to use mental rotation as defined in the 
pioneering study (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) ? In fact, Dean (1990) and myself (Lejeune & 
Decker, 1994) have proposed that in tasks using stimuli rotated in the picture plane, other 
perceptual processes might be used. This interpretation was in fact initially proposed by 
Piaget and Inhelder (1966). These perceptual processes would engage the activation of 
multiple eye movements to compare the rotated stimulus to the same stimulus in its canonical 
(or learned) orientation. I think that depth rotations might avoid such processes, or at least, 
necessarily engage other transformational imagery subsystems (see Lejeune & Decker, 
1994). 
In conclusion, in the light of these previous comments, mental chronometry does not 
seem to provide clear and absolute evidence for the use of imagery processes in children and 
probably in the elderly. However, whatever the interpretation of the RT patterns, it does not 
invalidate the data and the interpretations reported in the present thesis. Indeed, the purpose 
of this thesis was not to understand how subjects solve a mental rotation task at different 
ages but rather to investigate the development of related processes, namely the ability to 
maintain vi suo-spatial information in STM, and how these related processes affect 
information processing during a mental rotation task. 
Mental scanning tasks 
The mental scanning tasks used in my experimental contribution are probably the most 
critical ones. Introspectively, we have the impression of being able to scan the image of a 
well known pattern. Kosslyn et al. 's (1978) pioneering study, although open to criticism, 
was probably the best study to assess mental scanning ability. The new paradigm (see Finke 
& Pinker, 1982) is fundamentally different from the first one. Image scanning is no longer 
carried out on an image generated from long term memory but rather on an iconic trace. This 
iconic trace has its origin in the stimulation of the retina by a pattern displayed on a computer 
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screen. A problem is that this computer screen is a two-dimensional space (Pylyshyn, 
1984). Consequently, there might be a risk of confusion between the screen properties and 
those of the visual buffer. Eye movements might explain RTs patterns: The time required to 
move the eyes would result in increased RTs (the longer the distance to scan is, the bigger 
the eye movements are). 
It is not obvious that the processes engaged in this new paradigm are similar to those 
observed with Kosslyn's (1978) method. However, it is unthinkable that we could use 
Kosslyn's method in developmental studies - especially with children. In fact, in an 
unpublished study, I (Lejeune, 1993) tried to use Kosslyn's method with young children but 
only negative results could be reported. Children did not seem to understand the instructions 
and encountered real difficulties in memorizing the accurate locations of the details on the 
general pattern. 
Other general methodological issues 
Subject sampling 
A central issue in developmental studies is the age of the subjects. We have seen in 
chapter 2 that age categories in previously published studies on mental rotation have not 
always been the same. However, it seems that a distinction between preoperational and 
operational children is relevant. Consequently, the selection of the ages five and eight in 
children is relevant. However, the level of operativity has not been measured in children. 
Consequently, it might be that some of them had a level of operational development different 
from that supposed to be attained on the basis of their chronological age. 
Moreover, in children, age categories were spread over six months. So, a child in the 
"five-years-old" category could have been four years and nine months old or five years and 
three months old. Six months in the life of a child is quite a long period of time. However, 
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this is a classical way to define an age category. This could partially explain why the 
individual differences were important in children. I have analysed the data from means, i.e. I 
have probably included in the same set of data, performance of children who had different 
levels of development. I think that we would gain in developmental studies by accurately 
analysing individual performance. 
Similarly, the age of the elderly people generally varied between 65 and 80 years-old. 
They were all supposed to be healthy. However, the limits between normal and pathological 
development in elderly are often tiny (see AssaI & Machado, 1993). Consequently, subjects 
tested were probably at a different level of development. With the elderly, we are also 
confronted with huge individual differences; this is a common issue while investigating 
ageing (see Ferrandez, 1993). Here again, single case studies would be valuable. 
The different levels of development in children and the elderly which have not been 
controlled in my experiments might explain why I observed some differences across 
experiments for an identical task in a same age category (see for instance. mental rotation 
performances in experiments 1 and 2). 
Another aspect which could have been interesting in studying the development of imagery 
is the sex variable. It is now commonly shown that males are usually more efficient than 
females in spatial processing (at least in young adults). This aspect has not been addressed in 
the present thesis. 
Material used 
The application of methodologies used in young adults to children and elderly should not 
only be considered with reference to theoretical issues but also with reference to the 
adequacy of the material used to test particular groups of subjects. Specifically, the material 
basically consisted most of the time in the presentation of visual stimuli on a computer 
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screen. If it is more and more common for a child to use computers in the context of hislher 
games, elderly people are often reluctant to use computers. These machines seem often to be 
mysterious to them and their comments during task solving make me think that they are 
scared by the situation. It could also influence their information processing times. 
However, as previous studies used similar methodologies, comparisons across 
experiments are possible. In the near future, new paradigms should be formulated to avoid 
the interference of a particular material on the performance of subjects. 
Perspectives 
At present, most of the developmental studies have tried to show differences between 
children, the elderly and young adults. Young adults have been considered as the reference. 
Methodologies used with young adults have been applied to different age categories and 
different patterns of responses have emerged. It has led to the conclusion that children and 
elderly are poorer at performing imagery tasks than young adults. 
However, I think that most developmental studies have considered imagery from a 
perspective that is too general. Mental rotation, mental scanning, or other transformational 
imagery sub systems have been considered in a very simplistic way. Their development has 
been approached as if they consisted of small individual boxes in a cognitive system. 
Developmental psychology has approached imagery the way it was conceived in the first 
theoretical models of imagery (see Kosslyn, 1980). Indeed, in these models, the whole 
system consisted of the juxtaposition of a set of boxes. The ROTATE box referred to the 
mental rotation process, just as the SCAN box referred to the mental scanning process. 
Contemporary cognitive psychology tries to decompose complex processes into several 
subsystems. Indeed, Kosslyn (1994) modified his early model of imagery functioning in 
light of research in the neurosciences. He demonstrated that the former "boxes" (especially 
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those concerning the transformational imagery subsystems) have to be considered in 
connection with several subsystems of high level vision. Imagery architecture is a complex 
system with multiple interconnected units. In this reformulation of the initial model. he did 
not refer to developmental studies. I think that it is also the role of developmental 
psychology to consider the development of these subsystems in the functioning of complex 
processes such as mental rotation or mental scanning. The relation between transformational 
imagery sub systems and the ability to maintain vi suo-spatial information has been studied in 
this thesis. 
However, a huge amount of work has still to be done to decompose the different 
subsystems and to understand their genesis. In this thesis, only a small aspect has been 
considered. Even for this aspect, namely the maintenance of visuo-spatial information in the 
visual buffer, many studies are required to understand the complexity of this process. The 
experiments reported have suggested a decomposition between the visual and the spatial 
components. It appeared that both components could develop differently across ages: The 
spatial component could be more sensitive to age. However. this spatial component itself is 
not yet clearly defined. It seems that the "dorsal system" in Kosslyn's (1994) model might 
be itself decomposed into other units. Kosslyn (1994) himself wrote with humour that 
although his model seems to be complicated and has been sometimes described as an 
encyclopedia, it is not yet probably sufficiently complex to account for the different 
processes humans can carry out. 
Other aspects of the whole system will have to be considered in future research. Some 
have already approached the relationship between imagery and visual perception (for 
instance in the context of object recognition, see Lejeune, 1992b). The memorisation of 
location (e.g. Ellis, Katz & William, 1987) has also been considered. Attentional processes 
also seem to be a good candidate to account for developmental differences. Indeed, the 
transformational imagery sub systems have been proposed to be strongly related to the 
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central executive in Logie's (1995) model. The understanding of the development of such a 
system in the context of imagery tasks seems to be necessary. 
The decomposition of the "Big Picture" will have to go through the creation of new 
methodologies as well. You may recall that the history of imagery has been stormy (sec 
chapter 1), and debates were resolved thanks to the use of new approaches, especially 
neuroscientific ones. Developmental studies should also be innovative in their approach. 
They should not be limited to the methodologies used in young adults. Moreover, I am 
firmly convinced that developmental psychology would gain from the analysis of single case 
performances. We have seen the development of a similar necessity in neuropsychology. 
Individual differences are too broad and mean values might hide reality. Piagetian studies 
were in this context far more informative than any other developmental studies. 
The time is ripe for an integration of several approaches. Developmental psychology has 
its role to play in the understanding of cognitive functions. It has a seat in the Parliament of 
Science besides general cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, comparative psychology, 
and neurobiology. I am convinced that developmental psychology will shed some light on 
the complex network of the imagery subsystems. 
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Mental rotation tasks 
Means and standard deviations as a function of task, stimulus orientation and age. 
Five-year-o annequms as Ids M . Tt k 
(f flY 120° lSOO 
m: 5.79 m: 5.45 m: 5.00 m: 3.91 
s: 0.41 s: 0.97 s: 1.1 s: 1.06 
lve-year-o s: ones ld C Tt k as 
(f flY lWO 180° 
m: 5.83 m: 5.45 m: 4.71 m: 3.45 
s: 0.38 s: 0.72 s: 1.3 s: 1.67 
F" Ids L Tt k lve-year-o as 
(f flY lWO 180° 
m: 5.83 m: 5.45 m:4.2 m: 3.63 
s: 0.38 s: 0.72 s: 1.88 s: 1.81 
h EigJ t-year-o Ids M . Tt k annequms as 
(f flY 120° lSOO 
m: 4.41 m: 4.12 m: 3.95 m: 3.29 
s: 1.44 s: 1.54 s: 1.39 s: 0.95 
E"h 19, t-year-o Ids C ones Tt k as 
(f flY lWO lSOO 
m:4.75 m: 4.25 m: 3.95 m: 3.70 
s: 1.32 s: 1.35 s: 1.48 s: 1.54 
E· h Ids L Tt k 19, t-year-o as 
(f flY lWO lSOO 
m: 4.75 m: 4.12 m: 3.54 m: 3.54 
s: 1.45 s: 1.29 s: 1.66 s: 1.66 
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APPENDIX 1 (continued) 
Young adl M . ~ k u ts: annequms as 
<Y flY 120° 180° 
m: 5.75 m: 5.62 m: 5.41 m: 4.41 
s: 0.67 s: 0.64 s: 1.05 s: 0.65 
d 1 C oung a u ts: ones ~ k as 
<Y flY lWO lSOO 
m: 5.5 m: 5.75 m: 5.66 m: 5.66 
s: 0.83 s: 0.60 s: 0.63 s: 0.86 
~ adl L~k oung u ts: as 
<Y flY lWO lSOO 
m: 5.62 m: 5.70 m: 5.62 m: 5.25 
s: 0.64 s: 0.62 s: 0.92 s: 0.98 
Elderly people: annequms as M . ~ k 
<Y flY lWO lSOO 
m: 5.25 m: 5.00 m: 4.83 m: 3.58 
s: 1.03 s: 1.14 s: 1.09 s: 1.21 
I I C Elderty peopje: ones ~ k as 
<Y flY 120° lSOO 
m: 5.54 m: 5.50 m: 5.04 m:4.66 
s: 1.10 s: 1.10 s: 0.99 s: 1.01 
Elderl"v peopi e: as I L~ k 
<Y flY lWO lSOO 
m: 5.13 m: 5.25 m: 4.83 m:4.66 




Mental rotation tasks 
Means and standard deviations as a function of task, stimulus orientation and age. 
F ive-year-o Ids M • T'i k annequms as 
(J' flY tZOO lSOO 
m: 0.16 m: 1.33 m: 2.83 m: 3.58 
s: 0.57 s: 1.55 s: 1.69 s: 2.27 
lve-year-o Ids C ones T'i k as 
(J' flY 1 ZOO lSOO 
m: 1.16 m: 2.91 m: 3.08 m: 0.58 
s: 1.11 s: 1.92 s: 2.1 s: LSI 
F' Ids L T'i k lve-year-o as 
(J' flY I ZOO lSOO 
m: 0.58 m: 1.66 m: 2.25 m: 3.66 
s: 1.51 s: 1.96 s: 2.3 s: 2.01 
Eight-year-o annequms as Ids M . T'i k 
(J' flY 1 ZOO lSOO 
m: 0.33 m:0.5 m:0.66 m: 1.58 
s: 0.88 s: 1.00 s: 1.61 s: 1.56 
E' ht 19l -year-o Ids C ones Task 
(J' flY 1 ZOO lSOO 
m: 0.25 m: 0.41 m: 0.58 m: 1.33 
s: 0.86 s: 1.16 s: 0.79 s: 1.49 
E'h IdsLT'i k tgl t-year-o as 
(J' flY 120° lSOO 
m: 0.08 m:0.25 m:0.5 m: 0.91 
s: 0.28 s: 0.45 s: 0.67 s: 1.24 
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APPENDIX 2 (continued) 
diM . ~ k Young a u ts: annequms as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m:0.25 m:O m: 0.16 m: 0.41 
s: 0.45 s: 0 s: 0.38 s: 0.9 
d It C oung a u s: ones ~ k as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m:0.08 m:0.08 m:O m:O 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0 s: 0 
~ ad It L ~ k oung u s: as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m: 0.16 m: 0.33 m: 0.16 m:0.33 
s: 0.38 s: 0.77 s: 0.38 s: 0.88 
1M· ~ k Elde~ly: annequms as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m: 1.00 m: 0.41 m: 1.16 m: 1.66 
s: 1.2 s: 0.99 s: 1.11 s: 1.43 
Elde I C ~ k rty: ones as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m: 1.25 m: 1.83 m: 1.58 m: 2.41 
s: 1.28 s: 1.69 s: 1.62 s: 2.46 
Eld I L ~ k erty: as 
(J' flY 12CY' lSOO 
m: 1.08 m: 1.25 m: 1.58 m: 2.5 




Mental rotation tasks 
Means and standard deviations as a function of experimental condition, and age. 
Five-year-olds: Without advanced information 
(f f:IY 120" lSOO 24()0 3000 
m: 3300 m: 4597 m:4368 m: 4857 m:4204 m: 3704 
s:979 s: 1241 s: 1966 s: 1424 s: 1405 s: 1187 
me: 3.5 me: 3.58 me: 3.33 me: 3.25 me: 3.00 me: 3.33 
s: 0.77 s: 0.49 s: 0.75 s: 0.82 s: 0.89 s: 0.6 
Five-year-olds: Advanced information, retention interval: 1000 msec. 
(f f:IY 120° 180° 24()0 3000 
m: 2773 m: 3537 m: 3306 m: 4479 m: 3673 m: 3318 
s:877 s: 1119 s: 1180 s: 1500 s: 1010 s: 1297 
me: 3.6 me: 3.41 me: 3.16 me: 2.91 me: 3.08 me: 3.58 
s: 0.41 s: 0.58 s: 0.75 s: 1.39 s: 1.11 s: 0.8 
Five-year-olds: Advanced information, retention interval: 500 msec. 
(f f:IY 120° 180° 24()0 3000 
m: 2565 m: 2855 m: 2711 m: 2842 m: 2405 m: 2541 
s:738 s: 990 s: 1111 s:845 s:636 s:786 
me: 3.83 me: 3.41 me: 3.66 me: 3.33 me: 3.33 me: 3.75 
s: 0.41 s: 1.02 s: 0.4 s: 0.87 s: 0.93 s: 0.42 
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APPENDIX 3 (continued) 
Eight-year-olds: Without advanced itiformation 
(f (J:f lWO lSOO 24()0 3000 
m: 1853 m: 2428 m: 2555 m: 2985 m: 2494 m: 2227 
s:583 s: 1225 s: 1357 s: 1041 s: 1338 s: 1117 
me: 4.00 me: 3.5 me: 3.75 me: 3.66 me: 3.33 me: 3.58 
s: 0.00 s: 0.84 s: 0.42 s: 0.61 s: 0.98 s: 0.38 
Eight-year-olds: Advanced in/ormation, retention interval: 1000 msec. 
(f (J:f lWO lSOO 24()0 3000 
m: 1466 m: 1707 m: 1653 m: 1404 m: 1455 m: 1456 
s:228 s: 429 s:337 s: 198 s:282 s:350 
me: 3.91 me: 3.83 me: 4.00 me: 3.83 me: 3.91 me: 4.00 
s: 0.2 s: 0.26 s: 0.00 s: 0.26 s: 0.2 s: 0.00 
Eight-year-olds: Advanced information, retention interval: 500 msec. 
(f (J:f lWO lSOO 24()0 3000 
m: 1529 m: 1561 m: 1472 m: 1656 m: 1446 m: 1394 
s:556 s: 411 s:292 s:477 s: 389 s:366 
me: 3.66 me: 3.91 me: 3.75 me: 3.66 me: 3.83 me: 3.91 
s: 0.26 s: 0.2 s: 0.42 s: 0.82 s: 0.26 s: 0.2 
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APPENDIX 3 (continued) 
Young adults: Without advanced information 
(f' (f:f 12QO 1SOO 24()0 3000 
m:847 m: 1087 m: 1150 m: 1464 m: 1203 m: 1022 
s:224 s: 378 s:387 s:430 s:368 s:369 
me: 3.91 me: 3.83 me: 3.91 me: 3.75 me: 3.83 me: 3.75 
s: 0.2 s: 0.26 s: 0.2 s: 0.42 s: 0.26 s: 0.27 
Young adults: Advanced information, retention interval: 1000 msec. 
(f' (f:f l2QO 180° 24()0 3000 
m:660 m: 851 m:798 m:758 m: 796 m: 760 
s: 185 s:250 s: 215 s: 221 s:225 s:254 
me: 3.66 me: 3.58 me: 3.66 me: 3.5 me: 4.00 me: 3.83 
s: 0.41 s: 0.58 s: 0.25 s: 0.63 s: 0.00 s: 0.26 
Young adults: Advanced information, retention interval: 500 msec. 
(f' (f:f l2QO lSOO 24()0 3000 
m:597 m:626 m:577 m:614 m: 583 m: 563 
s:98 s: 153 s: 130 s:201 s: 113 s: 104 
me: 3.91 me: 3.58 me: 3.66 me: 3.41 me: 4.00 me: 3.83 
s: 0.20 s: 0.58 s: 0.61 s: 0.66 s: 0.00 s: 0.41 
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APPENDIX 3 (continued) 
Elderly people: Without advanced information 
(f (f:f lWO lSOO 2400 3000 
m: 1717 m: 2710 m: 2981 m: 4276 m: 2907 m: 2209 
s:774 s: 1680 s:2306 s:3864 s:2205 s: 1160 
me: 3.75 me: 3.58 me: 3.66 me: 3.91 me: 3.75 me: 3.83 
s: 0.42 s: 0.37 s: 0.61 s: 1.39 s: 0.61 s: 0.41 
Elderly people: Advanced iriformation, retention interval: 1000 msec. 
(f (f:f IWO 1800 2400 3000 
m: 2419 m: 3180 m: 3414 m: 3347 m: 2856 m: 3680 
s: 1701 s: 2541 s:3658 s:3041 s:2776 s:5362 
me: 3.91 me: 3.75 me: 3.41 me: 3.00 me: 3.41 me: 3.58 
s: 0.2 s: 0.42 s: 0.74 s: 1.04 s: 0.73 s: 0.66 
Elderly people: Advanced information, retention interval: 500 msec. 
(f (f:f 1200 lSOO 2400 3000 
m: 2312 m: 3304 m: 2766 m: 2840 m: 2523 m: 2770 
s: 1696 s:2333 s: 2611 s:2572 s:2363 s:2885 
me: 3.58 me: 3.83 me: 3.83 me: 3.66 me: 3.66 me: 3.5 




Mental rotation tasks 
Means and standard deviations as a function of experimental condition, and age. 
F' IdsRt (' 't 11000 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva , msec. 
(f flY lWO 180° 
m: 2175 m: 2838 m: 3205 m: 3214 
s: 423 s: 801 s: 1225 s: 1392 
me: 1.00 me: 1.91 me: 2.25 me: 2.83 
s: 1.04 s: 1.24 s: 1.54 s: 2.48 
F' Ids R t t . t I 500 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva , msec. 
(f flY 120° 1SOO 
m: 2307 m: 2632 m: 2800 m: 3534 
s: 591 s: 392 s: 612 s: 1343 
me: 0.91 me: 2.41 me: 2.41 me: 3.00 
s: 1.56 s: 1.16 s: 1.16 s: 1.8 
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APPENDIX 4 (continued) 
E' h Ids R t ttl 1000 IX, t-year-o : e en IOn In erva, msec. 
(f (fJ' lWO lSOO 
m: 1827 m: 1765 m: 1838 m: 1859 
s: 411 s: 211 s:256 s:312 
me: 0.75 me: 0.83 me: 1.33 me: 1.5 
s: 0.62 s: 0.93 s: 1.55 s: 1.78 
E" h Ids R t t' . t I 500 19j t-year-o e en IOn In erva , msec. 
(f (fJ' lWO lSOO 
m: 1636 m: 1748 m: 1725 m: 1673 
s:230 s:244 s: 237 s:286 
me: 0.16 me: 0.66 me: 0.83 me: 0.5 
s: 0.38 s: 0.77 s: 1.26 s: 0.52 
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APPENDIX 4 (continued) 
YI d I R t' . t I 1000 oung a u ts: eten IOn m erva • msec. 
(f (l'f 12(f 1SOO 
m:933 m: 1102 m: 1043 m: 1034 
s: 174 s:312 s: 182 s:290 
me: 0.33 me: 0.42 me: 0.75 me: 0.5 
s: 0.65 s: 0.51 s: 0.86 s: 0.79 
dl R oung a u ts: I 500 etentlOn mterva • msec. 
(f (l'f 12(f 1SOO 
m:935 m: 1076 m: 1054 m:993 
s:256 s:269 s:206 s: 197 
me: 0.33 me: 0.08 me: 0.25 me: 0.41 
s: 0.65 s: 0.28 s: 0.45 s: 0.51 
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APPENDIX 4 (continued) 
Eld I I R erty peopi e: 1 1000 etentwn mterva, msec. 
(f ({'f 12QO 1SOO 
m: 2091 m: 2296 m: 2610 m: 2894 
s:302 s:506 s:553 s: 848 
me: 0.75 me: 0.91 me: 1.25 me: 2.41 
s: 0.86 s: 0.79 s: 0.86 s: 0.99 
ld I 1 R E e~ty people: I 500 etentwn mterva , msec. 
(f ({'f 12QO 1800 
m: 2287 m: 2463 m: 2709 m: 2783 
s: 460 s:368 s: 519 s: 433 
me: 0.25 me: 1.42 me: 1.83 me: 2.66 




Mental rotation tasks 
Reaction times: Means and standard deviations as a function of experimental condition, and 
age (1 > 1m: L normal followed by L mirror-reversed; 1 > 1: L normal followed by L normal; 
c > c: C followed by C; and c > 1: C followed by L normal). 
F" Ids R t 1" t I 500 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva, msec 
(f (JJ' tWO lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 2305 m(l > 1m): 2672 m(l > 1m): 2576 m(l > 1m): 2618 
s: 791 s:792 s: 1057 s:969 
m(l > 1): 2451 m(l > I): 2605 mO > I): 2594 m(l > I): 2634 
s:991 s:835 s: 915 s:929 
m(c > c): 2405 m(c > c): 2516 m(c > c): 2519 m(c > c): 2526 
s:862 s:696 s:900 s:819 
m(c > 1): 2314 m(c > 1): 2408 m(c > I): 2388 m(c > 1): 2383 
s:683 s:698 s:715 s:692 
F" IdsRt t ·t 11000 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva , msec 
(f (JJ' lWO lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 2556 m(l > 1m): 3207 m(l > 1m): 3424 m(l > 1m): 4470 
s: 853 s: 924 s: 1253 s: 1455 
m(l > 1): 2533 m(l > 1): 2857 m(l > 1): 3094 m(l > 1): 3836 
s: 825 s:809 s:864 s:954 
m(c > c): 2505 m(c > c): 2723 m(c > c): 2884 m(c > c): 3092 
s: 818 s: 844 s:831 s:991 
m(c > 1): 2308 m(c > 1): 2409 m(c > 1): 2384 m(c > 1): 2416 
s: 797 s: 761 s: 853 s:764 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
E" h Ids R t "t I 500 19, t-year-o eten IOn In erva , msec 
0' (JY lWO lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 1365 m(1 > 1m): 1503 m(l > 1m): 1525 m(l > 1m): 1680 
s:469 s:419 s:357 s: 431 
m(l > I): 1362 m(l > I): 1482 m(l > I): 1476 m(l > I): 1588 
s:376 s: 407 s:339 s: 430 
m(c > c): 1372 m(c > c): 1445 m(c > c): 1449 m(c>c): 1515 
s: 441 s: 444 s: 391 s: 421 
m(c > I): 1247 m(c > I): 1279 m(c > I): 1263 m(c>l): 1310 
s: 381 s:369 s:396 s: 410 
E" h Ids R l' "nt I 1000 ig, t-year-o eten IOn I erva, msec 
0' (JY lWO lSOO 
m(l> 1m): 1427 m(l > 1m): 1653 m(1 > 1m): 1633 m(l > 1m): 1559 
s:268 s:340 s:269 s: 198 
m(l > I): 1451 m(l > I): 1557 m(l > I): 1644 m(l > I): 1570 
s:288 s:259 s:337 s:229 
m(c > c): 1425 m(c > c): 1393 m(c > c): 1480 m(c > c): 1549 
s:305 s:279 s:363 s:253 
m(c > I): 1382 m(c > I): 1386 m(c > I): 1442 m(c > 1): 1423 
s: 197 s: 282 s:227 s:245 
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APPENDIX 5 (eontinued) 
oung ad I R u ts: 'nt 1 500 etentlOn I erva, msec 
(f (JJ' 12()O lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 585 mO > 1m): 592 mO > 1m): 595 m(1 > 1m): 623 
s: 110 s: 128 s: 130 s: 150 
m(l > 1): 568 m(l > 1): 575 m(l > I): 581 mel > 1): 586 
s: 109 s: 111 s: 116 s: 114 
m(e >e): 571 m(e >e): 574 m(e >e): 584 m(e >e): 584 
s: 111 s: 112 s: 117 s: 112 
m(e> 1): 581 m(e >1): 585 m(e > I): 582 m(e > 1): 589 
s: 110 s: 105 s: 113 s: 109 
y: ad 1 R t t' 't 1 1000 e ounK u ts e en Ion In erva , ms c 
(f (JJ' 12()O lSOO 
m(1 > 1m): 655 m(l > 1m): 775 m(1 > 1m): 768 mO > 1m): 770 
s:225 s:233 s:230 s: 199 
m(l > I): 652 mO > 1): 665 mO > 1): 676 m(l > I): 679 
s:220 s: 217 s:230 s:231 
m(e >e): 651 m(e > e): 649 m(e > e): 666 m(e > e): 665 
s: 198 s: 186 s: 210 s: 193 
m(e > 1): 663 m(e > 1): 679 m(e > 1): 686 m(e> I): 685 
s:212 s:229 s:234 s: 232 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
Ide 1 I R E rly peOpie: . t 1 500 etentlOn In erva , msec 
(f (JY lWO lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 2124 m(l> 1m): 2724 m(l > 1m): 2695 m(l > 1m): 2922 
s: 1490 s: 1907 s:2317 s:2466 
m(l > I): 2326 m(l > I): 2455 m(l > I): 2629 m(l > I): 2778 
s: 1776 s: 1783 s:2248 s: 22] 2 
m(c > c): 2222 m(c > c): 2457 m(c> c): 2619 m(c>c): 2612 
s: 1598 s: 1918 s:2147 s: 210] 
m(c > I): 2013 m( c > I): 2082 m(c > I): 2314 m(c > I): 2313 
s: 1459 s: 1484 s: 2110 s:2005 
Id I 1 R E erly peoPJ e: 't 11000 etentlOn In erva , msec 
(f (JY lWO lSOO 
m(l > ]m): 2032 m(l > 1m): 2445 m(] > 1m): 3296 m(l > 1m): 3662 
s: 1217 s: 1307 s:2338 s:2383 
mO > I): 2040 mO > 1): 2303 mO > 1): 2805 mO > I): 3089 
s: 1195 s: 1268 s: 1441 s: 1686 
m(c > c): 2045 m(c > c): 2163 m(c > c): 2435 m(c > c): 2536 
s: 1229 s: 1251 s: 1351 s: 1329 
m(c > 1): 1871 m(c > 1): 1943 m(c > 1): 1926 m(c > 1): 1962 
s: 1179 s: 1179 s: 1213 s: 1181 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
Experiment 3c: 
Mental rotation tasks 
Errors: Means and standard deviations as a function of experimental condition, and age (l > 
1m: L normal followed by L mirror-reversed; I > I: L normal followed by L normal; c > c: C 
followed by C; and c > I: C followed by L normal). 
F' Ids R t" . t I 500 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva, msec 
cr (JY 12()O lSOO 
mO > 1m): 0.25 m(l > 1m): 0.16 m(l > 1m): 0.33 m(l > 1m): 0.4] 
s: 0.45 s: 0.38 s: 0.65 s: 0.66 
m(l > I): 0.33 m(l > I): 0.25 m(l>I):0.]6 m(l > I): 0.5 
s: 0.65 s: 0.62 s: 0.38 s: 0.67 
m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.33 m(c > c): 0.5 
s: 0.45 s: 0.45 s: 0.65 s: 0.79 
m(c > I): 0.16 m(c > I): 0.25 m(c > I): 0.16 m(c > I): 0.33 
s: 0.38 s: 0.45 s: 0.38 s: 0.65 
F' Ids R t t . t 1 1000 lve-year-o e en IOn In erva , msec 
cr (JY 12()O lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 0.41 m(l > 1m): 0.5 m(l > 1m): 0.75 m(l > 1m): 1.16 
s: 0.51 s: 0.67 s: 0.75 s: 0.38 
m(l > I): 0.33 mO > I): 0.41 mO > 1): 0.66 m(l > I): 1.08 
s: 0.49 s: 0.51 s: 0.65 s: 0.28 
m(c > c): 0.41 m(c > c): 0.66 m(c > c): 0.66 m(c > c): 0.91 
s: 0.66 s: 0.65 s: 0.49 s: 0.66 
m(c > 1): 0.25 m(c > 1): 0.41 m(c > I): 0.33 m(c > I): 0.4] 
s: 0.45 s: 0.51 s: 0.49 s: 0.51 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
h Ids R I 500 Eigl t-year-o . etentlOn mterva , msec 
(f flY l:ZOO lSOO 
mO > 1m): 0.08 mO > 1m): 0.08 mO > 1m): 0.08 m(1 > 1m): 0.25 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.62 
mO > I): 0.08 m(l > 1): 0.08 m(l > I): 0.08 m(1 > I): 0 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0 
m(c > c): 0.16 m(c > c): 0 m(c > c): 0.08 m(c > c): 0.25 
s: 0.38 s: 0 s: 0.28 s: 0.62 
m(c > 1): 0 m(c > 1): 0.16 m(c> 1): 0 m(c > 1): 0.08 
s: 0 s: 0.38 s: 0 s: 0.28 
E' h Ids R t t' . terval 1000 19l t-year-o e en IOn m , msec 
(f flY l:ZOO lSOO 
mO > 1m): 0.25 mO > 1m): 0.16 m(l > 1m): 0.25 m(1 > 1m): 0.33 
s: 0.45 s: 0.38 s: 0.45 s: 0.65 
m(1 > I): 0.16 mO > I): 0.08 mO > I): 0.16 m(1 > 1): 0.25 
s: 0.38 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.62 
m(c > c): 0.16 m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.16 m(c > c): 0.16 
s: 0.57 s: 0.45 s: 0.57 s: 0.38 
m(c > 1): 0.08 m(c> I): 0.08 m(c > 1): 0.25 m(c > 1): 0.08 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.62 s: 0.28 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
YI ad It R t ti t 1 500 oung u s: e en on In erva , msec 
(f (fJ' 12Cf lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 0.25 m(l > 1m): 0.08 m(l > 1m): 0.16 m(1 > 1m): 0.25 
s: 0.45 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.45 
m(1 > 1): 0.08 m(1 > 1): 0.08 m(1 > 1): 0.16 m(1 > 1): 0.16 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.38 
m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.08 m(c > c): 0.16 m(c> c): 0.25 
s: 0.62 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.62 
m(c > 1): 0.08 m(c > 1): 0.08 m(c > 1): 0.16 m(c > 1): 0.25 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.62 
YI d It R t ttl 1000 oung a u s e en Ion In erva, msec 
(f (fJ' 12Cf lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 0.08 m(1 > 1m): 0.16 m(1 > 1m): 0.16 m(1 > 1m): 0.5 
s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.38 s: 0.67 
m(1 > I): 0.08 m(l > 1): 0 m(1 > 1): 0.16 m(l > 1): 0.33 
s: 0.28 s: 0 s: 0.38 s: 0.65 
m(c > c): 0 m(c > c): 0.08 m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.16 
s: 0 s: 0.28 s: 0.45 s: 0.38 
m(c > I): 0 m( c > 1): 0.08 m(c > 1): 0.08 m(c > I): 0.16 
s: 0 s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 
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APPENDIX 5 (continued) 
ldl I R E erly peOp4 e: I 500 etentlOn mterva , msec 
(f fff 1 ZOO lSOO 
m(l > 1m): 0.16 mO > 1m): 0.16 mO > 1m): 0.08 mO > 1m): 0.33 
s: 0.38 s: 0.38 s: 0.28 s: 0.49 
m(1 > 1): 0.16 m(1 > I): 0.16 m(1 > I): 0.08 m(l > 1): 0.33 
s: 0.38 s: 0.38 s: 0.28 s: 0.49 
m(c > c): 0.25 m(c > c): 0.16 m(c > c): 0.08 m(c > c): 0.33 
s: 0.45 s: 0.38 s: 0.28 s: 0.49 
m(c> I): 0.08 m(c > I): 0.08 m(c > I): 0.33 m(c > I): 0.16 
s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.65 s: 0.38 
d I I R . t I 1000 El erly peopi e: etentlOn m erva , msec 
(f fff I ZOO lSOO 
mO > 1m): 0.58 m(1 > 1m): 0.41 m(1 > 1m): 0.91 mO > 1m): 1.08 
s: 0.51 s: 0.51 s: 0.66 s: 0.66 
mO > I): 0.41 mO > 1): 0.41 m(l > 1): 0.75 m(1 > I): 0.91 
s: 0.51 s: 0.51 s: 0.62 s: 0.28 
m(c > c): 0.33 m(c > c): 0.33 m(c > c): 0.66 m(c > c): 0.58 
s: 0.49 s: 0.49 s: 0.49 s: 0.51 
m(c> I): 0.16 m(c > 1): 0.25 m(c > 1): 0.25 m(c > I): 0.5 




Means and standard deviations 
Five-year-olds: Perceptual Control - ANlMASK version -
de Ii P On r maKer~ > erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.5 m: 3.83 m: 3.5 m: 2.91 m: 3.0 m: 3.2 
s: 1.16 s: 0.38 s: 0.79 s: 1.44 s: 1.21 s: 1.19 
Five-year-olds: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
deli P On r magery > erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 2.25 m: 2.08 m: 1.75 m: 2.0 m: 2.16 m: 1.91 
s: 1.48 s: 1.37 s: 1.42 s: 1.53 s: 1.26 s: 1.56 
Five-year-olds: Perceptual Control- ANlMASK version -
Ii Order Perception> magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.75 m: 3.58 m: 3.41 m: 3.25 m: 3.75 m: 3.5 
s: 0.86 s: 1.16 s: 1.16 s: 0.75 s: 0.45 s: 0.67 
Five-year-olds: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
de P Ii On r erceptlOn > maKery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.0 m: 2.58 m: 2.5 m: 1.75 m: 1.75 m: 2.0 
s: 1.12 s: 1.24 s: 1.24 s: 1.05 s: 0.96 s: 1.04 
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APPENDIX 6 (continued) 
Five-year-olds: Perceptual Control - SCAN version -
o de Ii P Ii r maRer\) > erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.16 m: 2.75 m: 2.75 m: 3.16 m: 2.83 m: 2.83 
s: 1.34 s: 1.54 s: 1.6 s: 1.4 s: 1.52 s: 1.58 
Five-year-olds: Imagery task - SCAN version -
de Ii P Oli r mager. II> erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 2.91 m: 2.75 m: 2.33 m: 2.25 m: 2.16 m: 2.58 
s: 1.5 s: 1.48 s: 1.61 s: 1.06 s: 1.4 s: 1.51 
Five-year-olds: Perceptual Control- SCAN version-
Ii Order Perceptlon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.58 m: 3.16 m: 3.25 m: 2.58 m: 2.91 m: 3.16 
s: 0.66 s: 0.83 s: 0.96 s: 1.08 s: 0.9 s: 0.83 
Five-year-olds: Imagery task - SCAN version -
Ii Order Perceptlon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.16 m: 3.08 m: 2.58 m: 2.33 m: 2.25 m: 2.33 
s: 0.83 s: 1.24 s: 1.24 s: 1.15 s: 1.13 s: 0.98 
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APPENDIX 6 (continued) 
Eight-year-olds: Perceptual Control- ANIMASK version -
Order Imaiery > P erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m: 3.5 m: 3.41 m: 3.5 m: 3.75 m: 3.83 
s: 1.15 s: 1.16 s: 1.37 s: 0.67 s: 0.45 s: 0.38 
Eight-year-olds: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
rde l P erceptlOn r mafler~ > 0 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.58 m: 3.16 m: 2.75 m: 2.0 m: 2.25 m: 2.25 
s: 0.66 s: 0.71 s: 1.28 s: 0.73 s: 1.13 s: 1.48 
Eight-year-old,s: Perceptual Control- AN/MASK version -
Ii Order Perceptzon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m:3.66 m: 3.58 m: 3.75 m: 3.83 m: 3.75 
s: 0.49 s: 0.49 s: 0.51 s: 0.45 s: 0.38 s: 0.45 
Eight-year-olds: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
de P Ii 0" r erceptzon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.33 m:3.0 m: 3.25 m: 2.5 m:3.0 m: 2.0 
s: 1.07 s: 0.73 s: 0.86 s: 0.9 s: 0.95 s: 0.85 
255 
APPENDIX 6 (continued) 
Eight-year-olds: Perceptual Control - SCAN version -
de l P On r mager > erceptzon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m:4.0 m:4.0 m: 3.33 m: 3.75 m: 3.91 m: 3.75 
s: 0.0 s: 0.0 s: 0.65 s: 0.45 s: 0.28 s: 0.45 
Eight-year-olds: Imagery task - SCAN version -
Order Imagery> P erceptzon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m:4.0 m: 3.66 m: 3.91 m: 3.16 m: 3.75 m: 3.41 
s: 0.0 s: 0.65 s: 0.28 s: 0.83 s: 0.45 s: 0.51 
Eight-year-olds: Perceptual Control - SCAN version -
de P l On r erceptzon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.81 m: 3.63 m: 3.72 m: 3.54 m: 3.63 m: 3.81 
s: 0.4 s: 0.92 s: 0.46 s: 0.93 s: 0.5 s: 0.4 
Eight-year-olds: Imagery task - SCAN version -
l Order Perception> magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.54 m: 3.45 m: 3.36 m: 3.27 m: 3.0 m: 2.63 
s: 0.93 s: 0.68 s: 0.67 s: 1.19 s: 1.26 s: 1.28 
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Young adults: Perceptual Control- ANIMASK version-
de l P 0" r ma~er v> erceptlon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m:4.00 m: 3.66 m: 3.58 m: 3.91 m: 3.91 m: 3.66 
s: 0.0 s: 0.49 s: 0.51 s: 0.28 s: 0.28 s: 0.65 
Young adults: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
Order Imagery> P erceptlon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.75 m: 3.08 m: 2.83 m: 2.75 m: 3.0 m: 2.83 
s: 0.45 s: 0.66 s: 1.02 s: 0.96 s: 1.12 s: 0.83 
Young adults: Perceptual Control - ANIMASK version -
de P l 0" r erceptlon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m:4.0 m: 3.41 m: 3.75 m: 3.58 m: 3.83 
s: 0.65 s: 0.0 s: 0.66 s: 0.45 s: 0.51 s: 0.38 
Young adults: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
de P l 0" r erceptlon > maRery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.58 m: 3.5 m: 3.08 m: 3.08 m: 3.8 m: 2.75 
s: 0.66 s: 0.52 s: 0.99 s: 0.79 s: 0.99 s: 0.96 
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Young adults: Perceptual Control- SCAN version -
de Ii P 0,., r magery > erceptzon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.75 m: 3.75 m: 3.5 m: 3.83 m: 3.75 m: 3.83 
s: 0.45 s: 0.45 s: 0.67 s: 0.38 s: 0.45 s: 0.38 
Young adults Imagery task - SCAN version -
Order Image,"- > P erceptzon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m: 3.66 m: 3.58 m: 3.58 m: 3.75 m: 3.91 
s: 0.65 s: 0.49 s: 0.66 s: 0.66 s: 0.45 s: 0.28 
Young adults: Perceptual Control- SCAN version-
Ii Order Perceptlon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.91 m: 3.75 m: 3.41 m: 3.83 m:4.0 m: 3.91 
s: 0.28 s: 0.62 s: 0.66 s: 0.38 s: 0.0 s: 0.28 
Young adults: Imagery task - SCAN version -
OdeP Ii ,., r erceptlon > ma1!ery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.75 m: 3.75 m: 3.58 m: 3.83 m: 3.75 m: 3.58 
s: 0.45 s: 0.45 s: 0.51 s: 0.38 s: 0.45 s: 0.66 
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Elderly: Perceptual Control - ANIMASK version -
de Ii ~ Oli r magery> ercepFon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.41 m: 3.75 m: 3.16 m: 3.5 m: 2.91 m: 3.58 
s: 1.16 s: 0.62 s: 0.83 s: 0.79 s: 1.16 s: 0.79 
Elderly: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
o de Ii P Ii r magery > ercej!JlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.58 m: 3.5 m: 2.75 m: 2.25 m: 2.66 m: 2.5 
s: 0.66 s: 0.52 s: 0.96 s: 0.96 s: 1.07 s: 0.79 
Elderly: Perceptual Control - ANIMASK version -
de P Ii Oli r erceptlOn > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m:4.0 m: 3.33 m: 2.91 m: 3.33 m: 3.33 m: 3.66 
s: 0.0 s: 0.65 s: 0.9 s: 1.15 s: 0.88 s: 0.65 
Elderly: Imagery task - ANIMASK version -
OdeP Ii Ii r erceptzon > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.25 m: 2.66 m: 2.75 m: 2.75 m: 2.66 m: 1.91 
s: 0.75 s: 0.88 s: 0.96 s: 1.21 s: 0.88 s: 0.79 
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Elderly Perceptual Control - SCAN version -
Ode L P 11 r mager. v> erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m: 3.5 m: 2.75 m: 3.91 m: 3.83 m: 3.58 
s: 1.15 s: 1.16 s: 1.42 s: 0.28 s: 0.38 s: 0.79 
Elderly: Imagery task - SCAN version -
Ode l P Ti r ma~er. > erceptlOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.58 m: 3.66 m: 2.75 m: 3.0 m: 2.75 m: 3.08 
s: 0.51 s: 0.65 s: 1.13 s: 0.85 s: 1.42 s: 1.16 
Elderly: Perceptual Control - SCAN version -
Ode P l Ti r erceptlOn > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.83 m: 3.83 m: 3.25 m: 2.75 m: 3.08 m: 2.75 
s: 0.38 s: 0.88 s: 1.05 s: 1.13 s: 0.79 s: 1.05 
Elderly: Imagery task - SCAN version -
Ode P l 11 r erceptlOn > magery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.33 m: 2.91 m: 2.66 m: 3.25 m: 3.0 m: 3.25 
s: 0.98 s: 1.31 s: 1.15 s: 0.96 s: 0.95 s: 0.75 
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APPENDIX 7 
Five-year-o Ids P erceptua ontro -Ie I AN/MASK versIOn. 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.62 m: 3.71 m: 3.45 m: 3.08 m: 3.37 m: 3.33 
s: 1.01 s: 0.85 s: 0.97 s: 1.13 s: 0.96 s: 0.96 
Ive-year-o Ids l : magery tas k AN/MASK - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 2.62 m: 2.33 m: 2.12 m: 1.87 m: 1.95 m: 1.95 
s: 1.34 s: 1.31 s: 1.36 s: 1.29 s: 1.12 s: 1.3 
Five-year-o Ids P erceptua ontro -Ie I SCAN versIon 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.37 m: 2.95 m: 3.0 m: 2.87 m: 2.87 m:3.0 
s: 1.05 s: 1.23 s: 1.31 s: 1.26 s: 1.22 s: 1.25 
Ive-year-o Ids Ii : magery tas k SCAN - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.04 m: 2.91 m: 2.45 m: 2.29 m: 2.21 m: 2.45 
s: 1.19 s: 1.34 s: 1.41 s: 1.08 s: 1.25 s: 1.25 
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E"h iI(, t-year-o Ids P erceptua IC I ANIMASK ontro - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m: 3.58 m: 3.5 m: 3.62 m: 3.79 m: 3.79 
s: 0.86 s: 0.88 s: 1.02 s: 0.57 s: 0.41 s: 0.41 
h Eil(l t-year-o Id I s: magery tas k AN/MASK - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.45 m: 3.08 m:3.0 m: 2.25 m: 2.62 m: 2.12 
s: 0.88 s: 0.71 s: 1.1 s: 0.84 s: 1.09 s: 1.19 
h EigJ t-year-o Ids P erceptua IC 1 SCAN ontro - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.91 m: 3.82 m: 3.52 m: 3.65 m: 3.78 m: 3.78 
s: 0.28 s: 0.65 s: 0.59 s: 0.71 s: 0.42 s: 0.42 
Eight-year-olds: Imagery task - SCAN version -
L Order Perception> mal(ery 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.78 m: 3.56 m: 3.65 m: 3.21 m: 3.39 m: 3.04 
s: 0.67 s: 0.66 s: 0.57 s: 0.99 s: 0.98 s: 1.02 
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Young adl P u ts: erceptua IC I ANIMASK ontro - versIOn. 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.83 m: 3.83 m: 3.5 m: 3.83 m:3.75 m: 3.75 
s: 0.48 s: 0.38 s: 0.58 s: 0.38 s: 0.44 s: 0.53 
Young ad I l u ts: magery tas k ANIMASK - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.66 m: 3.29 m: 2.95 m: 2.91 m: 3.04 m: 2.79 
s: 0.56 s: 0.62 s: 0.99 s: 0.88 s: 1.04 s: 0.88 
Young adl P u ts: erceptua I SCAN IC ontro - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.83 m: 3.75 m: 3.45 m: 3.83 m: 3.87 m: 3.87 
s: 0.38 s: 0.53 s: 0.65 s: 0.38 s: 0.33 s: 0.33 
Young ad I l k SCAN u ts: magery tas - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.71 m: 3.71 m: 3.58 m: 3.71 m: 3.75 m: 3.75 
s: 0.55 s: 0.46 s: 0.58 s: 0.55 s: 0.44 s: 0.53 
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Eld I P tiC t I AN/MASK erly: erceprua on ro - version 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.71 m: 3.54 m: 3.04 m: 3.41 m: 3.12 m: 3.62 
s: 0.85 s: 0.65 s: 0.85 s: 0.97 s: 1.03 s: 0.71 
Eld I 1 t k AN/MASK erly: ma ery as - versIOn 
Short-Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.41 m: 3.08 m: 2.75 m: 2.5 m: 2.66 m: 2.21 
s: 0.71 s: 0.82 s: 0.94 s: 1.1 s: 0.96 s: 0.83 
Eld I P erceptua erly: Ie I SCAN ontro - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.75 m: 3.41 m: 3.00 m: 3.33 m: 3.45 m: 3.16 
s: 0.84 s: 1.01 s: 1.25 s: 1.01 s: 0.72 s: 1.01 
Eld I 1 k SCAN eny: ma~ ery tas - versIOn 
Short -Yes Medium- Long - Yes Short -No Medium- Long - No 
Yes No 
m: 3.45 m: 3.29 m:2.7 m: 3.12 m: 2.87 m: 3.16 
s: 0.77 s: 1.08 s: 1.12 s: 0.89 s: 1.19 s: 0.96 
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